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Ube  mmverstts  ot  uincaao 

POUNDED  BY  JOHN  D.  ROCKEFELLER 


A  STUDY  OF  CN.  DOMITIUS  CORBULO 

AS  FOUND  IN  THE  "ANNALS" 

OF  TACITUS 


A  DISSERTATION 

SUBMITTED    TO   THE    FACULTY  OF   THE    GRADUATE    SCHOOL   OF    ARTS 

AND    LITERATURE    IN    CANDIDACY    FOR    THE    DEGREE 

OF    DOCTOR    OF    PHILOSOPHY 

(department  of  latin) 


BY 

DRAPER  T.  SCHOONOVER 


Ube  *Glnf\>ersitE  ot  Gbtcaao 

FOUNDED  BY  JOHN  D.  ROCKEFELLER 


A  STUDY  OF  CN.  DOMITIUS  CORBULO 

AS  FOUND  IN  THE  "ANNALS" 

OF  TACITUS 


A  DISSERTATION 

SUBMITTED    TO    THE    FACULTY  OF    THE    GRADUATE    SCHOOL    OF    ARTS 

AND    LITERATURE    IN    CANDIDACY    FOR    THE    DEGREE 

OF    DOCTOR    OF    PHILOSOPHY 

(DEPARTMENT   OF   LATIN) 


BY 

DRAPER  T.  SCHOONOVER 


CHICAGO 

THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO  PRESS 

1909 


Copyright  1909  By 
The  University  of  Chicago 


Published  March  iqog 


Composed  and  Printed  By 

The  University  of  Chicago  Press 

Chicago,  Illinois,  U.  S.  A. 


PREFACE 

The  subject  of  this  dissertation  was  suggested  by  Professor  G.  L.  Hen- 
drickson  in  a  course  given  by  him  on  the  minor  works  of  Tacitus  at  The 
University  of  Chicago  in  the  summer  of  1906.  The  work  was  carried  on 
under  his  supervision  and  I  am  greatly  indebted  to  him  for  kind  and  helpful 
suggestions.  My  thanks  are  due  also  to  Professor  Frank  Frost  Abbott 
who  read  the  manuscript  and  made  valuable  criticisms. 

D.T.  S. 

Marietta,  Ohio 


SUMMARY  OF  CONTENTS 

Introduction  

Views  held  by  previous  scholars  regarding  the  account  of  Corbulo  in  the 
Annals  of  Tacitus— Statement  of  the  thesis— Tacitus  used  some  encomi- 
astic  biography    of   unknown   source. 

Difference  between  Biography  and  History    .... 

One  of  technique— Clearly  recognized  by  the  ancients— History  concerned 
with  facts  of  history  per  se— Biography  concerned  with  facts  to  illustrate  a 
man's  character. 

Tacitus'  Treatment  of  Leading  Characters  in  His  Histories— 
Ostorius  Scapula — Propraetor  to  Britain — Immediate  action  against  the 
natives— Revolt  of  the  Brigantes  and  the  Silures— Treatment  of  Caratacus 
— Death  of  Ostorius — No  sacrificing  of  historical  narration. 
Suetonius  Paulinus—ln  Britain— Invades  the  island  of  Mona— Descrip- 
tion of  the  natives— Revolt  of  Boudicca — Defeat  of  Romans  under  Cerialis 
— Suetonius'  march  to  Londinium — Defeats  the  Britons — Tacitus  again 
adheres  to  the  technique  of  history. 

Chronology  

No  attempt  to  work  out  in  detail— Campaign  against  the  Chauci,  47  a.d. 
— Corbulo  appointed  to  the  command  in  Armenia  in  54 — In  Artaxata  in  59 

— The  miraculum  in  xiii.  41  taken  to  refer  to  the  eclipse  of  April  30,  59 

Corbulo  reaches  Tigranocerta  in  the  fall  of  59 — Under  the  year  62  events 
narrated  which  occurred  during  the  years  60-62— Corbulo  in  Armenia 
in  63  brings  about  peace— No  regard  paid  to  narrating  events  in  annalistic 
order — The  writer  paid  no  attention  to  time. 

Topography      

Aegea— By  inference  winter  quarters  placed  in   northwest  Armenia — 

Trapezus — Volandum    somewhere    between    Trapezus    and    Artaxata 

Artaxata  on  the  Araxes  river— March  along  the  borders  of  the  Mardi— 
Reaches  Tigranocerta— Nisibis  37  (?)  miles  from  Tigranocerta— The 
writer  had  no  clear  idea  of  topography  as  shown  by  indefinite  topographi- 
cal statements — Corbulo  in  Syria — Paetus  north  of  Mt.  Taurus  on  the 
Arsanias  river— Withdraws  to  Cappadocia  after  his  defeat— Corbulo 
crosses  the  Euphrates  at  Melitene— Meets  the  Parthians  at  an  unnamed 
place  to  adjudicate  matters  finally— Detailed  geography  can  be  worked 
out  only  by  the  aid  of  Strabo,  Dio,  and  Plutarch— Little  definite  knowledge 
secured  from  Tacitus — Writer  not  concerned  with  topography  but  used 
the  places  as  a  means  to  lend  praise  to  Corbulo. 

Exposition 

Selections  from  the  Annals  dealing  with  Corbulo — First  campaigns  against 
the  Chauci— Corbulo  characterized  in  the  phrase  magna  cum  cura  et  mox 
gloria  which  points  to  the  praise  of  the  man— Restores  the  army  veterem 
v 


PAGE 

I 


14 


17 


VI  SUMMARY   OF   CONTENTS 

ad  morem — His  power  as  a  disciplinarian  illustrated  by  the  punishment 
of  two  soldiers — Criticism  of  Corbulo  by  the  minority  but  not  by  the  writer 
— Ordered  to  return  to  the  south  of  the  Rhine  by  Claudius,  he  still  main- 
tained military  discipline  in  the  army — Granted  the  insignia  of  a  triumph 
— Appointed  to  command  in  Armenia  because  of  his  virtutes— Meaning 
of  the  phrase  per  recentem  gloriam — Chronology  disregarded — Narrative 
highly  encomiastic  as  shown  by  direct  characterization  and  by  the  prefer- 
ence of  all  classes  for  Corbulo — Wins  distinction  by  his  own  merits  and 
without  the  aid  of  the  emperors. 

War  Against  the  Parthians — An  implied  <rvyKpi<7ts  between  Corbulo  and 
Lucullus — The  description  of  the  terribly  demoralized  condition  of  the 
army  affords  a  dark  background  against  which  to  set  the  good  qualities 
of  Corbulo — Severity  of  the  winter  57-58 — The  strictness  of  Corbulo  in 
discipline  again  emphasized — Disobedience  and  defeat  of  Paccius  Orfitus 
which  proved  the  wisdom  of  Corbulo  in  understanding  a  situation — First 
active  operations  against  the  Parthians  show  Corbulo's  adaptability  to 
circumstances — Foresight  further  shown  by  his  detecting  the  designs  of 
the  enemy — Capture  of  Volandum  treated  with  an  elaborate  rhetorical 
averts  to  add  praise  to  the  general — Volandum  not  identical  with'OXa^ 
of  Strabo — Foresight  of  Corbulo  shown  in  his  march  to  Artaxata — Con- 
trasted with  Tiridates — Surrender  and  destruction  of  Artaxata  and  the 
reasons  for  its  destruction — The  miraculum,  an  encomiastic  treatment  of  an 
eclipse — The  treatment  of  the  incident  by  three  different  persons  indicated 
— March  to  Tigranocerta — Indefiniteness  of  topography — An  elaborate 
characterization  of  Corbulo — Arrival  of  Tigranes  and  his  establishment 
on  the  throne — Withdrawal  of  Corbulo  to  Syria — The  description  of  the 
situation  of  the  Parthians  in  their  helplessness  against  the  skilful  plans  of 
Corbulo  affords  a  strong  irx#a  crvyKpiriKSv — Criticism  of  Corbulo  by 
the  minority  again  implied — Arrival  of  Paetus — Contrasted  with  Corbulo 
— Boastful,  cowardly,  inefficient  in  conducting  a  campaign  and  unable 
to  maintain  any  advantage  he  gained — Defeated  by  the  Parthians — Sur- 
rendered when  he  could  have  held  out — His  army  demoralized — The  whole 
an  amplified  description  of  the  inefficiency  of  Paetus  who  serves  as  a  foil 
to  set  off  the  efficiency  and  cleverness  of  Corbulo — Corbulo  again  in  com- 
mand in  Armenia — Compared  to  Lucullus  in  his  plans  to  overrun  Armenia 
— Description  of  his  operations  against  the  Parthians — His  cleverness  in 
dealing  with  men — Use  of  the  term  gloria — Entirely  successful  in  his  oper- 
ations against  the  Parthians  yet  free  from  all  boastfulness  which  contrasts 
strongly  with  the  actions  of  Paetus — No  data  to  determine  what  the  source 
of  Tacitus  was — Indication  of  sources  in  the  Annates — An  encomiastic 
treatment  given  the  account  which  is  unique  in  the  historical  works  of 
Tacitus. 

The  Account  of  Corbulo's  Campaigns  in  Cassius  Dio  .       .        53 

Dio's  account  of  Corbulo's  campaign  against  the  Chauci  is  essentially 
the  same  as  that  given  by  Tacitus  but  omits  the  elements  of  characteriza- 
tion— Brief  statement  given  of  Corbulo's  taking  charge  of  affairs  in  the 
East — No  mention  made  of  the  severe  winter  57-58 — No  mention  made 


SUMMARY   OF  CONTENTS 

of  Volandum  nor  of  the  miraculum — The  account  of  the  march  to  Tigrano- 
certa  the  same  as  in  Tacitus  but  with  all  personal  characterization  omitted 
— Paetus  at  Rhandeia  on  the  Arsanias  River — Paetus  defeated  and  the 
withdrawal  of  the  Romans  from  Armenia — Corbulo  again  placed  in  com- 
mand in  Armenia — Agreement  finally  made  at  Rhandeia — Facts  of  his- 
tory in  the  two  authors  essentially  the  same  but  treated  with  rhetorical 
elaboration  in  Tacitus. 


UNIVERSITY 


INTRODUCTION 

All  scholars  will  agree  that  the  account  of  Corbulo's  campaigns  given 
in  the  Annals  of  Tacitus  goes  back  to  the  Memoirs  of  Corbulo  as  its  ultimate 
source.  Those  who  have  discussed  the  subject  have  assumed  that  Tacitus 
had  at  hand  the  Memoirs  and  drew  upon  them  for  material  for  the  narrative 
as  we  have  it.  The  treatment  of  Corbulo  is  so  unique  and  so  at  variance 
with  what  one  expects  to  find  in  the  history  of  Tacitus  that  it  has  led  some 
scholars,  as  Held,  Fabia,;and  Imendorffer1  to  assume  that  he  made  use  of 
other  works  at  his  command  to  correct  and  supplement  the  Memoirs. 
But  the  general  view  has  been  that  the  Memoirs  were  the  basis  for  the 
account  which  Tacitus  gives.  It  is  from  this  general  view  that  I  dissent; 
I  wish  to  show  that  so  far  as  the  account  in  the  Annals  goes  Tacitus  did  not 

1  The  following  quotations  will  illustrate  the  views  of  scholars  relating  to  this 
subject: 

Egli  Feldziige  in  Armenien  Budinger,  p.  333:  "Die  Geschichte  der  armensch- 
parthischen  Feldziige  nach  Tacitus  wird  nach  ihrer  geschichtlichen  und  geograph- 
ischen  Seite  durchaus  von  dem  Gesichtspunkte  einer  verherrlichenden  Lebensbeschrei- 
bung  des  Corbulo  beherrscht  oder: 

"Der  Zweck.  des  Tacitus  war  die  Lebensbeschreibung  seines  Helden  Corbulo  auf 
der  Folie  des  weltgeschichtlichen  Theina's  der  Eroberung  Armeniens." 

Held  De  Gn.  Domitio  Corbulone,  p.  24:  "Triplex  sane  in  rerum  enarratione  argu- 
mentorum  et  testimoniorum  genus  agnosces:  unum,  ex  quo  diversorum  scriptorum 
opera  in  iudicium  vocata  ab  annalium  auctore  sentias,  alterum,  quo  epistolarum  a 
Corbulone  ad  Caesarem  missarum  et  procul  dubio  actis  imperialibus  adiectarum  usum 
non  recusatum  esse  comprobetur;  tertium,  ex  quo  emergat  ex  historia  rerum  a  Cor- 
bulone confecta  tamquam  ex  fonte  Cornelium  Taciturn  hausisse." 

A.  v.  Gutschmid  "Geschichte  Irans  und  seiner  Nachbarlander,"  in  Schanz 
Rom.  Lit.,  sec.  442:  "Die  beiden  Berichte,  die  wir  iiber  diese  (armenischen)  Ereig- 
nisse  haben,  der  des  Tacitus  und  der  des  Dio  gehen  auf  eine  und  dieselbe  Quelle  zuriick, 
die  Memoiren  des  Corbulo." 

Imendorffer  Beitrdge  zur  Quellenkitnde  der  seeks  letzten  B  ticker  der  Annalen  des 
Tacitus,  pp.  5,  6:  ".  .  .  .  darf  man  dagegen  mit  einiger  Zuversicht  vermuthen,  dass 
Tacitus  die  von  dem  romischen  Feldherrn  Domitius  Corbulo  gelieferte  Beschreibung 
des  von  ihm  selbst  geleiteten  Feldzuges  gegen  die  Parther  allerdings  ausgiebig  benutz 
hat.  .  .  .  Es  ist  also  recht  wohl  moglich,  dass  Tacitus  die  Angaben  Corbulos  durch 
die  einer  anderen  Quelle  hie  und  da  erganzt  und  corrigiert  hat,  worauf  aus  das  'reliqua 
non  in  obscuro  habentur'  hinzuweisen  scheint." 

Fabia  Les  sources  de  Tacite  dans  les  Histolres  et  les  Annates,  p.  336:  Si  Tacite 
n'a  pas  pris  pour  source  principale  les  Memoires  de  Corbulon,  e'est  d'abord  qu'il  le 
soupconnait  de  n'avoir  pas  toujours  dit  la  verite."  Cf.  Furneaux  Annals  of  Tac, 
Vol.  II,  p.  iog. 


2  A    STUDY   OF   CN.    DOMITIUS   CORBULO 

use  the  Memoirs,  but  employed  and  partially  incorporated  into  his  history 
an  encomiastic  biography  of  unknown  source.  Paucity  of  historical  fact 
and  an  excess  of  personal  characterization  have  been  observed  by  com- 
mentators and  such  treatment  of  a  subject  is  not  in  keeping  with  true  objec- 
tive historical  narration.  While  history  and  biography  overlap,  yet  the 
ancients  recognized  pretty  clearly  the  function  of  each. 


DIFFERENCE  BETWEEN  BIOGRAPHY  AND  HISTORY 

The  difference  between  biography  and  history  is  the  basis  of  an  impor- 
tant difference  between  the  literary  technique  of  biography  and  of  history 
which  is  not  always  observed  consistently,  but  is  to  be  looked  upon  as 
definitely  recognized.  So,  for  example,  in  the  early  books  of  the  Annals 
Tacitus  gives  a  careful  account  of  the  campaigns  of  Germanicus.  The 
temptation  to  treat  Germanicus  biographically  must  have  been  very  great, 
yet  he  confines  himself  strictly  to  the  technique  of  history,  which  required 
the  suppression  of  individual  figures  and  the  paying  of  due  consideration 
to  chronology  and  topography.  Whatever  Tacitus  affords  for  the'charac- 
terization  of  Germanicus  he  affords  indirectly1  by  allowing  his  merits  to 
come  out  from  the  facts  of  history  treated  as  such.  The  ancient  rhetoricians 
afford  a  clearly  defined  theory  of  history,2  but  not  of  biography.  So  far 
as  a  theory  of  biography  is  afforded,  it  is  to  be  found  in  the  theory  of  enco- 
mium. For  though  biography  became  different  from  formal  encomium, 
yet  the  aim  of  both  was  essentially  the  same:  the  presentation  of  character 
and  merit  (^0os  and  dpeT^p  Biography  was  concerned  with  facts  of 
history  only  in  so  far  as  they  served  to  illustrate  these.  It  neglected  chron- 
ology and  topography  which  were  the  concern  of  the  historian.  For  its 
object  was  not  to  narrate  the  facts  of  history  per  se,  but  only  to  use  the 
deeds  of  its  subject  as  indicative  of  his  virtue.  This  is  true  of  the  Agricola, 
for  "although  the  external  form  of  historiography  is  preserved,  yet  in  its 
essence  the  account  is  in  the  manner  of  encomium,  in  which  the  7rpd£cis 
are  adduced,  not  as  historical  events  per  se,  but  as  indications  of  traits  of 
character."-*  From  this  point  of  view  all  ancient  biography  was  written 
from  the  Euagoras  of  Isocrates  on,  and  almost  without  exception  the 

1  Bruns  Die  Personlichheit  in  der  Geschichtsschreibung  der  Allen,  p.  71:  "Bei  den 
beiden  ersten  (Augustus,  Germanicus)  hat  sich  Tacitus  auf  das  erste  Hauptmittel 
des  indirekten  Stils  beschrankt,  das  Urtheil  durch  Andere." 

2  Rhet.  Lat.  Min.,  ed.  Halm,  p.  588:  "Historici  officii  sunt  tria:  ut  veras  res,  ut 
dilucide,  ut  breviter  exponat." 

3  Leo  Die  griechisch-romische  Biographie,  p.  147:  "'urTopta  erzahlt  die  irpd^ett 
von  Volkern  und  Mannern,  /3ios  schildert  das  1)6os  eines  Mannes.  Diesem  Zwecke 
dient  im  pios  die  Erzahlung  der  irpd^eis,  nur  soviel  wird  von  den  der  Geschichte  ange- 
horenden  irpd£eis  ausgewahlte  und  nur  soweit  wird  von  den  ausgewahlten  berichtet, 
als  es  fur  die  Schilderung  des  fjdos  dienlich  ist." 

4  Hendrickson  The  Proconsulate  of  Julius  Agricola,  p.  20. 

3 


4  A   STUDY   OF   CN.    DOMITIUS   CORBULO 

writers  of  ancient  biography  have  given  utterance  to  their  realization  of 
the  difference  between  biography  and  history.5 

But  neither  Germanicus  nor  Agricola  affords  the  best  comparison  with 
Corbulo,  because  Germanicus  was  a  prince  and  naturally  held  a  conspicu- 
ous place  in  the  eyes  of  the  Roman  world.  The  Agricola  was  written  out 
of  filial  devotion  and  received  an  encomiastic  treatment.  The  best  exam- 
ples for  comparison  will  be  afforded  by  men  of  like  position  with  Corbulo 
and  in  these  we  have  Suetonius  Paulinus  and  Ostorius  Scapula,  of  whom 
a  more  detailed  account  will  be  given  as  showing  Tacitus'  method  of  treat- 
ing leading  generals  in  his  histories. 

OSTORIUS    SCAPULA 

Ostorius  Scapula  was  appointed  propraetor  to  Britain  where,  on  his 
arrival,  he  found  the  natives  in  a  state  of  insurrection.  They  thought  no 
active  movements  would  be  taken  against  them  because  the  general  was 
unacquainted  with  the  army  and  winter  was  approaching.  But  in  this 
they  were  deceived,  for  Ostorius  knew  the  effect  that  an  immediate  offen- 
sive movement  would  have  in  striking  dismay  into  the  enemy  and  in  increas- 
ing the  confidence  of  his  own  troops.  He  caught  the  enemy  unawares 
and  routed  it.  Tacitus  then  gives  an  account  of  the  revolt  of  the  Iceni 
and  a  description  of  their  stronghold.  This  place,  though  difficult  of  access, 
was  captured  by  Ostorius  without  any  legionary  force  and  among  the  deeds 
of  valor  displayed  was  the  saving  the  life  of  a  citizen  by  the  lieutenant's 
son.  After  this  battle  the  tribes  were  quiet,  at  least  nominally  so,  and 
the  army  was  led  among  the  Ceangi.  Devastation  of  the  fields  went 
on  where  there  was  any  unrest  on  the  part  of  the  natives.  Ostorius 
was  ready  to  cross  over  into  Ireland  when  news  came  of  the  revolt 
of  the  Brigantes.  This  tribe  was  soon  subdued,  but  the  Silures,  who  were 
now  in  revolt  under  the  leadership  of  Caratacus  were  not  put  down  so 
quickly. 

5  Plut.  Alexander  i :  otire  yap  Icrroplas  ypdcpo/j-ev,  d\X&  fliovs,  oftre  reus  kiricpavund- 
rais  irpd^ecri  iravrcas  tvecm  drjXwcns  aperrjs  -fj  Kcuc/as,  d\Aa  wpayna  @paxi>  voWdKis  Kal 
prj/xa  Kal  iraiSid  tis  Hfupatriv  tfffovs  tirolr/cre  p.a\\ov  fj  /U<£xat  fxvpibveKpot.  Kal  irapard^eLS  ai 
p.eyiffTa.1  Kal  TroXiopidai  irbXewv.  Nepos  Pelopidas  i :  "cuius  de  virtutibus  dubito  quern 
ad  modum  exponam,  quod  vereor,  si  res  explicare  incipiam  ne  non  vitara  eius  enarrare, 
sed  historiam  videar  scribere.  Epaminondas  i :  "cum  autem  exprimere  imaginem  con- 
suetudinis  atque  vitae  velimus  Epaminondae,  nihil  videmur  debere  praetermittere, 
quod  pertineat  ad  earn  declarandam,"  and  at  the  close  of  this  same  life  Nepos  adds: 
"huius  de  virtutibus  vitaque  satis  erit  dictum."  Polybius  x.  21  (24),  5  ff.:  iitrirep  yap 
iKeivos  6  t6ttos,  xnrdpxoiv  iyKW/JuatrriKdi,  dir-rJTei  t6v  K€<pa\aid>dr)  Kal  /uer'  aircrews  tCiv 
TTpd^eojv  awo\oyian6v  ovtcds  6  rrjs  icrroplas,  kolv6s  &v  eiralvov  Kal  \f/6yov,  £r]Tet  t6v  d\T)drj 
Kal    rbv    /tier'    diroSel^etvs    Kal    t&v    eKdo-rois    Trapeiro/x^vwu    crvWoy lit /j,6v. 


DIFFERENCE    BETWEEN    BIOGRAPHY   AND   HISTORY  5 

At  this  point  Caratacus  becomes  the  leading  figure  in  the  narrative. 
The  historian,  after  giving  a  careful  description  of  the  barbarian  stronghold, 
adds  an  epitomized  speech  of  Caratacus  to  his  followers  just  before  the 
battle.  The  enthusiasm  displayed  by  the  barbarians  amazed  Ostorius, 
but  the  Roman  officers  and  troops  were  confident  and  urged  him  to  lead 
them  against  the  enemy.  After  a  description  of  the  fight,  Tacitus  turns 
to  an  extended  account  of  the  long  struggle  of  Caratacus  against  the  Roman 
power,  his  capture,  his  reputation  throughout  the  islands,  Gaul,  and  'even 
Italy,  so  that  the  emperor  to  satisfy  the  curiosity  of  the  Roman  populace 
had  Caratacus,  his  wife,  daughters,  and  brothers  exhibited  in  public.  He 
characterizes  him  as  he  stood  before  the  imperial  tribunal  and  gives  an 
epitome  of  the  speech  he  delivered. 

Turning  to  the  senate  Tacitus  says  it  spoke  eloquently  on  the  capture 
of  Caratacus,  likening  it  to  the  capture  of  Syphax  by  Scipio  and  of  Perses 
by  Paulus.  It  voted  the  insignia  of  a  triumph  to  Ostorius.  But  soon  the 
followers  of  the  barbarian  chieftain  in  Britain  revolted  and  the  writer 
gives  an  account  of  the  loss  of  some  Roman  troops  and  of  the  guerrilla 
warfare  that  was  carried  on.  In  the  midst  of  these  troubles  Ostorius 
died  and  where  the  historian  might  have  been  tempted  to  add  a  direct 
characterization  of  the  general  he  has  not  done  so,  but  has  adhered  to  the 
technique  of  history.  The  writer  was  concerned  primarily  with  facts  of 
history,  and  so  far  as  a  characterization  of  Ostorius  is  afforded,  it  is  afforded 
indirectly  and  without  any  sacrifice  of  the  narrative  of  events.  There  is 
no  mention  of  the  personal  appearance  of  Ostorius,  of  his  power  of  disci- 
pline, of  the  special  inclination  of  the  soldiers  and  natives  toward  him,  of 
his  sharing  the  hardships  of  his  soldiers,  of  his  shrewdness  in  detecting  the 
schemes  of  the  enemy  and  of  pitting  one  tribe  against  another,  of  his  modera- 
tion in  success,  and  there  is  no  contrast  with  another  general.  Greater 
prominence  is  given  the  situation  in  Britain  as  Ostorius  found  it,  the  revolt 
of  the  Iceni  and  Brigantes,  the  campaigns  against  the  Silurae  and  Ordo- 
vices,  the  position  of  the  conquered  Caratacus,  and  the  guerrilla  warfare 
carried  on  until  the  death  of  Ostorius. 

SUETONIUS   PAULINUS 

The  field  of  action  of  Suetonius  Paulinus  also  was  Britain.  On  arriving 
there  he  at  once  made  preparations  to  invade  the  island  of  Mona.  After 
a  brief  statement  of  the  preparations  made,  Tacitus  gives  a  description  of 
the  motley  host  of  Druids,  women  with  fire-brands  running  to  and  fro  and 
soldiers  assembled  on  the  shore  to  meet  the  Romans  who  crossed  against 
them,  some  by  wading  and  swimming  and  some  by  means  of  boats.     The 


6  A    STUDY   OF   CN.    DOMITIUS    CORBULO 

Romans  were  victorious.  In  the  midst  of  their  success  news  came  of  the 
rising  of  the  Iceni  under  Boudicca,  and  the  causes  leading  to  the  revolt 
are  narrated  in  a  way  that  implies  criticism  of  the  conduct  of  the  Romans 
toward  the  natives  and  their  lack  of  preparations  against  a  possible  rebel- 
lion. An  account  is  given  of  the  omens  observed  which  the  Britons  regarded 
as  foreboding  the  defeat  of  the  Romans.  The  outbreak  came  in  the  absence 
of  Paulinus  and  the  Romans  were  annihilated.  A  force  under  Cerialis 
coming  to  their  assistance  lost  all  its  infantry,  while  Cerialis  and  the  cavalry 
escaped.  Suetonius  marched  straight  through  the  enemy  to  Londinium 
and  after  viewing  the  situation  resolved  to  sacrifice  one  town  in  order  to 
save  all.  Against  the  prayers  of  the  people  he  marched  away,  but  granted 
all  who  wished  to  follow,  a  place  in  the  line  of  march.  Of  those  who 
remained  behind,  the  Britons  slew  eighty  thousand  and  ravaged  at  will 
in  vengeance  for  the  wrongs  that  had  been  inflicted  upon  them. 

When  Suetonius  was  ready  to  meet  the  enemy  he  chose  a  place  for 
battle  in  a  defile  with  narrow  opening  facing  the  enemy  and  hedged  in  by 
a  forest  behind,  so  that  he  feared  no  ambush.  Then  Tacitus  gives  a  descrip- 
tion of  the  gathered  mass  of  Britons  and  of  the  activity  of  Boudicca  in  urg- 
ing on  her  followers.  He  shows  how  Suetonius  by  a  speech  aroused  the 
ardor  of  his  soldiers  to  such  a  pitch  that  he  was  sure  of  the  outcome  and 
gave  the  command  to  attack.  A  description  of  the  attack  and  defeat  of 
the  Britons  follows.  Eighty  thousand  Britons  were  said  to  have  perished 
and  only  four  hundred  Romans.  Boudicca  took  poison  and  Poeninus 
Postumus  who  had  disobeyed  the  orders  of  his  superior  and  cheated  his 
legion  out  of  a  share  in  the  honor  of  victory,  committed  suicide  when  news 
of  the  success  reached  him.  Then  the  troops,  brought  together  and  aug- 
mented by  additional  forces  from  Germany,  went  into  winter  quarters. 
Many  of  the  rebellious  tribes  were  brought  to  terms  by  fire  and  sword,  but 
the  more  spirited  slowly  yielded  by  reason  of  the  lack  of  harmony  between 
Suetonius  and  Julius  Classicianus  the  procurator  who  had  succeeded 
Catus. 

In  this  account  also  we  find  that  Tacitus  has  adhered  strictly  to  the 
technique  of  history.  An  excellent  opportunity  to  characterize  Suetonius 
was  afforded  by  his  march  through  the  enemy  to  Londinium,  but  no  descrip- 
tion of  the  march  is  given.  In  the  accounts  of  both  generals  whatever 
encomiastic  touches  occur  are  merely  incidental  and  the  elements  of  encom- 
iastic treatment  do  not  occur  in  anything  like  the  amplification  in  which 
we  shall  find  them  in  the  account  of  Corbulo.  The  narration  of  facts 
is  faithfully  kept.  The  leaders  are  conspicuous  figures,  but  not  more  so 
than  we  should  expect. 


CHRONOLOGY 

In  dealing  with  the  question  of  the  chronology  of  Corbulo's  life  and 
campaigns  my  aim  will  be  to  show  that  Tacitus  (and  his  source)  followed 
merely  the  sequence  of  events,  and  that  he  either  had  no  clear  idea  of  the 
chronology  or,  if  he  had,  did  not  care  to  make  use  of  it.  In  the  account 
of  the  campaign  against  the  Chauci,1  Nipperdey  regards  the  events  as 
spread  over  more  than  one  year,  although  they  are  given  as  having  taken 
place  in  the  year  47,  and  there  is  nothing  in  the  narrative  itself  to  show 
that  they  extended  over  a  longer  period. 

The  question  of  chronology  which  has  caused  so  much  discussion,  begins 
with  the  appointment  of  Corbulo  to  take  charge  of  affairs  in  Armenia. 
Nero  came  to  the  throne  in  October  of  54,  and  one  of  his  first  acts  was  to 
appoint  Corbulo  to  command  in  the  East.  While  not  expressly  so  stated, 
the  natural  inference  is  that  he  went  to  the  East  in  the  spring  of  55,  but  the 
events  narrated  in  xiii.  8,  9,  must  have  extended  over  more  than  one  year.3 
When  we  come  to  the  account  in  xiii.  34-41,  we  again  find  events  given 
under  the  year  58,  which  must  have  extended  over  more  than  one  year. 
The  chronology  of  the  chapters  and  the  assignment  of  events  depends  some- 
what on  the  way  in  which  we  interpret  the  "  miraculum"  in  chap.  41 .  Egli 
takes  it  to  refer  to  the  eclipse  of  April  30,  59,  mentioned  by  Pliny,  N.  H. 
ii.  180,  and  thus  assigns  a  definite  date  for  the  destruction  of  Artaxata. 
Laufenburg,  Furneaux,  and  Henderson  reject  Egli's  argument  on  the 
ground  that  such  a  description  could  not  refer  to  an  eclipse  and  that  Cor- 
bulo could  not  have  reached  Artaxata  so  soon  in  the  spring.  Henderson 
explains  it  as  some  effect  of  cloud  and  sunshine.  They  all  admit  that 
Tacitus  knew  of  the  above  eclipse  and  refers  to  it  in  xiv.  12,  where  he  says: 
iam  sol  repente  obscuratus  et  tactae  de  coelo  quattuordecim  urbis  regiones. 

Now  there  were  just  two  eclipses  which  Corbulo  in  Armenia  might 
have  seen.  A  total  eclipse  April  30,  59,  and  a  partial  eclipse  October  13, 
60. 3  Of  these  the  latter  is  not  to  be  taken  into  consideration  because  it 
was  not  one  of  any  magnitude  and  for  the  further  reason  that  Pliny  very 
definitely  gives  the  year  in  which  Corbulo  observed  the  eclipse  reported: 
Solis  defectum  Vipstano  et  Fonteio  coss.  These  men  were  consuls  for  the 
year  59.     As  Corbulo  reported  an  eclipse  for  this  year  and  the  one  of  April 

1  xi.  18,  19. 

2  Cf.     "quae  in  alios  consules  egressa  coniunxi." 

3  See  Ginzel  Spezieller  Canon  der  Finstemisse,  p.  77. 

7 


8  A    STUDY   OF   CN.    DOMITIUS   CORBULO 

30  was  the  only  one  he  could  have  seen  in  Armenia  in  that  year  the  ques- 
tion resolves  itself  into  this:  Could  the  description  in  Tacitus  refer  to 
an  eclipse  and  could  Corbulo  have  been  in  Artaxata  at  the  time  of  its  occur- 
rence ?  In  the  description  as  we  have  it  commentators  have  made  the  mis- 
take of  assuming  that  Tacitus  took  it  from  Corbulo's  Memoirs.  Hender- 
son says  that  it  is  best  to  dissociate  the  account  in  Pliny  from  that  in  Tac- 
itus, but  gives  no  adequate  reason  for  doing  so.  The  two  accounts  in  a 
certain  sense  are  to  be  dissociated,  namely  in  this:  in  the  account  of  Pliny 
we  have  the  record  of  an  eclipse  given  by  a  historian  and  as  he  found  it 
in  Corbulo's  Memoirs,  and  in  the  passage  of  Tacitus  we  have  a  rhetorical 
amplification  of  the  same  phenomena  used  by  an  encomiast  to  exalt  the 
praises  of  the  general  by  enlisting,  so  to  speak,  the  co-operation  of  nature 
itself.  The  purpose  of  the  one  is  to  set  forth  truthfully  facts  of  history, 
that  of  the  other  is  to  glorify  the  man  he  is  describing,  and  he  makes  all 
facts  serve  this  purpose. 

No  doubt  the  phenomena  observed  by  Corbulo  were  very  unusual. 
That  phenomena  observed  at  times  of  eclipses  are  very  remarkable,  is  a 
well-known  fact.     The  following  is  a  description  from  Monroe  B.  Synder: 

As  totality  approaches,  a  pale-purple  coloring  spreads  over  the  landscape. 
Within  a  minute  of  the  total  phase,  the  phenomena  begin  to  succeed  each  other 
so  rapidly  that  no  single  observer  can  note  them  all.  By  those  glancing  at  the 
landscape  in  the  direction  of  the  approaching  shadow  a  majestic  darkness  will 
be  seen  to  sweep  forward  with  a  swiftness  truly  impressive.  Those  looking  at 
the  earth,  and  away  from  the  eclipsing  sun,  will  see  a  succession  of  flitting  bands, 
alternately  dark  and  bright,  known  as  the  shadow  bands,  which  for  many  decades 
remained  an  unexplained  puzzle.4 

4  Cyclopedia  Americana  under  "Eclipse."  For  further  evidence  of  the  strange- 
ness of  the  phenomena  we  may  compare  the  following:  "The  most  instantaneous 
darkening  of  the  orb  of  day,  more  particularly  when  it  is  unlooked  for,  is  calculated 
to  impress  a  spectator  with  vague  terror;  even  when  expected,  it  fills  the  mind  with 
awe,  as  a  demonstration  of  the  forces  and  motions  of  the  mechanism  of  the  universe. 
The  sudden  darkness,  too,  is  impressive  from  its  strangeness  as  much  as  occurring  by 

day;  it  resembles  neither  the  darkness  of  night  nor  the  gloom  of  twilight Stars 

and  planets  appear,  and  all  animals  are  dismayed  by  the  general  aspect  of  nature." 
— The  International  Cyclopedia,  Vol.  V,  p.  257.  "When  the  sun  was  reduced  to  a 
small  crescent,  the  shadows  of  all  objects  were  depicted  with  great  severity  and  blackness 
reminding  one  of  the  effects  of  illumination  with  the  electric  light.  The  sky  at  this 
period  assumed  an  indigo  tint,  and  the  landscape  was  tinged  with  a  bronze  hue." — 
Warren  De  La  Rue  Athenaeum,  Vol.  II,  p.  269.  "On  looking  up  one  of  the  grandest 
spectacles  of  which  it  is  possible  to  conceive  met  the  eye.  Surrounding  the  dark  body 
of  the  moon  was  a  crown  of  light,  with  rays  shooting  out  in  five  great  sheaths  to  a  dis- 
tance equal  to  the  sun's  diameter,  or  nearly  a  million  of  miles.  No  painting  can 
represent  it  and  no  pen  can  describe  it." — Quoted  by  Newcomb  of  an  eclipse  observed 
in  the  United  States,  August  7,  1869,  Universal  Encyclopedia,  under  "Eclipse." 


CHRONOLOGY  9 

While  the  quotations  given  refer  to  total  eclipses,  yet  the  phenomena 
might  very  well  be  true  in  great  measure  of  a  partial  eclipse  of  the  magni- 
tude of  the  one  in  question,  which  for  Artaxata  was  9?8.s  I  think  the  two 
accounts  in  Tacitus  and  Pliny  refer  to  the  same  eclipse,  and  that  Artaxata 
was  destroyed  April  30,  59. 

As  to  the  argument  that  Corbulo  could  not  have  reached  Artaxata  so 
soon,  it  is  not  proven  because  we  do  not  know  where  Corbulo  spent  the 
winter.  There  is  absolutely  no  hint  of  winter  quarters  nor  that  Corbulo 
still  drew  his  supplies  from  Trapezus.  It  seems  far  more  reasonable  to 
assume  that  he  did  winter  within  striking  distance  of  Artaxata.  More- 
over, after  his  successful  campaign  of  58  there  would  be  no  enemy  between 
his  camp  and  Trapezus,  if  he  still  wished  to  draw  supplies  from  that  place 
and  we  know  that  he  won  over  the  Moschi  to  an  alliance.  It  is  more  plaus- 
ible to  suppose  that  the  three  forts  were  taken  in  58,  whence  arose  the  con- 
fidence of  taking  Artaxata,  but  the  season  was  too  far  spent  to  permit  of 
preparations  and  a  march  against  that  city.  Then  with  no  enemy  behind 
him  Corbulo  would  go  into  winter  quarters  preparatory  for  an  early  march 
in  the  spring  on  Artaxata.  Tiridates  would  most  naturally  withdraw  to 
Artaxata  after  the  failure  of  the  negotiations  and  winter  there.  This 
assumption  is  strengthened  by  the  fact  that  we  hear  nothing  of  him  until 
Corbulo  is  close  to  the  city.  Under  ordinary  circumstances  an  army  would 
not  leave  its  winter  quarters  until  there  was  a  reasonable  assurance  of  fair 
weather,  but  the  hardships  of  an  early  march  would  not  be  greater  than 
those  endured  in  the  winter  quarters  of  57-58.  The  very  thing  that  Cor- 
bulo would  do  would  be  to  strike  early  and  rapidly  in  order  to  take  the 
enemy  by  surprise  and  catch  him  unprepared.  That  the  Romans  met 
with  no  serious  opposition  is  a  just  inference  from  the  fact  that  none  is 
recorded  until  the  day  before  the  surrender  of  Artaxata.  In  view  of  this 
a  march  of  150  or  200  miles  would  be  entirely  possible  in  early  spring. 

It  seems  best  to  take  the  winter  referred  to  in  xiii.  35  as  that  of  57-58, 
or  the  one  previous  to  the  opening  of  an  active  campaign.  The  events 
narrated  up  to  and  including  the  taking  of  the  three  forts,  I  believe,  all 
happened  in  the  year  58.  Most  editors  regard  Volandum  as  identical 
with  'OAavr;6  of  Strabo,  from  the  resemblance  the  words  bear  to  each  other. 
To  my  mind  the  evidence  is  not  conclusive,  and  the  identity  of  the  two 
places  is  highly  improbable  from  the  situation  as  we  have  it.  Those  who 
believe  in  the  identity  of  the  two  names  also  believe  that  the  capture  of 
Artaxata  followed  immediately  the  capture  of  the  three  forts  in  one  and  the 
same  year.  They  are  led  to  this  belief  from  the  fact  that  all  chronological 
s  Ginzel,  p.  202.  6  Strabo  xi.  14.  6. 


IO  A   STUDY   OF   CN.    DOMITIUS   CORBULO 

data  are  lacking.  But  this  is  a  place  where  the  writer  has  disregarded  the 
time  element.  It  seems  more  likely  that  Volandum  was  some  stronghold 
in  northwest  Armenia  where  Corbulo  was  when  the  negotiations  between 
him  and  Tiridates  were  broken  off  in  58.  Corbulo  had  hoped  to  adjudicate 
matters  by  negotiation,  and  avoid  the  necessity  of  overrunning  Armenia — 
a  method  which  he  followed  consistently  throughout  his  entire  command. 
The  most  natural  inference  is  that  no  extensive  plans  had  been  laid  for 
overrunning  Armenia,  and  going  to  Artaxata  until  after  the  first  negotia- 
tions had  failed.  This  belief  is  strengthened  by  the  fact  that  he  did  not 
understand  the  Parthians  at  first,  as  is  shown  by  his  seeking  long  and  in 
vain  to  get  a  battle  with  them  on  Roman  lines  of  fighting.  7  The  negotia- 
tions having  failed,  he  at  once  began  active  operations,  captured  the  three 
forts,  and  then  conceived  the  idea  of  aiming  a  blow  directly  at  the  capital, 
as  is  shown  by  these  words:  unde  orta  fiducia  caput  gentis  Artaxata  adgre- 
diendi.&  Now  if  Volandum  was  the  same  as  'OXavrj  and  if  Corbulo  had 
captured  it  with  so  little  effort,  and  had  come  so  near  Artaxata,  there  would 
have  been  no  need  to  say  that  the  capture  of  Volandum  "inspired  a  reso- 
lution to  attempt  Artaxata,"  for  he  never  would  have  reached  Volandum 
without  having  resolved  to  attack  Artaxata.  The  words  above  do  have 
their  proper  significance  if  they  are  applied  to  the  capture  of  the  fort  in  the 
year  previous  to  the  capture  of  the  Armenian  capital,  and  if  that  fort  was 
at  a  considerable  distance  from  Artaxata. 

The  situation  up  to  this  point  resolves  itself  into  this.  Armenia  was  to 
be  the  field  of  action.  Corbulo  in  Cappadocia  made  his  levy  of  troops 
from  that  and  the  adjoining  states,  but  could  not  take  the  field  for  some 
years  owing  to  the  demoralized  condition  of  the  army.  Fortunately  for 
the  Romans  the  Parthians  were  distracted  by  a  revolt.  When  Corbulo 
felt  strong  enough  to  take  the  field  he  led  his  troops  into  winter  quarters 
somewhere  in  northwest  Armenia.  That  he  was  in  this  region  is  shown 
by  the  fact  that  Tiridates  broke  off  the  negotiations  in  order  to  intercept 
provisions  coming  to  the  Romans  by  way  of  Trapezus.  In  these  winter 
quarters  the  discipline  of  the  troops  would  be  completed  for  the  coming 
campaigns  and  a  Roman  army  on  Armenian  soil  would  serve  to  bring  the 
Parthians  to  some  sort  of  understanding.  The  following  season  would  be 
given  up  to  the  negotiations  and  the  first  year's  campaign,  concluding  with 
the  capture  of  the  three  forts.  Corbulo  would  then  go  into  winter  quarters 
near  where  he  had  been  carrying  on  his  campaign  and  where  supplies  could 
still  reach  him  from  Trapezus  if  he  wished  to  draw  from  that  place,  as  the 
enemy  would  have  been  forced  back  toward  Artaxata  and  the  country 
1  xiii.  37.  8  xiii.  39. 


CHRONOLOGY  1 1 

would  be  free  from  an  enemy  behind  him.  His  safety,  moreover,  would 
be  further  insured  by  an  alliance  with  the  Moschi.9  In  these  winter  quar- 
ters he  would  make  ready  for  a  rapid  march  on  Artaxata  in  the  spring 
when  he  must  have  cut  loose  from  his  base  of  supplies.  He  would  make 
an  early  and  rapid  march  in  order  to  take  the  enemy  by  surprise  and  con- 
fuse him  by  the  very  rapidity  of  his  movements. 

It  will  be  observed  that  no  mention  is  made  of  the  winter  58-59. 
Events  are  run  together  without  reference  to  when  they  occurred,  showing 
that  the  writer  had  in  mind  some  other  purpose  than  annalistic  narra- 
tion ;  it  made  no  difference  to  him  whether  the  forts  were  taken  in  58  or  59. 

I  think  we  can  assume  that  Artaxata  was  immediately  destroyed  after 
its  surrender  and  that  Corbulo  at  once  set  out  for  Tigranocerta.  Furneaux 
is  of  a  different  opinion,  but  this  is  the  view  of  Egli  and  Henderson,  and 
such  is  the  plain  statement  of  the  text.  It  would  be  the  very  course  to  be 
expected — rapid,  decisive  movements  on  the  part  of  the  Romans.  Nothing 
else  would  have  such  disheartening  effect  on  the  Parthians  and  Armenians 
who  were  opposed  to  them. 

In  the  summer  of  59,  probably  about  the  middle  of  August,10  Corbulo 
was  in  Tauronitium.  For  just  before  reaching  this  place  the  army  had 
come  into  cultivated  fields  and  had  reaped  the  crops.  Not  long  after  this 
ambassadors  came  from  Tigranocerta  offering  the  surrender  of  the  city. 
All  commentators  save  Furneaux  are  agreed  that  Corbulo  reached  Tigrano- 
certa in  the  fall  of  59.  Now  whether  the  capture  of  Legerda  and  the 
return  of  the  Hyrcanian  ambassadors  took  place  in  the  year  59  or  60  is 
uncertain  from  the  account  in  Tacitus.  But  the  events  narrated  in  xiv. 
23,  24  must  have  followed  immediately  after  the  destruction  of  Artaxata 
and  it  seems  best  to  assume  at  least  the  capture  of  Legerda  in  the  year  59, 
assuming  that  this  place  was  some  fort  not  far  from  Tigranocerta.  The 
return  of  the  Hyrcanian  embassy  could  hardly  have  occurred  in  the  year 
59  for  the  reason  that  Corbulo  reached  Tigranocerta  late  in  the  year,  and 
it  would  not  be  likely  that  news  could  have  reached  the  ambassadors  in 
time  to  permit  of  their  arrival  in  the  fall  or  winter.  Then,  too,  the  territory 
which  they  would  have  had  to  cross  from  the  borders  of  Syria  would  have 

9  xiii.  37. 

10  Egli  Feldsuge  in  Armenien  Biidinger  p.  288.  In  den  Sommer  59  fallt  der 
Marsch  des  Corbulo  von  Artaxata  nach  Tigranocerta  mit  dem  Angriff  der  Marder. 
....  Schon  vorher  war  in  Hocharmenien  das  Getreide  geerntet  worden,  was  friih- 
estens  im  August  geschehen  sein  konnte;  denn  in  der  milden  Tauraunitis  sah  Brandt 
(Bei  Ritter.  Erdkunde  X,  671)  am  7.  August  trotz  starker  Sommerhitze  das  Ge- 
treide noch  ungereift.  Corbulo  hatte  aber  schon  vor  Ankunft  in  der  Tauraunitis, 
also  in  einer  hoher  liegenden,  nicht  so  milden  Gegend  geerntet. 


12  A    STUDY   OF    CN.    DOMITIUS   CORBULO 

been  more  or  less  hostile.  But  the  account  as  we  have  it  gives  everything 
as  happening  in  one  year,  the  march  from  Artaxata,  the  return  of  the 
embassy,  the  thwarting  of  Tiridates'  attempts,  the  coming  of  Tigranes 
and  the  return  of  Corbulo  to  Syria.  Manifestly  we  have  here  events  nar- 
rated which  refer  to  two  years,  but  no  mention  is  made  of  the  winter  59-60. 
Commentators  seem  agreed  that  Corbulo  spent  one  winter  in  Tigranocerta, 
and  that  it  must  have  been  this  winter,  but  Tacitus  makes  no  mention  of 
such  a  thing.  It  is  simply  an  inference  from  the  fact  that  too  many  things 
are  narrated  to  have  occurred  in  one  year.  Possibly  the  capture  of  Legerda 
ended  the  campaign  of  59.  Then  Corbulo  wintered  in  Tigranocerta  and 
during  the  winter,  or  far  more  likely  the  following  spring,  the  Hyrcanian 
embassy  returned,  while  the  year  60  was  given  up  to  a  campaign  against 
Tiridates,  the  setting-up  of  Tigranes,  and  the  withdrawal  of  Corbulo  to 
Syria.  As  before,  we  see  here  a  disregard  for  the  annalistic  arrangement. 
There  is  a  sequence  of  events,  but  so  closely  interwoven  that  no  one  can 
tell  which  of  them  belong  to  the  year  59,  and  which  to  the  year  60. 

This  running  of  events  together  is  seen  in  xv.  1-17.  Under  the  year 
62  events  are  narrated  which  must  belong  to  three  different  years  for  three 
separate  winters  are  referred  to:  hibemavisse;11  hieme;12  and  hibernavit.13 
Furneaux,  following  Nipperdey,  takes  hibemavisse  as  referring  to  the  winter 
of  61-62,  but  it  must  refer  to  that  of  60-61 ,  as  will  be  seen  from  what  follows. 
Hibernavit  refers  to  62-63,  the  winter  after  the  defeat  of  Paetus.14  This 
leaves  two  winters  unaccounted  for.  Instante  iam  hieme  must  be  the 
winter  previous  to  the  defeat  of  Paetus,  or  61-62.  Then  hibemavisse 
refers  to  the  winter  60-61.  That  hibemavisse  refers  to  this  winter  is  shown 
by  the  implied  criticism  of  Corbulo  in  his  withdrawal  from  Tigranocerta 
to  hastily  constructed  winter  quarters  on  the  borders  of  Syria.  So  we  have 
the  following:  For  the  year  59,  the  taking  of  Artaxata,  march  to  Tigrano- 
certa and  its  surrender,  the  capture  of  Legerda  and  winter  quarters  at 
Tigranocerta;  60,  the  coming  of  the  Hyrcanian  embassy,  overrunning  of 
Armenia,  establishment  of  Tigranes  on  the  throne,  and  the  withdrawal  of 
Corbulo  to  Syria;  61,  Corbulo  in  Syria  fortifies  the  Euphrates,  compels 
Vologeses  to  come  to  terms;  Paetus  arrives;  he  crosses  the  Taurus  on  an 
expedition  against  Tigranocerta  late  in  the  season,  it  seems,  and  without 
any  apparent  success;  62,  Corbulo  guards  Cappadocia;  Paetus  is  defeated; 
winter  in  Cappadocia.  The  events  narrated  in  xv.  25-31  are  given  as 
having  taken  place  in  the  following  year,  63. 

From  this  we  see  that  no  attention  is  paid  to  the  narrating  of  events  in 

11  xv.  6.  I3  xv.  8.  J3  xv.  17. 

J4  "  Exim  Paetus  per  Cappadociam  hibernavit;' '  see  xv.  23  which  begins  the  year  63. 


CHRONOLOGY  13 

regular  annalistic  order.  They  are  run  together  in  such  a  way  that  it  is 
impossible  to  assign  definitely  to  the  exact  year  the  events  as  they  occurred. 
That  such  is  the  case  one  has  only  to  read  the  accounts  of  the  commentators 
already  mentioned.  The  writer  had  another  purpose  in  mind,  and  was 
not  concerned  with  an  impartial  recording  of  facts  of  history.  He  seized 
such  facts  in  the  life  and  campaigns  of  Corbulo  as  served  his  purpose  and 
wherever  chronological  data  are  afforded  they  are  afforded  only  incidentally. 


TOPOGRAPHY 

When  we  come  to  consider  the  topography  of  Corbulo's  campaigns 
we  find  even  greater  disregard  for  places  than  we  found  for  time  in  the 
matter  of  chronology.  The  mention  of  places  is  merely  incidental  and  it 
is  not  likely  that  a  definite  geography  will  ever  be  made  out.  The  question 
has  been  carefully  studied  by  Egli  and  Henderson.1  The  latter  makes 
a  careful  comparison  of  the  ancient  authorities  in  regard  to  the  positions 
of  Tigranocerta  and  of  Rhandeia.  He  further  compares  the  views  of  the 
modern  writers  who  have  discussed  the  subject  and  concludes  by  agreeing 
with  none  of  them  in  all  points. 

The  first  place  mentioned  is  Aegea,  a  town  in  Cilicia  on  the  gulf  of  Issus, 
where  Corbulo  met  Quadratus.  Where  he  was  until  active  campaigning 
began  we  are  not  told  except  that  he  moved  troops  across  Syria  and  made 
levies  in  Galatia  and  Cappadocia.2  We  infer  that  the  winter  quarters  of 
57-58  were  in  northwest  Armenia  from  the  fact  that  Tiridates  withdraws 
to  intercept  provisions  coming  to  the  Romans  by  way  of  Trapezus.  Also, 
inlecti  Moschi,3  would  indicate  that  Corbulo  was  engaged  in  northern 
Armenia.  The  next  place  mentioned  is  Volandum,4  but  the  account  in 
Tacitus  gives  us  no  clear  idea  as  to  where  it  was,  whether  near  to  or  far 
from  Artaxata  nor  in  what  direction  it  lay.  Three  forts  were  taken  in  one 
day,  but  this  is  the  only  one  named.  Corbulo  was  next  in  Artaxata  on  the 
Araxes  River.  Hence  it  is  apparent  how  meager  is  the  geographical  knowl- 
edge up  to  this  point:  Aegea,  Trapezus,  Volandum,  Artaxata. 

The  next  objective  point  of  Corbulo  was  Tigranocerta  and  while  it 
seems  to  be  impossible  to  locate  the  site  today  yet  we  may  rightly  assume 
that  the  situation  caused  the  people  of  ancient  times  no  such  trouble.  But 
of  the  march  between  Artaxata  and  Tigranocerta  only  the  Mardi,  a  people, 
and  Tauraunitium,  a  district,  are  mentioned.  These  are  general  state- 
ments, while  all  geographical  details  are  disregarded,  which  leads  to  the 
conclusion  that  the  writer  had  no  general  idea  of  the  geography  or  else  he 
had  in  mind  some  other  purpose  than  historical  narration.  As  regards 
fort  Legerda*  we  have  to  infer  that  it  was  somewhere  near  Tigranocerta, 
but  it  cannot  be  located.  Nisibis6  was  said  to  be  37  miles  from  Tigrano- 
certa, but  if  we  look  into  modern  discussions  of  the  subject  we  are  led  to 
the  conclusion^thatj[here[again  the  writer  did  not  have  the  situation  clearly 

1  The  EnglishV oumal  oj  Philology,  Vol.  XXVIII,  pp.  99,  271. 

3  xiii.  35.  3  xiii.  37.  4  xiii.  39.  s  xiv.  25.  6  xv.  5. 

14 


TOPOGRAPHY  1 5 

in  mind,  for  there  is  no  place  which  will  satisfy  the  statements  given  by 
ancient  writers  as  to  the  relative  positions  of  the  two  cities. 

The  next  topographical  indications  are  general  statements  and  might 
apply  to  any  one  of  many  places.  An  escort  was  given  the  Hyrcanian 
embassy  to  the  Red  Sea:  ne  Euphraten  trans  gressi  kostium  custodiis  cir- 
cumvenirenturJ  Corbulo  went  to  drive  out  Tiridates  who  had  entered: 
per  Medos  extrema  Armeniae.8  Then  Corbulo  withdrew  into  Syria:  atque 
interim  reliquos  legiones  pro  ripa  Euphratis  locate 

Now  if  we  turn  to  Paetus  we  find  that  he  was  north  of  Mt.  Taurus: 
rapit  exercitum  trans  montem  Taurum  reciperandis,  at  ferebat,  Tigranocer- 
tis.10  Shortly  before  his  defeat  he  placed  a  force  on  Mt.  Taurus:  tria  millia 
delecti  peditis  proximo  iugo  imposuit,11  and  his  wife  in  a  stronghold  called 
Arsamosata:  cui  Arsamosata  nomen  est.12  He  bridged  the  river  Arsanias 
at  a  place  where  the  stream  was  fordable.13  Cassius  Dio14  says  that  Paetus 
was  besieged  at  a  place  called  Rhandeia,  on  the  Arsanias,  but  observe  that 
the  account  in  Tacitus  is  not  so  definite.  All  that  is  given  is  that  Paetus 
was  somewhere  north  of  Mt.  Taurus  on  the  Arsanias.  When  Paetus  sent 
to  Corbulo  for  assistance  the  latter  hastened  to  him  through  Commagene 
and  Cappadocia:  regionem  Commagenam,  exim  Cappadociam,  inde  Arme- 
nios  petivit.1*  He  met  Paetus  on  the  banks  of  the  Euphrates:  Corbulo 
cum  suis  copiis  apud  ripam  Euphratis  obvius.  .  .  .  praetulit,16  and  then 
withdrew  to  Syria:  Syriam  repetiturum;  and  Paetus  to  Cappadocia:  exim 
Paetus  per  Cappadociam  hibernavit.1"1 

Now  where  the  ambassadors18  from  Vologeses  and  Tiridates  met  Cor- 
bulo we  do  not  know,  but  Corbulo  crossed  the  Euphrates  at  Melitene: 
apud  Melitenen,  qua  tramittere  Euphraten  parabat19.  And  although  they 
met  to  adjudicate  matters  on  the  field  of  Paetus'  disgrace,  still  we  are  not 
given  the  name  of  the  place.  This  is  remarkable  when  we  consider  the 
way  in  which  the  Romans  viewed  a  defeat  of  that  kind  and  the  importance 
given  the  place  by  the  meeting  of  the  Roman  and  Parthian  forces  there. 

To  sum  up  the  definite  geography  in  the  account  in  Tacitus  we  have 
Aegea,  the  place  of  landing  when  Corbulo  went  to  the  East,  Artaxata  on 
the  Araxes,  Tigranocerta  in  the  south  of  Armenia  with  Nisibis  37  (  ?)  miles 
distant,  and  Melitene  on  the  Euphrates.  Less  definite  is  the  situation 
of  Paetus  north  of  Mt.  Taurus  on  the  Arsanias  River  and  Corbulo  in  Syria 
fortifying  the  Euphrates.  Wholly  general  is  the  position  of  Corbulo  in 
Cappadocia  and  Armenia  until  he  reaches  Artaxata,  the  reference  to  places 

7  xiv.  25.  ioxv.  8.  '3  xv.  15.  16  xv.  !&  18  xv.  27. 

8  xiv.  26.  IT  xv.  10.  m  lxii.  21.  1.  17  xv.    17.  I9  XV.  26. 

9  XV.    3.  J2  XV".    IO.  1S  XV.   12. 


l6  A   STUDY  OF  CN.    DOMITIUS   CORBULO 

on  the  march  to  Tigranocerta,  the  invasion  and  repulse  of  Tigranes  when 
he  enters,  per  Medos  extrema  Armeniae,  the  withdrawal  of  Corbulo  to  the 
Euphrates  in  Syria  and  his  march  through  Commagene  and  Cappadocia 
to  aid  Paetus. 

Those  who  work  out  a  detailed  geography  for  Corbulo's  campaigns  do 
so  not  from  the  account  in  Tacitus,  but  from  that  account  plus  Strabo, 
Cassius  Dio,  and  Plutarch,  and  that  is  the  correct  way  when  we  wish  to 
get  at  the  facts  of  topography.  But  if  we  consider  the  account  only  in 
Tacitus,  we  find  that  very  little  definite  knowledge  can  be  obtained,  and  it 
is  quite  likely  that  the  matter  was  as  confusing  to  the  readers  of  Tacitus 
in  his  day  as  it  is  to  us.  The  explanation  is  that  the  writer  whom  Tacitus 
was  following  was  not  concerned  with  the  geography.  He  selected  only 
the  places  and  made  such  use  of  them  as  would  serve  to  add  praise  to  his 
hero. 


EXPOSITION 

The  portions  of  the  Annals  dealing  with  Corbulo  are  here  brought 
together  and  printed  that  it  may  be  seen  how  closely  connected  the  account 
is  and  its  similarity  to  a  biography.     The  text  is  that  of  Halm. 

XI.  18.  Per  idem  tempus  Chauci,  nulla  dissensione  domi,  et  morte  Sanquinii 
alacres,  dum  Corbulo  adventat,  inferiorem  Germaniam  incursavere  duce  Gan- 
nasco,  qui  natione  Canninefas,  auxiliare  stipendium  meritus,  post  transfuga, 
levibus  navigiis  praedabundus  Gallorum  maxime  oram  vastabat,  non  ignarus 
dites  et  inbelles  esse,  at  Corbulo  provinciam  ingressus  magna  cum  cura  et  mox 
gloria,  cui  principium  ilia  militia  fuit,  triremes  alveo  Rheni,  ceteras  navium,  ut 
quaeque  habiles,  per  aestuaria  et  fossas  adegit;  luntribusque  hostium  depressis 
et  exturbato  Gannasco,  ubi  praesentia  satis  composita  sunt,  legiones  operum  et 
laboris  ignavas,  populationibus  laetantes,  veterem  ad  morem  reduxit,  ne  quis 
agmine  decederet  nee  pugnam  nisi  iussus  iniret.  stationes,  vigiliae,  diurna  noc- 
turnaque  munia  in  armis  agitabantur.  feruntque  militem,  quia  vallum  non  accinc- 
tus,  atque  alium,  quia  pugione  tantum  accinctus  foderet,  morte  punitos.  quae 
nimia  et  incertum  an  falso  iacta  originem  tamen  e  severitate  ducis  traxere;  in  ten - 
tumque  et  magnis  delictis  inexorabilem  scias,  cui  tantum  asperitatis  etiam  adversus 
levia  credebatur. 

19.  Ceterum  is  terror  milites  hostesque  in  diversum  adfecit:  nos  virtutem 
auximus,  barbari  ferociam  infregere.  et  natio  Frisiorum,  post  rebellionem  clade 
L.  Apronii  coeptam  infensa  aut  male  fida,  datis  obsidibus  consedit  apud  agros  a 
Corbulone  descriptos:  idem  senatum,  magistratus,  leges  inposuit.  ac  ne  iussa 
exuerent,  praesidium  immunivit,  missis  qui  maiores  Chaucos  ad  deditionem 
pellicerent,  simul  Gannascum  dolo  adgrederentur.  nee  inritae  aut  degeneres 
insidiae  fuere  adversus  transfugam  et  violatorem  fidei.  sed  caede  eius  motae  Chau- 
corum  mentes,  et  Corbulo  semina  rebellionis  praebebat,  ut  laeta  apud  plerosque, 
ita  apud  quosdam  sinistra  fama.  cur  hostem  conciret  ?  adversa  in  rem  publicam 
casura:  sin  prospere  egisset,  formidolosum  paci  virum  insignem  et  ignavo  principi 
praegravem.  igitur  Claudius  adeo  novam  in  Germanias  vim  prohibuit,  ut  referri 
praesidia  cis  Rhenum  iuberet. 

20.  lam  castra  in  hostili  solo  molienti  Corbuloni  eae  litterae  redduntur.  ille 
re  subita,  quamquam  multa  simul  offunderentur,  metus  ex  imperatore,  contemptio 
ex  barbaris,  ludibrium  apud  socios,  nihil  aliud  prolocutus  quam  'beatos  quondam 
duces  Romanos',  signum  receptui  dedit.  ut  tamen  miles  otium  exueret,  inter 
Mosam  Rhenumque  trium  et  viginti  milium  spatio  fossam  perduxit,  qua  incerta 
Oceani  vitarentur.  insigne  tamen  triumphi  indulsit  Caesar,  quamvis  bellum 
negavisset. 

XIII.  8 laeti,  quod  Domitium  Corbulonem  retinendae  Armeniae  prae- 

posuerat  videbaturque  locus  virtutibus  patefactus.  copiae  Orientis  ita  dividuntur, 

*7 


l8  A    STUDY   OF   CN.    DOMITIUS    CORBULO 

ut  pars  auxiliarium  cum  duabus  legionibus  apud  provinciam  Suriam  et  legatum 
eius  Quadratum  Ummidium  remaneret,  par  civium  sociorumque  numerus  Corbu- 
loni  esset,  additis  cohortibus  absque,  quae  in  Cappadocia  hiemabant.  socii  reges, 
prout  bello  conduceret,  parere  iussi:  sed  studia  eorum  in  Corbulonem  promp- 
tiora  erant.  qui  ut  instaret  famae,  quae  in  novis  coeptis  validissima  est,  itinere 
propere  confecto  apud  Aegeas  civitatem  Ciliciae  obvium  Quadratum  habuit,  illuc 
progressum,  ne,  si  ad  accipiendas  copias  Suriam  intravisset  Corbulo,  omnium  ora 
in  se  verteret,  corpore  ingens,  verbis  magnificis  et  super  experientiam  sapien- 
tiamque  etiam  specie  inanium  validus. 

9.  Ceterum  uterque  ad  Vologesem  regem  nuntiis  monebant,  pacem  quam 
bellum  mallet  datisque  obsidibus  solitam  prioribus  reverentiam  in  populum 
Romanum  continuaret.  et  Vologeses,  quo  bellum  ex  commodo  pararet,  an  ut 
aemulationis  suspectos  per  nomen  obsidum  amoveret,  tradit  nobilissimos  ex 
familia  Arsacidarum.  accepitque  eos  centurio  Insteius  ab  Ummidio  missus, 
forte  prior  ea  de  causa  adito  rege.  quod  postquam  Corbuloni  cognitum  est,  ire 
praefectum  cohortis  Arrium  Varum  et  reciperare  obsides  iubet.  hinc  ortum  inter 
praefectum  et  centurionem  iurgium  ne  diutius  extends  spectaculo  esset,  arbitrium 
rei  obsidibus  legatisque,  qui  eos  ducebant,  permissum.  atque  illi  per  recentem 
gloriam  et  inclinatione  quadam  etiam  hostium  Corbulonem  praetulere.  unde 
discordia  inter  duces,  querente  Ummidio  praerepta  quae  suis  consiliis  patravisset, 
testante  contra  Corbulone  non  prius  conversum  regem  ad  offerendos  obsides, 
quam  ipse  dux  bello  delectus  spes  eius  ad  metum  mutaret.  Nero  quo  componeret 
diversos,  sic  evulgari  iussit:  ob  res  a  Quadrato  et  Corbulone  prospere  gestas 
laurum  fascibus  imperatoriis  addi.    quae  in  alios  consules  egressa  coniunxi. 

34 Eius  anni  principio  mollibus  adhuc  initiis  prolatatum  inter  Parthos 

Romanosque  de  obtinenda  Armenia  bellum  acriter  resumitur,  quia  nee  Vologeses 
sinebat  fatrem  Tiridaten  dati  a  se  regni  expertem  esse  aut  alienae  id  potentiae 
donum  habere,  et  Corbulo  dignum  magnitudine  populi  Romani  rebatur  parta  olim  a 
Lucullo  Pompeioque  recipere.  ad  hoc  Armenii  ambigua  fide  utraque  arma  invita- 
bant,  situ  terrarum,  similitudine  morum  Parthis  propiores  conubiisque  permixti 
ac  libertate  ignota  illuc  magis  ut  ad  servitium  inclinantes. 

35.  Sed  Corbuloni  plus  molis  ad  versus  ignaviam  militum  quam  contra  per- 
fidiam  hostium  erat:  quippe  Suria  transmotae  legiones,  pace  longa  segnes,  munia 
castrorum  aegerrime  tolerabant.  satis  constitit  fuisse  in  eo  exercitu  veteranos, 
qui  non  stationem,  non  vigilias  inissent,  vallum  fossamque  quasi  nova  et  mira 
viserent,  sine  galeis,  sine  loricis,  nitidi  et  quaestuosi,  militia  per  oppida  expleta. 
igitur  dimissis,  quibus  senectus  aut  valetudo  adversa  erat,  supplementum  petivit. 
et  habiti  per  Galatiam  Cappadociamque  dilectus,  adiectaque  ex  Germania  legio 
cum  equitibus  alariis  et  peditatu  cohortium.  retentusque  omnis  exercitus  sub 
pellibus,  quamvis  hieme  saeva  adeo,  ut  obducta  glacie  nisi  effossa  humus  ten- 
toriis  locum  non  praeberet.  ambusti  multorum  artus  vi  frigoris  et  quidam 
inter  excubias  exanimati  sunt,  adnotatusque  miles,  qui  fascem  lignorum 
gestabat,  itapraeriguisse  manus,  ut  oneri  adhaerentes  truncis  brachiis  deciderent. 
ipse  cultu  levi,  capite  intecto,  in  agmine,  in  laboribus  frequens  adesse,  laudem 


OF  / 

EXPOSITION  19 

strenuis,  solacium  invalidis,  exemplum  omnibus  ostendere.  dehinc  quia  duritiam 
caeli  militiaeque  multi  abnuebant  deserebantque,  remedium  severitate  quaesitum 
est.  nee  enim,  ut  in  aliis  exercitibus,  primum  alterumque  delictum  venia  prose- 
quebatur,  sed  qui  signa  reliquerat,  statim  capite  poenas  luebat.  idque  usu 
salubre  et  misericordia  melius  apparuit:  quippe  pauciores  ilia  castra  deseruere 
quam  ea,  in  quibus  ignoscebatur. 

36.  Interim  Corbulo  legionibus  intra  castra  habitis,  donee  ver  adolesceret, 
dispositisque  per  idoneos  locos  cohortibus  auxiliariis,  ne  pugnam  priores  auderent 
praedicit:  curam  praesidiorum  Paccio  Orfito  primi  pili  honore  perfuncto  mandat. 
is  quamquam  incautos  barbaros  et  bene  gerendae  rei  casum  offerri  scripserat, 
tenere  se  munimentis  et  maiores  copias  opperiri  iubetur.  sed  rupto  imperio, 
postquam  paucae  e  proximis  castellis  turmae  advenerant  pugnamque  imperitia 
poscebant,  congressus  cum  hoste  funditur.  et  damno  eius  exterriti  qui  subsidium 
ferre  debuerant,  sua  quisque  in  castra  trepida  fuga  rediere.  quod  graviter  Cor- 
bulo accepit  increpitumque  Paccium  et  praefectos  militesque  tendere  extra 
vallum  iussit;  inque  ea  contumelia  detenti  nee  nisi  precibus  universi  exercitus 
exsoluti  sunt. 

37.  At  Tiridates  super  proprias  clientelas  ope  Vologesi  fratris  adiutus,  non 
furtim  iam,  sed  palam  bello  infensare  Armenian!,  quosque  fidos  nobis  rebatur, 
depopulari,  et  si  copiae  contra  ducerentur,  eludere  hucque  et  illuc  volitans  plura 
fama  quam  pugna  exterrere.  igitur  Corbulo  quaesito  diu  proelio  frustra  habitus 
et  exemplo  hostium  circumferre  bellum  coactus,  dispertit  vires,  ut  legati  prae- 
fectique  diversos  locos  pariter  invaderent;  simul  regem  Antiochum  monet  proxi- 
mas  sibi  praefecturas  petere.  nam  Pharasmanes  interfecto  filio  Radamisto 
quasi  proditore,  quo  fidem  in  nos  testaretur,  vetus  adversus  Armenios  odium 
promptius  exercebat.  tuncque  primum  inlecti  Moschi,  gens  ante  alias  socia 
Romanis,  avia  Armeniae  incursavit.  ita  consilia  Tiridati  in  contrarium  vertebant, 
mittebatque  oratores,  qui  suo  Parthorumque  nomine  expostularent,  cur  datis 
nuper  obsidibus  redintegrataque  amicitia,  quae  novis  quoque  beneficiis  locum 
aperiret,  vetere  Armeniae  possessione  depelleretur.  ideo  nondum  ipsum  Vologe- 
sen  commotum,  quia  causa  quam  vi  agere  mallent:  sin  perstaretur  in  bello,  non 
defore  Arsacidis  virtutem  fortunamque  saepius  iam  clade  Romana  expertam. 
ad  ea  Corbulo,  satis  comperto  Vologesen  defectione  Hyrcaniae  attineri,  saudet 
Tiridati  precibus  Caesarem  adgredi:  posse  illi  regnum  stabile  et  res  incruentas 
contingere,  si  omissa  spe  longinqua  et  sera  praesentem  potioremque  sequeretur. 

38.  Placitum  dehinc,  quia  commeantibus  in  vicem  nuntiis  nihil  in  summam 
pacis  proficiebatur,  conloquio  ipsorum  tempus  locumque  destinari.  mille  equitum 
praesidium  Tiridates  adfore  sibi  dicebat:  quantum  Corbuloni  cuiusque  generis 
militum  adsisteret,  non  statuere,  dum  positis  loricis  et  galeis  in  faciem  pacis  veni- 
retur.  cuicumque  mortalium,  nedum  veteri  et  provido  duci,  barbarae  astutiae 
patuissent:  ideo  artum  inde  numerum  finiri  et  hinc  maiorem  offerri,  ut  dolus 
pararetur;  nam  equiti  sagittarum  usu  exercito  si  detecta  corpora  obicerentur, 
nihil  profuturam  multitudinem.  dissimulato  tamen  intellectu  rectius  de  iis,  quae 
in  publicum  consulerentur,  totis  exercitibus  coram  dissertaturos  respondit.    locum- 


20  A   STUDY   OF   CN.    DOMITIUS    CORBULO 

que  delegit,  cuius  pars  altera  colles  erant  clementer  adsurgentes  accipiendis  pedi- 
tum  ordinibus,  pars  in  planitiem  porrigebatur  ad  explicandas  equitum  turmas. 
dieque  pacto  prior  Corbulo  socias  cohortes  et  auxilia  regum  pro  cornibus,  medio 
sextam  legionem  constituit,  cui  accita  per  noctem  aliis  ex  castris  tria  milia  ter- 
tianorum  permiscuerat,  una  cum  aquila,  quasi  eadem  legio  spectaretur.  Tiri- 
dates  vergente  iam  die  procul  adstitit,  unde  videri  magis  quam  audiri  posset, 
ita  sine  congressu  dux  Roman  us  abscedere  militem  sua  quemque  in  castra  iubet. 

39.  Rex  sive  fraudem  suspectans,  quia  plura  simul  in  loca  ibatur,  sive  ut 
commeatus  nostras  Pontico  mari  et  Trapezunte  oppido  adventantes  interciperet, 
propere  discedit.  sed  neque  commeatibus  vim  facere  potuit,  quia  per  montes 
ducebantur  praesidiis  nostris  insessos,  et  Corbulo,  ne  inritum  bellum  traheretur 
utque  Armenios  ad  sua  defendenda  cogeret,  excindere  parat  castella,  sibique 
quod  validissimum  in  ea  praefectura,  cognomen  to  Volandum,  sumit;  minora 
Cornelio  Flacco  legato  et  Insteio  Capitoni  castrorum  praefecto  mandat.  turn 
circumspectis  munimentis  et  quae  expugnationi  idonea  provisis,  hortatur  milites, 
ut  hostem  vagum  neque  paci  aut  proelio  paratum,  sed  perfidiam  et  ignaviam 
fuga  confitentem  exuerent  sedibus  gloriaeque  pariter  et  praedae  consulerent. 
turn  quadripertito  exercitu  hos  in  testudinem  conglobatos  subruendo  vallo  inducit, 
alios  scalas  moenibus  admovere,  multos  tormentis  faces  et  hastas  incutere  iubet. 
libritoribus  funditoribusque  attributus  locus,  unde  eminus  glandes  torquerent, 
ne  qua  pars  subsidium  laborantibus  ferret  pari  undique  metu.  tantus  inde  ardor 
certantis  exercitus  fuit,  ut  intra  tertiam  diei  partem  nudati  propugnatoribus  muri, 
obices  portarum  subversi,  capta  escensu  munimenta  omnesque  puberes  trucidati 
sint,  nullo  milite  amisso,  paucis  admodum  vulneratis.  et  inbelle  vulgus  sub 
corona  venundatum,  reliqua  praeda  victoribus  cessit.  pari  fortuna  legatus  ac 
praefectus  usi  sunt,  tribusque  una  die  castellis  expugnatis  cetera  terrore  et  alia 
sponte  incolarum  in  deditionem  veniebant.  unde  orta  fiducia  caput  gentis  Arta- 
xata  adgrediendi.  nee  tamen  proximo  itinera  ductae  legiones,  quae  si  amnem 
Araxen,  qui  moenia  adluit,  ponte  transgrederentur,  sub  ictum  dabantur:  procul 
et  latioribus  vadis  transiere. 

40.  At  Tiridates  pudore  et  metu,  ne,  si  concessisset  obsidioni,  nihil  opis  in 
ipso  videretur,  si  prohiberet,  inpeditis  locis  seque  et  equestres  copias  inligaret, 
statuit  postremo  ostendere  aciem  et  dato  die  proelium  incipere  vel  simulatione 
fugae  locum  fraudi  parare.  igitur  repente  agmen  Romanum  circumfundit,  non 
ignaro  duce  nostra,  qui  viae  pariter  et  pugnae  composuerat  exercitum.  latere 
dextro  tertia  legio,  sinistra  sexta  incedebat,  mediis  decumanorum  delectis;  recepta 
inter  ordines  impedimenta,  et  tergum  mille  equites  tuebantur,  quibus  iusserat, 
ut  instantibus  comminus  resisterent,  refugos  non  sequerentur.  in  cornibus  pedes 
Sagittarius  et  cetera  manus  equitum  ibat,  productiore  [cornu]  sinistra  per  ima 
collium,  ut,  si  hostis  intravisset,  fronte  simul  et  sinu  exciperetur.  adsultare  ex 
diverso  Tiridates,  non  usque  ad  ictum  teli,  sed  turn  minitans,  turn  specie  trepi- 
dantis,  si  laxare  ordines  et  diversos  consectari  posset,  ubi  nihil  temeritate  solutum, 
nee  amplius  quam  decurio  equitum  audentius  progressus  et  sagittis  confixus 
ceteros  ad  obsequium  exemplo  firmaverat,  propinquis  iam  tenebris  abscessit. 


EXPOSITION  2 1 

41.  Et  Corbulo  castra  in  loco  metatus,  an  expeditis  legionibus  nocte  Artaxata 
pergeret  obsidioque  circumdaret  agitavit,  concessisse  illuc  Tiridaten  ratus.  dein 
postquam  exploratores  attulere  longinquum  regis  iter  et  Medi  an  Albani  peteren- 
tur  incertum,  lucem  opperitur,  praemissaque  levis  armatura,  quae  muros  interim 
ambiret  oppugnationemque  eminus  inciperet.  sed  oppidani  portis  sponte  pate- 
factis  se  suaque  Romanis  permisere,  quod  salutem  ipsis  tulit:  Artaxatis  ignis 
inmissus  deletaque  et  solo  aequata  sunt,  quia  nee  teneri  poterant  sine  valido 
praesidio  ob  magnitudinem  moenium,  nee  id  nobis  virium  erat,  quod  firmando 
praesidio  et  capessendo  bello  divideretur,  vel  si  integra  et  incustodita  relinqueren- 
■  tur,  nulla  in  eo  utilitas  aut  gloria,  quod  capta  essent.  adicitur  miraculum  velut 
numine  oblatum:  nam  cuncta  Artaxatis  tenus  sole  inlustria  fuere;  quod  moenibus 
cingebatur,  repente  ita  atra  nube  coopertum  fulguribusque  discretum  est,  ut 
quasi  infensantibus  deis  exitio  tradi  crederetur. 

XIV.  23.  At  Corbulo  post  deleta  Artaxata  utendum  recenti  terrore  ratus  ad 
occupanda  Tigranocerta,  quibus  excisis  metum  hostium  intenderet  vel,  si  peper- 
cisset,  clementiae  famam  adipisceretur,  illuc  pergit,  non  infenso  exercitu,  ne  spem 
veniae  auferret,  neque  tamen  remissa  cura,  gnarus  facilem  mutatu  gentem,  ut 
segnem  ad  pericula,  ita  infidam  ad  occasiones.  barbari,  pro  ingenio  quisque,  alii 
preces  offerre,  quidam  deserere  vicos  et  in  avia  digredi;  ac  fuere  qui  se  speluncis 
et  carissima  secum  abderent.  igitur  dux  Romanus  diversis  artibus,  misericordia 
adversus  supplices,  celeritate  adversus  profugos,  inmitis  iis,  qui  latebras  insederant, 
ora  et  exitus  specuum  sarmentis  virgultisque  completos  igni  exurit.  atque  ilium 
fines  suos  praegredientem  incursavere  Mardi,  latrociniis  exerciti  contraque  inrum- 
pentem  montibus  defensi;  quos  Corbulo  inmissis  Hiberis  vastavit  hostilemque 
audaciam  externo  sanguine  ultus  est. 

24.  Ipse  exercitusque  ut  nullis  ex  proelio  damnis,  ita  per  inopiam  et  labores 
fatiscebant,  carne  pecudum  propulsare  famem  adacti.  ad  hoc  penuria  aquae, 
fervida  aestas,  longinqua  itinera  sola  ducis  patientia  mitigabantur,  eadem  pluraque 
gregario  milite  tolerantis.  ventum  dehinc  in  locos  cultos  demessaeque  segetes, 
et  ex  duobus  castellis,  in  quae  confugerant  Armenii,  alteram  impetu  captum; 
qui  primam  vim  depulerant,  obsidione  coguntur.  unde  in  regionem  Taurauni- 
tium  transgressus  inprovisum  periculum  vitavit.  nam  haud  procul  tentorio 
eius  non  ignobilis  barbarus  cum  telo  repertus  ordinem  insidiaram  seque  auctorem 
et  socios  per  tormenta  edidit,  convictique  et  puniti  sunt  qui  specie  amicitiae  dolum 
parabant.  nee  multo  post  legati  Tigranocerta  missi  patere  moenia  adferant, 
intentos  popularis  ad  iussa:  simul  hospitale  donum,  coronam  auream,  tradebant. 
accepitque  cum  honore,  nee  quicquam  urbi  detractum,  quo  promptius  obsequium 
integri  retinerent. 

25.  At  praesidium  Legerda,  quod  ferox  iuventus  clauserat,  non  sine  certamine 
expugnatum  est:  nam  et  proelium  pro  muris  ausi  erant  et  pulsi  intra  munimenta 
aggeri  demum  et  inrumpentium  armis  cessere.  quae  facilius  proveniebant,  quia 
Parthi  Hyrcano  bello  distinebantur.  miserant  que  Hyrcani  ad  principem  Romanum 
societatem  oratum,  attineri  a  se  Vologesen  pro  pignore  amicitiae  ostentantes. 
eos  regredientes  Corbulo,  ne  Euphraten  transgressi  hostium  custodiis  circum- 


22  A   STUDY    OF   CN.    DOMITIUS   CORBULO 

venirentur,  dato  praesidio  ad  litora  maris  rubri  deduxit,  unde  vitatis  Parthorum 
finibus  patrias  in  sedes  remeavere. 

26.  Quin  et  Tiridaten  per  Medos  extrema  Armeniae  intrantem,  praemisso 
cum  auxiliis  Verulano  legato  atque  ipse  legionibus  citis,  abire  procul  ac  spem 
belli  amittere  subegit;  quosque  nobis  aversos  animis  cognoverat,  caedibus  et 
incendiis  perpopulatus  possessionem  Armeniae  usurpabat,  cum  advenit  Tigranes 
a  Nerone  ad  capessendum  imperium  delectus,  Cappadocum  ex  nobilitate,  regis 
Archelai  nepos,  sed  quod  diu  obses  apud  urbem  fuerat,  usque  ad  servilem 
patientiam  demissus.  nee  consensu  acceptus,  durante  apud  quosdam  favore 
Arsacidarum.  at  plerique  superbiam  Parthorum  perosi  datum  a  Romanis  regem 
malebant.  additum  ei  praesidium  mille  legionarii,  tres  sociorum  cohortes 
duaeque  equitum  alae,  et  quo  facilius  novum  regnum  tueretur,  partes  Armeniae, 
ut  cuique  finitima,  Pharasmani  Polemonique  et  Aristobulo  atque  Antiocho  parere 
iussae  sunt.  Corbulo  in  Suriam  abscessit,  morte  Ummidii  legati  vacuam  ac  sibi 
permissam. 

XV.  1.  Interea  rex  Parthorum  Vologeses  cognitis  Corbulonis  rebus  regemque 
alienigenam  Tigranen  Armeniae  impositum,  simul  fratre  Tiridate  pulso  spretum 
Arsacidarum  fastigium  ire  ultum  volens,  magnitudine  rursum  Romana  et  con- 
tinui  foederis  reverentia  diversas  ad  curas  trahebatur,  cunctator  ingenio  et  defec- 
tione  Hyrcanorum,  gentis  validae,  multisque  ex  eo  bellis  inligatus.  atque  ilium 
ambiguum  novus  insuper  nuntius  contumeliae  exstimulat:  quippe  egressus 
Armenia  Tigranes  Adiabenos,  conterminam  nationem,  latius  ac  diutius  quam 
per  latrocinia  vastaverat,  idque  primores  gentium  aegre  tolerabant:  eo  contemp- 
tionis  descensum,  ut  ne  duce  quidem  Romano  incursarentur,  sed  temeritate 
obsidis  tot  per  annos  inter  mancipia  habiti.  accendebat  dolorem  eorum  Mono- 
bazus,  quern  penes  Adiabenum  regimen,  quod  praesidium  aut  unde  peteret  rogi- 
tans.  iam  de  Armenia  concessum,  proxima  trahi;  et  nisi  defendant  Parthi,  levius 
servitium  apud  Romanos  deditis  quam  captis  esse.  Tiridates  quoque  regni 
profugus  per  silentium  aut  modice  querendo  gravior  erat:  non  enim  ignavia 
magna  imperia  contineri;  virorum  armorumque  faciendum  certamen;  id  in 
summa  fortuna  aequius  quod  validius,  et  sua  retinere  privatae  domus,  de  alienis 
certare  regiam  laudem  esse. 

2.  Igitur  commotus  his  Vologeses  concilium  vocat  et  proximum  sibi  Tiridaten 
constituit  atque  ita  orditur:  chunc  ego  eodem  mecum  patre  genitum,  cum  mihi 
per  aetatem  summo  nomine  concessisset,  in  possessionem  Armeniae  deduxi,  qui 
tertius  potentiae  gradus  habetur:  nam  Medos  Pacorus  ante  ceperat.  videbarque 
contra  Vetera  fratrum  odia  et  certamina  familiae  nostrae  penates  rite  composuisse. 
prohibent  Romani  et  pacem  numquam  ipsis  prospere  lacessitam  nunc  quoque 
in  exitium  suum  abrumpunt.  non  ibo  infitias:  aequitate  quam  sanguine,  causa 
quam  armis  retinere  parta  maioribus  malueram.  si  cunctatione  deliqui,  virtute 
corrigam.  vestra  quidem  vis  et  gloria  in  integro  est,  addita  modestiae  fama,  quae 
neque  summis  mortalium  spernenda  est  et  a  dis  aestimatur'.  simul  diademate 
caput  Tiridatis  evinxit,  promptam  equitum  manum,  quae  regem  ex  more  sectatur, 
Monaesi   nobili   viro   tradidit,  adiectis  Abiabenorum  auxiliis,  mandavitque  Ti- 


EXPOSITION  23 

granen  Armenia  exturbare,  dum  ipse  positis  adversus  Hyrcanos  discordiis  vires 
intimas  molemque  belli  ciet,  provinciis  Romanis  minitans. 

3.  Quae  ubi  Corbuloni  certis  nuntiis  audita  sunt,  legiones  duas  cum  Veru- 
lano  Severo  et  Vettio  Bolano  subsidium  Tigrani  mittit,  occulto  praecepto,  com- 
positius  cuncta  quam  festinantius  agerent:  quippe  bellum  habere  quam  gerere 
malebat.  Scripseratque  Caesari  proprio  duce  opus  esse,  qui  Armeniam  def enderet : 
Suriam  ingruente  Vologese  acriore  in  discrimine  esse,  atque  interim  reliquas 
legiones  pro  ripa  Euphratis  locat,  tumultuariam  provincialium  manum  armat, 
hostiles  ingressus  praesidiis  intercipit.  et  quia  egena  aquarum  regio  est,  castella 
fontibus  inposita;   quosdam  rivos  congestu  harenae  abdidit. 

4.  Ea  dum  a  Corbulone  tuendae  Suriae  parantur,  acto  raptim  agmine 
Monaeses,  ut  famam  sui  praeiret,  non  ideo  nescium  aut  incautum  Tigranen 
offendit.  occupaverat  Tigranocertam,  urbem  copia  defensorum  et  magnitudine 
moenium  validam.  ad  hoc  Nicephorius  amnis  haud  spernenda  latitudine  partem 
murorum  ambit,  et  ducta  ingens  fossa,  qua  fluvio  diffidebatur.  inerantque  milites 
et  provisi  ante  commeatus,  quorum  subvectu  pauci  avidius  progressi  et  repentinis 
hostibus  circumventi  ira  magis  quam  metu  ceteros  accenderant.  sed  Partho  ad 
exsequendas  obsidiones  nulla  comminus  audacia:  raris  sagittis  neque  clausos 
exterret  et  semet  frustratur.  Adiabeni  cum  promovere  scalas  et  machinamenta 
inciperent,  facile  detrusi,  mox  erumpentibus  nostris  caeduntur. 

5.  Corbulo  tamen,  quamvis  secundis  rebus  suis,  moderandum  fortunae  ratus 
misit  ad  Vologesen,  qui  expostularent  vim  provinciae  inlatam:  socium  amicumque 
regem,  cohortes  Romanas  circumsideri.  omitteret  potius  obsidionem,  aut  se 
quoque  in  agro  hostili  castra  positurum.  Casperius  centurio  in  earn  legationem 
delectus  apud  oppidum  Nisibin,  septem  et  triginta  milibus  passuum  a  Tigrano- 
certa  distantem,  adiit  regem  et  mandata  ferociter  edidit.  Vologesi  vetus  et  penitus 
infixum  erat  arma  Romana  vitandi,  nee  praesentia  prospere  fluebant.  inritum 
obsidium,  tutus  manu  et  copiis  Tigranes,  fugati  qui  expugnationem  sumpserant, 
missae  in  Armeniam  legiones,  et  aliae  pro  Suria  paratae  ultro  inrumpere;  sibi 
inbecillum  equitem  pabuli  inopia:  nam  exorta  vis  locustarum  ambederat  quid- 
quid  herbidum  aut  frondosum.  igitur  metu  abstruso  mitiora  obtendens,  mis- 
surum  ad  imperatorem  Romanum  legatos  super  petenda  Armenia  et  firmanda 
pace  respondet.    Monaesen  omittere  Tigranocertam  iubet,  ipse  retro  concedit. 

6.  Haec  plures  ut  formidine  regis  et  Corbulonis  minis  patrata  ac  magnifica 
extollebant:  alii  occulte  pepigisse  interpretabantur,  ut  omisso  utrimque  bello  et 
abeunte  Vologese  Tigranes  quoque  Armenia  abscederet.  cur  enim  exercitum 
Romanum  a  Tigranocertis  deductum  ?  cur  deserta  per  otium  quae  bello  defen- 
derant  ?  an  melius  hibernavisse  in  extrema  Cappadocia,  raptim  erectis  tuguriis, 
quam  in  sede  regni  modo  retenti  ?  dilata  prorsus  arma,  ut  Vologeses  cum  alio 
quam  cum  Corbulone  certaret,  Corbulo  meritae  tot  per  annos  gloriae  non  ultra 
periculum  faceret.  nam,  ut  rettuli,  proprium  ducem  tuendae  Armeniae  poposcerat 
et  adventare  Caesennius  Paetus  audiebatur.  iamque  aderat,  copiis  ita  divisis, 
ut  quarta  et  duodecuma  legiones  addita  quinta,  quae  recens  e  Moesis  excita  erat, 
simul  Pontica  et  Galatarum  Cappadocumque  auxilia  Paeto  oboedirent,  tertia  et 


24  A    STUDY    OF   CN.    DOMITIUS   CORBULO 

sexta  et  decuma  legion es  priorque  Suriae  miles  apud  Corbulonem  manerent; 
cetera  ex  rerum  usu  sociarent  partirenturve.  sed  neque  Corbulo  aemuli  patiens, 
et  Paetus,  cui  satis  ad  gloriam  erat,  si  proximus  haberetur,  despiciebat  gesta, 
nihil  caedis  aut  praedae,  usurpatas  nomine  tenus  urbium  expugnationes  dictitans : 
se  tributa  ac  leges  et  pro  umbra  regis  Romanum  ius  victis  impositurum. 

7.  Sub  idem  tempus  legati  Vologesis,  quos  ad  principem  missos  memoravi, 
revertere  inriti  bellumque  propalam  sumptum  a  Parthis.  nee  Paetus  detrectavit, 
sed  duabus  legionibus,  quarum  quartam  Funisulanus  Vettonianus  eo  in  tempore, 
duodecumam  Calavius  Sabinus  regebant,  Armeniam  intrat  tristi  omine.  nam 
in  transgressu  Euphratis,  quern  ponte  tramittebant,  nulla  palam  causa  turbatus 
equus,  qui  consularia  insignia  gestabat,  retro  evasit.  hostiaque,  quae  munieban- 
tur,  hibemaculis  adsistens  semifacta  opera  fuga  perrupit  seque  vallo  extulit.  et 
pila  militum  arsere,  magis  insigni  prodigio,  quia  Parthus  hostis  missilibus  telis 
decertat. 

8.  Ceterum  Paetus  spretis  ominibus,  necdum  satis  firmatis  hibemaculis, 
nullo  rei  frumentariae  provisu,  rapit  exercitum  trans  montem  Taurum  reciperandis, 
ut  ferebat,  Tigranocertis  vastandisque  regionibus,  quas  Corbuio  integras  omi- 
sisset.  et  capta  quaedam  castella,  gloriaeque  et  praedae  nonnihil  partum,  si  aut 
gloriam  cum  modo  aut  praedam  cum  cura  habuisset.  longinquis  itineribus  per- 
cursando  quae  obtineri  nequibant,  corrupto  qui  captus  erat  commeatu  et  instante 
iam  hieme,  reduxit  exercitum  conposuitque  ad  Caesarem  litteras  quasi  confecto 
bello,  verbis  magnificis,  rerum  vacuas. 

9.  Interim  Corbulo  numquam  neglectam  Euphratis  ripam  crebrioribus  prae- 
sidiis  insedit;  et  ne  ponti  iniciendo  impedimentum  hostiles  turmae  adferrent 
(iam  enim  subiectis  campis  magna  specie  volitabant),  naves  magnitudine  prae- 
stantes  et  conexas  trabibus  ac  turribus  auctas  agit  per  amnem  catapultisque  et 
balistis  proturbat  barbaros,  in  quos  saxa  et  hastae  longius  permeabant,  quam  ut 
contrario  sagittarum  iactu  adaequarentur.  dein  pons  continuatus  collesque 
adversi  per  socias  cohortes,  post  legionum  castris  occupantur,  tanta  celeritate  et 
ostentatione  virium,  ut  Parthi  omisso  paratu  invadendae  Suriae  spem  omnem  in 
Armeniam  verterent,  ubi  Paetus  imminentium  nescius  quintam  legionem  procul 
in  Ponto  habebat,  reliquas  promiscis  miiitum  commeatibus  infirmaverat,  donee 
adventare  Vologesen  magno  et  infenso  agmine  auditum. 

10.  Accitur  legio  duodecuma,  et  unde  famam  aucti  exercitus  speraverat, 
prodita  infrequentia,  qua  tamen  retineri  castra  et  eludi  Parthus  tractu  belli  poterat, 
si  Paeto  aut  in  suis  aut  in  alienis  consiliis  constantia  fuisset:  verum  ubi  a  viris 
militaribus  adversus  urguentes  casus  firmatus  erat,  rursus,  ne  alienae  sententiae 
indigens  videretur,  in  diversa  ac  deteriora  transibat.  et  tunc  relictis  hibernis  non 
fossam  neque  vallum  sibi,  sed  corpora  et  arma  in  hostem  data  clamitans,  duxit 
legiones  quasi  proelio  certaturus.  deinde  amisso  centurione  et  paucis  militibus, 
quos  visendis  hostium  copiis  praemiserat,  trepidus  remeavit.  et  quia  minus 
acriter  Vologeses  institerat,  vana  rursus  fiducia  tria  milia  delecti  peditis  proximo 
Tauri  iugo  imposuit,  quo  transitum  regis  arcerent;  alares  quoque  Pannonios, 
robur  equitatus,  in  parte  campi  locat.    coniunx  ac  filius  castello,  cui  Arsamosata 


EXPOSITION  25 

nomen  est,  abciiti,  data  in  praesidium  cohorte  ac  disperso  milite,  qui  in  uno  habitus 
vagum  hostem  promptius  sustentavisset.  aegre  compulsum  ferunt,  ut  instantem 
Corbuloni  fateretur.  nee  a  Corbulone  properatum,  quo  gliscentibus  periculis 
etiam  subsidii  laus  augeretur.  expediri  tamen  itineri  singula  milia  ex  tribus 
legionibus  et  alarios  octingentos,  parem  numerum  e  cohortibus  iussit. 

11.  At  Vologeses,  quamvis  obsessa  a  Paeto  itinera  hinc  peditatu  inde  equite 
accepisset,  nihil  mutato  consilio,  sed  vi  ac  minis  alares  exterruit,  legionarios  obtri- 
vit,  uno  tan  turn  centurione  Tarquitio  Crescente  turrim,  in  qua  praesidium  agitabat, 
defendere  auso  factaque  saepius  eruptione  et  caesis,  qui  barbarorum  propius 
suggrediebantur,  donee  ignium  iactu  circumveniretur.  peditum  si  quis  integer 
longinqua  et  avia,  vulnerati  castra  repetivere,  virtutem  regis,  saevitiam  et  copias 
gentium,  cuncta  metu  extollentes,  facili  credulitate  eorum,  qui  eadem  pavebant. 
ne  dux  quidem  obniti  adversis,  sed  cuncta  militiae  munia  deseruerat,  missis  iterum 
ad  Corbulonem  precibus,  veniret  propere,  signa  et  aquilas  et  nomen  reliquum 
infelicis  exercitus  tueretur:  se  fidem  interim,  donee  vita  subpeditet,  retenturos. 

12.  Me  interritus  et  parte  copiarum  apud  Suriam  relicta,  ut  munimenta 
Euphrati  inposita  retinerentur,  qua  proximum  et  commeatibus  non  egenum, 
regionem  Commagenam,  exim  Cappadociam,  inde  Armenios  petivit.  comitaban- 
tur  exercitum  praeter  alia  sueta  bello  magna  vis  camelorum  onusta  frumenti,  ut 
simul  hostem  famemque  depelleret.  primum  e  perculsis  Paccium  primi  pili  cen- 
turionem  obvium  habuit,  dein  plerosque  militum;  quos  diversas  fugae  causas 
obtendentes  redire  ad  signa  et  clementiam  Paeti  experiri  monebat:  se  nisi  victori- 
bus  immitem  esse,  simul  suas  legiones  adire,  hortari,  priorum  admonere,  novam 
gloriam  ostendere.  non  vicos  aut  oppida  Armeniorum,  sed  castra  Romana  duas- 
que  in  iis  legiones  pretium  laboris  peti.  si  singulis  manipularibus  praecipua  ser- 
vati  civis  corona  imperatoria  manu  tribueretur,  quod  illud  et  quantum  decus, 
ubi  par  eorum  numerus  aspiceretur,  qui  adtulissent  salutem  et  qui  accepissent ! 
his  atque  talibus  in  commune  alacres  (et  erant  quos  pericula  fratrum  aut  propin- 
quorum  propriis  stimulis  incenderent)  continuum  diu  noctuque  iter  properabant. 

13.  Eoque  intentius  Vologeses  premere  obsessos,  modo  vallum  legionum, 
modo  castellum,  quo  inbellis  aetas  defendebatur,  adpugnare,  propius  incedens 
quam  mos  Parthis,  si  ea  temeritate  hostem  in  proelium  eliceret.  at  illi  vix  contu- 
berniis  extracti,  nee  aliud  quam  munimenta  propugnabant,  pars  iussu  ducis,  et 
alii  propria  ignavia  aut  Corbulonem  opperientes,  ac  vis  si  ingrueret,  provisis 
exemplis  cladis  Caudinae  Numantinaeque;  neque  eandem  vim  Samnitibus,  Italico 
populo,  ac  Parthis,  Romani  imperii  aemulis.  validam  quoque  et  laudatam  anti- 
quitatem,  quotiens  fortuna  contra  daret,  saluti  consuluisse.  qua  desperatione 
exercitus  dux  subactus  primas  tamen  litteras  ad  Vologesen  non  supplices,  sed  in 
modum  querentis  composuit,  quod  pro  Armeniis  semper  Romanae  dicionis  aut 
subiectis  regi,  quem  imperator  delegisset,  hostilia  faceret:  pacem  ex  aequo  utilem; 
ne  praesentia  tantum  spectaret.  ipsum  adversus  duas  legiones  totis  regni  viribus 
advenisse:  at  Romanis  orbem  terrarum  reliquum,  quo  bellum  iuvarent. 

14.  Ad  ea  Vologeses  nihil  pro  causa,  sed  opperiendos  sibi  fratres  Pacorum  ac 
Tiridaten  rescripsit;  ilium  locum  tempusque  consilio  destinatum,  quid  de  Armenia 


26  A    STUDY   OF   CN.    DOMITIUS   CORBULO 

cernerent;  adiecisse  deos  dignum  Arsacidarum,  simul  ut  de  legionibus  Romanis 
statuerent.  missi  posthac  Paeto  nuntii  et  regis  conloquium  petitum,  qui  Vasacen 
praefectum  equitatus  ire  iussit.  turn  Paetus  Lucullos,  Pompeios  et  si  qua  Caesares 
optinendae  donandaeve  Armeniae  egerant,  Vasaces  imaginem  retinendi  largiendive 
penes  nos,  vim  penes  Parthos  memorat.  et  multum  in  vicem  disceptato,  Mono- 
bazus  Adiabenus  in  diem  posterum  testis  iis  quae  pepigissent  adhibetur.  placuit- 
que  liberari  obsidio  legiones  et  decedere  omnem  militem  finibus  Armeniorum 
castellaque  et  commeatus  Parthis  tradi,  quibus  perpetratis  copia  Vologesi  fieret 
mittendi  ad  Neronem  legatos. 

15.  Interim  flumini  Arsaniae  (is  castra  praefluebat)  pontem  imposuit,  specie 
sibi  illud  iter  expedientis,  sed  Parthi  quasi  documentum  victoriae  iusserant;  nam- 
que  iis  usui  fuit,  nostri  per  diversum  iere.  addidit  rumor  sub  iugum  missas  legiones 
et  alia  ex  rebus  infaustis,  quorum  simulacrum  ab  Armeniis  usurpatum  est.  nam- 
que  et  munimenta  ingressi  sunt,  antequam  agmen  Romanum  excederet,  et  cir- 
cumstetere  vias,  captiva  olim  mancipia  aut  iumenta  adgnoscentes  abstrahentesque : 
raptae  etiam  vestes,  retenta  arma,  pavido  milite  et  concedente,  ne  qua  proelii 
causa  existeret.  Vologeses  armis  et  corporibus  caesorum  aggeratis,  quo  cladem 
nostram  testaretur,  visu  fugientium  legionum  abstinuit:  fama  moderationis 
quaerebatur,  postquam  superbiam  expleverat.  flumen  Arsaniam  elephanto 
insidens,  proximus  quisque  regem  vi  equorum  perrupere,  quia  rumor  incesserat 
pontem  cessurum  oneri  dolo  fabricantium:  sed  qui  ingredi  ausi  sunt,  validum  et 
fidum  intellexere. 

16.  Ceterum  obsessis  adeo  suppeditavisse  rem  frumentariam  constitit,  ut 
horreis  ignem  inicerent,  contraque  prodiderit  Corbulo  Parthos  inopes  copiarum 
et  pabulo  attrito  relicturos  oppugnationem,  neque  se  plus  tridui  itinere  afuisse. 
adicit  iure  iurando  Paeti  cautum  apud  signa,  adstantibus  iis,  quos  testificando 
rex  misisset,  neminem  Romanum  Armeniam  ingressurum,  donee  referrentur 
litterae  Neronis,  an  paci  adnueret.  quae  ut  augendae  infamiae  composita,  sic 
reliqua  non  in  obscuro  habentur,  una  die  quadraginta  milium  spatium  emensum 
esse  Paetum,  desertis  passim  sauciis,  neque  minus  deformem  illam  fugientium 
trepidationem,  quam  si  terga  in  acie  vertissent.  Corbulo  cum  suis  copiis  apud 
ripam  Euphratis  obvius  non  earn  speciem  insignium  et  armorum  praetulit,  ut 
diversitatem  exprobraret.  maesti  manipuli  ac  vicem  commilitonum  miserantes 
ne  lacrimis  quidem  temperare;  vix  prae  fietu  usurpata  consalutatio.  decesserat 
certamen  virtutis  et  ambitio  gloriae,  felicium  hominum  adfectus:  sola  misericordia 
valebat,  et  apud  minores  magis. 

17.  Ducum  inter  se  brevis  sermo  secutus  est,  hoc  conquerente  iam  inritum 
laborem,  potuisse  bellum  fuga  Parthorum  finiri:  ille  integra  utrique  cuncta 
respondit:  converterent  aquilas  et  iuncti  invaderent  Armeniam  abscessu  Vologe- 
sis  infirmatam.  non  ea  imperatoris  habere  mandata  Corbulo:  periculo  legio- 
num commotum  e  provincia  egressum;  quando  in  incerto  habeantur  Parthorum 
conatus,  Suriam  repetiturum:  sic  quoque  optimam  fortunam  orandam,  ut  pedes 
confectus  spatiis  itinerum  alacrem  et  facilitate  camporum  praevenientem  equitem 
adsequeretur.    exim  Paetus  per  Cappadociam  hibernavit:   at  Vologesis  ad  Cor- 


-EXPOSITION  27 

bulonem  missi  nuntii,  detraheret  castella  trans  Euphraten  amnemque,  ut  olim, 
medium  faceret.  ille  Armeniam  quoque  diversis  praesidiis  vacuam  fieri  expostu- 
labat.  et  postremo  concessit  rex;  dirutaque  quae  Euphraten  ultra  communi- 
verat  Corbulo,  et  Armenii  sine  arbitro  relicti  sunt. 

24.  Inter  quae  veris  principio  legati  Parthorum  mandata  regis  Vologesis  lit- 
terasque  in  eandem  formam  attulere:  se  priora  et  totiens  iactata  super  optinenda 
Armenia  nunc  omittere,  quoniam  di,  quamvis  potentium  populorum  arbitri, 
possessionem  Parthis  non  sine  ignominia  Romana  tradidissent.  nuper  clausum 
Tigranen;  post  Paetum  legionesque,  cum  opprimere  posset,  incolumes  dimisisse. 
satis  adprobatam  vim;  datum  et  lenitatis  experimentum.  nee  recusaturum  Tiri- 
daten  accipiendo  diademati  in  urbem  venire,  nisi  sacerdotii  religione  attineretur. 
iturum  ad  signa  et  effigies  principis,  ubi  legionibus  coram  regnum  auspicaretur. 

25.  Talibus  Vologesis  litteris,  quia  Paetus  diversa  tamquam  rebus  integris 
scribebat,  interrogatus  centurio,  qui  cum  legatis  advenerat,  quo  in  statu  Armenia 
esset,  omnes  inde  Romanos  excessisse  respondit.  turn  intellecto  barbarum  inrisu, 
qui  peterent  quod  eripuerant,  consuluit  inter  primores  civitatis  Nero,  bellum 
anceps  an  pax  inhonesta  placeret.  nee  dubitatum  de  bello.  et  Corbulo  militum 
atque  hostium  tot  per  annos  gnarus  gerendae  rei  praeflcitur,  ne  cuius  alterius 
inscitia  rursum  peccaretur,  quia  Paeti  piguerat.  igitur  inriti  remittuntur,  cum 
donis  tamen,  unde  spes  fieret  non  frustra  eadem  oraturum  Tiridaten,  si  preces 
ipse  attulisset.  Suriaeque  executio  C.  Cestio,  copiae  militares  Corbuloni  permis- 
sae,  et  quinta  decuma  legio  ducente  Mario  Celso  e  Pannonia  adiecta  est.  scribitur 
tetrarchis  ac  regibus  praefectisque  et  procuratoribus  et  qui  praetorum  finitimas 
provincias  regebant,  iussis  Corbulonis  obsequi,  in  tantum  ferme  modum  aucta 
potestate,  quern  populus  Romanus  Cn.  Pompeio  bellum  piraticum  gesturo  dederat. 
regressum  Paetum,  cum  graviora  metueret,  facetiis  insectari  satis  habuit  Caesar, 
his  ferme  verbis:  ignoscere  se  statim,  ne  tarn  promptus  in  pavorem  longiore  sol- 
licitudine  aegresceret. 

26.  At  Corbulo  quarta  et  duodecuma  legionibus,  quae  fortissimo  quoque 
amisso  et  ceteris  exterritis  parum  habiles  proelio  videbantur,  in  Suriam  translatis, 
sextam  inde  ac  tertiam  legiones,  integrum  militem  et  crebris  ac  prosperis  labori- 
bus  exercitum,  in  Armeniam  ducit.  addiditque  legionem  quintam,  quae  per 
Pontum  agens  expers  cladis  fuerat,  simul  quintadecumanos  recens  adductos  et 
vexilla  delectorum  ex  Illyrico  et  Aegypto,  quodque  alarum  cohortiumque,  et  auxi- 
lia  regum  in  unum  conducta  apud  Melitenen,  qua  tramittere  Euphraten  parabat. 
turn  lustratum  rite  exercitum  ad  contionem  vocat  orditurque  magnifica  de  auspiciis 
imperatoris  rebusque  a  se  gestis,  adversa  in  inscitiam  Paeti  declinans,  multa 
auctoritate,  quae  viro  militari  pro  facundia  erat. 

27.  Mox  iter  L.  Lucullo  quondam  penetratum,  apertis  quae  vetustas  obsaep- 
serat,  pergit.  et  venientes  Tiridatis  Vologesisque  de  pace  legates  haud  asperna- 
tus,  adiungit  iis  centuriones  cum  mandatis  non  inmitibus:  nee  enim  adhuc  eo 
ventum,  ut  certamine  extremo  opus  esset.  multa  Romanis  secunda,  quaedam 
Parthis  evenisse,  documento  adversus  superbiam.  proinde  et  Tiridati  conducere 
intactum  vastationibus  regnum  dono  accipere,   et  Vologesen  melius  societate 


28  A    STUDY   OF   CN.    DOMITIUS    CORBULO 

Romana  quam  damnis  mutuis  genti  Parthorum  consulturum.  scire,  quantum 
intus  discordiarum  quamque  indomitas  et  praeferoces  nationes  regeret:  contra 
imperatori  suo  immotam  ubique  pacem  et  unum  id  bellum  esse,  simul  consilio 
terrorem  adicere,  et  megistanas  Armenios,  qui  primi  a  nobis  defecerant,  pellit 
sedibus,  castella  eorum  excindit,  plana  edita,  validos  invalidosque  pari  metu 
complet. 

28.  Non  infensum  nee  cum  hostili  odio  Corbulonis  nomen  etiam  barbaris 
habebatur,  eoque  consilium  eius  fidum  credebant.  ergo  Vologeses  neque  atrox 
in  summam,  et  quibusdam  praefecturis  indutias  petit:  Tiridates  locum  diemque 
conloquio  poscit.  tempus  propinquum,  locus,  in  quo  nuper  obsessae  cum  Paeto 
legiones  erant,  cum  barbaris  delectus  esset  ob  memoriam  laetioris  sibi  rei,  Corbulo 
non  vitavit,  ut  dissimilitudo  fortunae  gloriam  augeret.  neque  infamia  Paeti 
angebatur,  quod  eo  maxime  patuit,  quia  filio  eius  tribuno  ducere  manipulos 
atque  operire  reliquias  make  pugnae  imperavit.  die  pacta  Tiberius  Alexander, 
inlustris  eques  Romanus,  minister  bello  datus,  et  Vinicianus  Annius,  gener  Cor- 
bulonis, nondum  senatoria  aetate,  set  pro  legato  quintae  legioni  inpositus,  in  castra 
Tiridatis  venere,  honori  eius  ac  ne  metueret  insidias  tali  pignore;  viceni  dehinc 
equites  adsumpti.  et  viso  Corbulone  rex  prior  equo  desiluit;  nee  cunctatus  Cor- 
bulo, sed  pedes  uterque  dexteras  miscuere. 

29.  Exim  Romanus  laudat  iuvenem  omissis  praecipitibus  tuta  et  salutaria 
capessentem.  ille  de  nobilitate  generis  multum  praefatus,  cetera  temperanter 
adiungit:  iturum  quippe  Romam  laturumque  novum  Caesari  decus,non  adversis 
Parthorum  rebus  supplicem  Arsaciden.  turn  placuit  Tiridaten  ponere  apud 
effigiem  Caesaris  insigne  regium  nee  nisi  manu  Neronis  resumere;  et  conloquium 
osculo  finitum.  dein  paucis  diebus  interiectis,  magna  utrimque  specie,  inde  eques 
compositus  per  turmas  et  insignibus  patriis,  hinc  agmina  legionum  stetere  fulgen- 
tibus  aquilis  signisque  et  simulacris  deum  in  modum  templi:  medio  tribunal 
sedem  curulem  et  sedes  effigiem  Neronis  sustinebat.  ad  quam  progressus  Tirida- 
tes, caesis  ex  more  victimis,  sublatum  capiti  diadema  imagini  subiecit,  magnis 
apud  cunctos  animorum  motibus,  quos  augebat  insita  adhuc  oculis  exercituum 
Romanorum  caedes  aut  obsidio.  at  nunc  versos  casus:  iturum  Tiridaten  ostentui 
gentibus,  quanto  minus  quam  captivum? 

30.  Addidit  gloriae  Corbulo  comitatem  epulasque;  et  rogitante  rege  causas, 
quotiens  novum  aliquid  adverterat,  ut  initia  vigiliarum  per  centurionem  nuntiari, 
convivium  bucina  dimitti  et  structam  ante  augurale  aram  subdita  face  accendi, 
cuncta  in  maius  attollens  admiratione  prisci  moris  adfecit.  postero  die  spatium 
oravit,  quo  tantum  itineris  aditurus  fratres  ante  matremque  viseret;  obsidem 
interea  filiam  tradit  litterasque  supplices  ad  Neronem. 

31.  Et  digressus  Pacorum  apud  Medos,  Vologesen  Ecbatanis  repperit,  non 
incuriosum  fratris:  quippe  et  propriis  nuntiis  a  Corbulone  petierat,  ne  quam 
imaginem  servitii  Tiridates  perferret  neu  ferrum  traderet  aut  complexu  provin- 
cias  optinentium  arceretur  foribusve  eorum  adsisteret,  tantusque  ei  Romae  quan- 
tus  consulibus  honor  esset.  scilicet  externae  superbiae  sueto  non  inerat  notitia 
nostri,  apud  quos  vis  imperii  valet,  inania  tramittuntur. 


EXPOSITION  29 

T.he  first  account  of  Corbulo  we  have  is  that  of  his  campaign  against 
the  Chauci,  who  were  ravaging  the  Gauls.  He  enters  his  province  magna 
cum  cura  et  mox  gloria.  In  the  second  sentence  of  this  opening  passage 
we  have  a  direct  characterization  of  the  general  in  the  way  in  which  he 
enters  the  province.  The  author  wishes  his  readers  to  feel  that  this  gen- 
eral is  not  a  man  who  will  be  caught  off  his  guard,  but  that  success  will 
attend  him.  The  words  mox  gloria1  point  to  the  narration  of  such  events 
as  will  add  to  this  man's  praise,  and  if  we  keep  this  in  mind  I  think  that 
some  of  the  difficulties  of  interpreting  the  Corbulo  episode  will  find  an 
explanation.  The  term  "gloria"  is  often  used  of  a  man  who  has 
attained  some  distinction,  or  as  a  worthy  goal  toward  which  he  strives. 
It  is  used  several  times  of  Corbulo,  and  always  in  a  commendatory  way. 
The  expression  is  applied  repeatedly  to  Agricola2  in  the  monograph  which 
bears  his  name,  and  which  has  been  shown  to  be  an  encomiastic  treatise.3 

After  a  brief  account  of  the  preparation  of  boats  on  the  Rhine,  and 
of  the  destruction  of  the  barbarian  rafts,  the  narrative  at  once  turns  to  a 
more  detailed  description  of  the  military  discipline  of  Corbulo.  He  at 
first  led  back  the  army,  idle  and  delighting  in  plundering,  to  the  old  custom 
and  would  allow  no  one  to  depart  from  the  line  nor  enter  into  a  fight  unless 
ordered.  Discipline  in  an  army  is  always  commendable,  and  while  we  do 
not  know  what  the  morale  of  the  army  was  when  Corbulo  took  command, 
the  implication  is  that  discipline  had  been  broken  down,  and  it  is  to  Cor- 
bulo's  praise  that  he  restored  it  veterem  ad  morem.  When  we  bear  in  mind 
that  to  the  Romans  everything  old  was  best,  and  that  the  ideals  were  to 
be  found  in  the  past,  this  phrase  has  special  significance.  Corbulo  brings 
the  discipline  up  to  the  best  standard  and  the  conclusion  must  be  that  in 
this  respect  he  is  one  of  the  best  generals. 

Corbulo's  strict  disciplinary  power  is  further  illustrated  by  the  account 
of  one  man  being  put  to  death  because  he  was  digging  a  trench  without  side 
arms,  and  another  because  he  was  girded  merely  with  a  dagger.  This 
story,  whether  true  or  false,  Tacitus  says,  had  its  origin  in  the  severity  of 
the  leader.  It  also  serves  to  show  why  men  believed  that  he,  whose  repu- 
tation for  harshness  towards  slight  offenses  was  such,  was  strict  and  inexor- 
able in  the  case  of  great  evils.  At  this  point  I  believe  Tacitus  expresses  his 
dissent  from  his  source.     He  found  that  the  author  he  was  following,  in 


2  "Intravit  animum  (Agricolae)  militaris  gloriae  cupido." — Chap.  5.  "Mox 
et  gloriam  communicabat." — Chap.  8.  "Sic  Agricola  simul  suis  virtutibus,  simul 
vitiis  aliorum  in  ipsam  gloriam  praeceps  agebatur." — Chap.  41. 

3  G.  L.  Hendrickson  The  Proconsulate  of  Julius  Agricola. 


30  A   STUDY    OF    CN.    DOMITIUS    CORBULO 

order  to  show  the  disciplinary  power  of  Corbulo,  had  so  exaggerated  an 
incident  that  he  could  not  believe  it,  and  so  he  says  that,  whether  true  or 
false,  the  story  had  its  origin  in  the  severity  of  the  leader.  As  a  fact  of 
history,  this  incident  is  of  minor  importance,  but  as  an  element  of  charac- 
terization it  serves  excellently  to  bring  out  the  quality  of  the  general  as  a 
stern  disciplinarian.  Further  emphasis  is  added  to  the  idea  by  showing 
that  the  course  of  Corbulo  was  commendable  from  the  results  that  followed. 
These  were  two:  nos  virtntem  auximus,  and  barbari  ferociam  infregere. 

A  passing  notice  is  given  to  the  Frisii,  and  this  adds  to  the  praise  of  Cor- 
bulo by  showing  his  ability  to  govern  in  a  civil  as  well  as  a  military  capacity. 
He  imposed  upon  the  natives  a  senate,  magistrates,  and  laws,  and  took 
proper  precaution  that  they  should  not  throw  off  his  commands.  He 
sent  men  to  induce  the  Greater  Chauci  to  surrender,  and  he  assailed  Gan- 
nascus  with  craft.  The  dark  side  of  Gannascus  is  shown.  He  was  said 
to  be  a  transfugam  et  violatorem  fidei. 

Still  by  the  death  of  Gannascus  Corbulo  was  said  to  be  affording  the 
occasion  of  a  rebellion.  With  most  people,  apud  plerosque,  his  course  of 
action  was  commendable;  with  certain  ones,  apud  quosdam,  it  caused  mis- 
givings. For,  they  ask,  why  should  he  arouse  the  enemy?  In  case  of 
defeat  the  misfortune  would  fall  upon  the  State,  the  very  thing  which  Cor- 
bulo would  not  want.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  suppose  that  he  had  been 
successful.  In  that  case  in  the  eyes  of  a  prince  who  was  ignavus  he  would 
be  a  dangerous  man  to  the  peace  of  a  nation.  This  passage  has  been 
interpreted  as  a  criticism  of  Tacitus  on  Corbulo,  but  I  think  Tacitus  is 
following  quite  closely  his  source.  In  that  the  author  was  aware  of  some 
criticism  of  Corbulo's  actions.  It  would  have  been  something  unusual 
for  so  prominent  a  man  to  escape  criticism  entirely.  However,  it  was  the 
majority  who  commended  Corbulo.  Even  with  "the  certain  ones,"  what 
is  given  in  the  text  shows  not  so  much  criticism  as  it  does  their  inability  to 
understand  the  meaning  of  Corbulo's  actions.  Any  other  interpretation 
for  the  words,  cur  hostem  conciret?  Adversa  in  rem  publicam  casura  is 
meaningless,  when  one  takes  into  account  the  whole  conduct  of  Corbulo. 
It  is  a  question  that  shows  perplexity  in  the  mind.  The  words  sin  prospere 
egisset  formidolosum  pact  virum  insignem  et  ignavo  principem  praegravent, 
cannot  be  a  criticism  of  Tacitus  on  Corbulo  unless  we  are  ready  to  admit 
one  of  two  things,  either  that  Tacitus  criticizes  him  for  his  success  which 
thereby  endangers  the  peace,  or  else  that  he  criticizes  him  for  exposing 
himself  to  the  danger  of  a  base  prince.  The  criticism  for  either  course 
would  be  absurd.  That  the  author  felt  that  no  blame  was  to  be  attached 
to  Corbulo  in  this  matter  is  shown  by  the  way  in  which  he  represents  Cor- 


EXPOSITION  3 1 

bulo's  immediate  withdrawal  to  this  side  of  the  Rhine  when  so  ordered 
by  Claudius.  Corbulo  exacted  strict  obedience  to  his  own  commands. 
He  knew  how  to  obey  his  superior.4  His  greatness  is  shown  in  his  obedience 
and  this  is  emphasized  by  showing  the  embarrassing  situation  in  which  he 
was  placed.  For,  it  is  said,  there  were  pouring  into  his  mind  fear  from  the 
emperor,  scorn  from  the  barbarians,  and  mockery  from  among  the  allies. 
Yet  he  obeyed,  saying  only:   beatos  quondam  duces  RomanosJ 

After  his  withdrawal  across  the  Rhine  Corbulo  set  his  troops  to  digging 
a  canal  as  a  protection  against  the  tides  from  the  ocean  in  order  that  they 
might  not  become  demoralized  by  inactivity.  He  received  the  insignia  of 
a  triumph,  although  the  right  to  wage  war  had  been  denied  him.  If  we 
look  into  the  account  in  Tacitus  for  good  reasons  why  the  insignia  should 
have  been  given  him,  we  fail  to  find  them.  The  idea  most  emphasized  in 
these  three  chapters  is  the  ability  of  Corbulo  as  a  commander,  and  his 
obedience  to  orders  from  his  superior  even  under  trying  circumstances. 
Did  he  deserve  the  insignia  ?  Possibly  he  did,  but  the  facts  in  the  narration 
do  not  show  it,  and  the  explanation  is  that  Tacitus'  source  was  not  con- 
cerned with  the  facts  of  history  per  se,  but  used  them  to  bring  out  the  meri- 
torious qualities  of  the  general. 

Corbulo6  is  next  mentioned  in  the  encomiastic  phrase:  videbaturquc 
locus  virtutibus  patejaciusJ     Now  what  opportunity  would  Corbulo  have 

4  For  a  commendation  of  obedience  to  orders  under  analogous  circumstances  cf . 
Nepos  Ages.  4:  "qui  cum  victori  praeesset  exercitui  maximamque  haberet  fiduciam 
regni  Persarum  potiundi.  tanta  modestia  dicto  audiens  fuit  iussis  absentium  magis- 
tratum,  ut  si  privatus  in  comitio  esset  Spartae.  cuius  exemplum  utinam  imperatores 
nostri  sequi  voluissent." 

s  xi.  20.  The  account  here  describes  the  hard  situation  under  which  it  was  dim- 
cult  to  obey  and  thereby  allows  the  character  of  Corbulo  to  reveal  itself  in  his  obedience, 
while  in  Cassius  Dio  lx.  30,  the  thought  that  his  recall  was  due  to  the  envy  of  Claudius 
is  the  rather  emphasized.  r-r\v  re  yap  dpeTrjv  avrov  kclI  tt]v  (LffK-rjcyLV  p.aOwv  ovk  iirtrpe- 
ipev  avrip  iwl  tt\4ov  avi-Tjdijvai.  irvdbp.evo's  bk  tovto  6  KopfiovXojv  eiravTjXde,  togovtov  p.bvov 
dvafibrjoas  "  t5  p.aKapioi  io  ndXai  vori  <TTpaTr)yr)(ravT€s'''  etr  b-qXuxnv  tin  rots  fiiv  diciv8i!r- 
vus  dvbpayadl^eadat.  i^rjv,  aiirbs  S'  vwb  tov  avTOKpdropos  bid  tov  (pdbvov    eveirobiaBtj. 

6  The  account  of  Corbulo's  campaign  against  the  Chauci  is  given  as  taking  place 
in  the  year  47.  He  has  no  new  command  until  appointed  by  Nero  in  54  to  take  charge 
of  the  situation  in  Armenia.  What  he  was  doing  during  this  time  we  do  not  know. 
Henderson  in  The  Lije  and  Principate  oj  the  Emperor  Nero,  p.  165,  says:  "He  stayed 
in  Rome,  amusing  the  Senate  by  his  bluntness  of  speech,  until  about  the  year  a.d.  51 
he  was  sent  to  govern  the  rich  and  peaceful  province  of  Asia."  But  in  all  these  years 
from  47  to  54  we  do  not  have  a  single  mention  of  him  in  Tacitus.  When  he  is  again 
brought  to  our  attention  in  xiii.  8,  it  is  in  connection  with  his  appointment  to  have 
charge  of  the  war  against  the  Parthians. 

7  The  translator  in  Bonn's  Library  renders  thus:  "it  seemed  to  open  a  place  and 
standing  for  virtue."     This  makes  the  statement  a  general  one.     But  obviously  it  refers 


32  A   STUDY   OF   CN.    DOMITIUS   CORBULO 

had  of  showing  the  virtutes  of  a  general  during  the  years  of  quiet  between 
his  campaign  against  the  Chauci  and  his  appointment  to  command  in  the 
East  ?  None  whatever.  The  virtutibus  refer  to  Corbulo's  success  in 
Germany  and  to  his  military  discipline,  and  so  are  to  be  taken  in  close  con- 
nection therewith.  This  is  further  shown  by  the  phrase  per  recentem 
gloriam.8  This  is  given  as  one  of  the  reasons  why  the  hostages  given  by 
Vologeses  preferred  Corbulo  to  Quadratus.  Corbulo  having  no  command 
during  those  seven  or  eight  years  of  inactivity  could  have  won  no  victory, 
and  a  victory  won  seven  years  before  is  too  old  to  speak  of  as  recentem. 
The  explanation  is  to  be  found  in  the  author's  disregard  for  chronology, 
as  I  have  shown  above.  Not  finding  anything  in  this  period  which  he 
cares  to  record,  and  not  concerned  with  a  time  element,  he  makes  the  recen- 
tem victoriam  refer  back  to  the  German  campaign. 

The  narrative  of  these  two  chapters9  is  highly  encomiastic.  After 
Corbulo's  appointment  and  a  statement  of  the  division  of  the  troops  we 
have  the  phrase:  sed  studia  eorum  in  Corbulonem  promptiora.  Again, 
when  the  question  of  choosing  between  Corbulo  and  Quadratus  is  left  to 
the  hostages  they  choose  the  former:  per  recentem  gloriam  et  inclinations 
quadam  etiam  hostium  Corbulonem  praetulere.  Preference  was  again  shown 
for  Corbulo  when  Quadratus  heard  that  he  was  coming  and  hastened  to 
Cilicia:  ne,  si  ad  accipiendas  copias  Suriam  intravisset  Corbulo,  omnium 
ora  in  se  verteret.  This  preference  was  due  to  Corbulo's  being  corpore 
ingens,  verbis  magnificis  et  super  experientiam  sapientiamque  etiam  specie 
inanium  validus.  Physical  qualities  are  one  of  the  things  enumerated  by 
the  rhetoricians  to  be  praised.10 

The  phrase  verbis  magnificis  has  been  interpreted  as  a  criticism  of 
Tacitus  on  Corbulo,  but  the  author  simply  meant  to  express  by  it  the  elo- 
quence of  the  general  as  one  of  the  many  good  qualities  possessed  by  him 
and  which  he  is  here  enumerating. 

The  sending  of  instructions  to  Vologeses  by  both  Corbulo  and  Quad- 
ratus to  maintain  the  usual  relations  toward  the  Roman  Empire  and  the 

directly  to  the  "virtutes"  of  Corbulo  and  this  view  is  supported  by  Dio  lxii.  19,  where  he 
says:  Sp-oia  yap  5t/  tois  irp&rois  'Pwpalwv,  ovx  Sti  t<j)  y4vei  \apirpbs  7)  rep  athpaTi  iirxvpbs, 
dXXa  Kal  tt)  if/vxTI  dpTi<ppwv  7jv  /ecu  7ro\i)  p&v  rb  avbpeiov  7ro\i>  8t  Kal  rb  Slicaiov  t6  re  iria- 
rbv  is  Tr&vTa.s  /ecu  rovs  olksIovs  Kal  tovs  TroXeplovs  elxev.  v<p'1  ovirep  Kal  6  NVpwj'  iirl  rbv 
irb\ep.ov  avrbv  dvd'  eavrov  airforeiXe,  bvvap.iv  aurcjj  8<tt]v  ovbevl  tiiXXip  iwirpe^/e,  iricrTeiHras 
6/xoiws  Kal  tovs  /3ap/3dpous  avrbv  KaTepydoevdai  Kal  avrQ  p,r)  iiravacrT^aeadai. 

8  xiii.   q.  9  xiii.  8,  9. 

io^p«s  yap  vepl  p.iv  cribparos  Sri  Ka\bs,  Sri  ju^yas,  6Vt  raxvs,  8tl  Icrxvpbs. — 
Spengel  II,  p.  12.  Cf.  Nepos  I  ph.  3:  "Fuit  autem  et  animo  magno  et  corpore  impera- 
toriaque  forma  ut  ipso  aspectu  cuivis  iniceret  admirationem  sui." 


EXPOSITION  33 

giving  of  hostages  by  Vologeses  afford  the  occasion  for  a  quarrel  between 
the  centurion  and  the  praefect,  and  this  quarrel  serves  to  bring  out  the  pre- 
ference of  the  natives  for  Corbulo.  The  quarrel  is  of  slight  importance  except 
in  so  far  as  it  adds  an  encomiastic  touch  to  Corbulo.  It  now  develops  into 
a  disagreement  between  Quadratus  and  Corbulo.  The  former  contended 
that  his  victories  had  been  wrenched  from  him,  while  the  latter  claimed 
that  no  hostages  were  offered  until  he  had  been  chosen  to  conduct  the  war. 
That  the  writer  believed  that  Corbulo's  claim  was  correct  is  clearly  shown 
from  what  has  already  been  stated  in  regard  to  the  preference  of  all  classes 
for,  him,  the  implication  being  that  whatever  advantage  Quadratus  had 
gained  was  wholly  due  to  the  influence  of  Corbulo.  And  yet  while  the 
success  thus  far  gained  was  due  to  the  influence  of  Corbulo  on  the  natives 
of  the  East,  Nero,  in  order  to  settle  the  dispute,  ordered  the  laurel  to  be 
added  to  the  imperial  fasces.  The  situation  as  here  represented  is  similar 
to  that  when  Corbulo  was  forbidden  to  conduct  further  operations  against 
the  Chauci.  The  writer's  object  was  to  make  his  readers  feel  that  Corbulo 
received  no  assistance  from  the  emperors,  but  that  it  was  by  his  own  abilities 
that  he  acquired  distinction  and  glory. 

The  war  against  the  Parthians1 1  which  had  been  prolonged  with  little 
vigor  was  now  taken  up  in  earnest,  because  Vologeses  would  neither  allow 
his  brother  Tiridates  to  be  deprived  of  the  kingdom  which  he  had  given 
him,  nor  would  he  allow  him  to  hold  it  as  a  gift  from  a  foreign  power. 
This  situation  served  to  give  an  encomiastic  touch  to  the  narrative  in  the 
comparison  of  Corbulo  with  Lucullus.  It  is  a  case  of  avyKpi<n<i  as  recog- 
nized by  the  rhetoricians.  Lucullus  and  Pompey  were  two  of  Rome's 
greatest  generals.  Their  campaigns  had  taken  place  in  Armenia,  but  since 
their  day  Roman  prestige  had  waned  much  in  the  East.  The  author  repre- 
sents Corbulo  as  thinking  it  worthy  of  the  greatness  of  the  Roman  people 
to  recover  what  these  two  generals  of  an  earlier  age  had  acquired. 

It  would  be  difficult  to  find  a  more  elaborate  characterization  of  a  man 
than  we  have  in  chap.  35.  There  is  first  given  a  statement  of  the  deplora- 
ble condition  of  affairs  which  had  to  be  corrected  before  anything  could  be 
accomplished  in  the  way  of  active  military  operations.  It  is  a  dark  back- 
ground over  against  which  are  set  the  meritorious  qualities  of  the  strict  and 
inexorable  disciplinarian.     The  difficulty  of  fighting  one  enemy  is  great 

11  We  have  no  further  mention  of  Corbulo  until  that  given  under  the  year  58.  The 
time  included  from  the  date  of  his  landing  in  the  East  and  this  date  was  doubtless  spent 
in  collecting  and  disciplining  an  army.  And  as  the  author  was  not  concerned  with  a 
time  element  and  was  dealing  primarily  with  the  irpd£eis  he  very  likely  passed  these 
years  over  in  silence. 


34  A    STUDY    OF    CN.    DOMITIUS   CORBULO 

enough,  but  here  Corbulo  has  a  greater  task  in  contending  against  the 
ignaviam  of  the  soldiers  than  against  the  perfidiam  of  the  enemy.  The 
difficulties  he  has  to  contend  with  are  shown  by  depicting  the  condition  of 
the  army:  soldiers  sluggish  from  a  long  peace  and  most  reluctantly  per- 
forming the  duties  of  the  camp;  veterans  in  the  army  who  had  never  per- 
formed picket  duty  nor  acted  as  sentinels  and  who  would  have  regarded  a 
rampart  or  foss  as  something  strange  and  marvelous;  without  helmets 
and  cuirasses,  dandified,  avaricious,  performing  their  military  service  in 
the  towns.  In  this  situation  there  is  an  implied  avyKptais  in  Corbulo's 
favor.  For  the  demoralized  condition  of  the  troops  is  due  wholly  or  in 
great  measure  to1  the  inefficiency  of  previous  commanders,  and  this  state 
of  affairs  he  succeeds  in  entirely  changing.  He  begins  by  dismissing  all 
who  were  incapacitated  by  age  or  sickness.  He  made  new  levies  through- 
out Galatia  and  Cappadocia  and  a  force  was  summoned  from  Germany. 
Such  was  the  condition  which  Corbulo  found  and  changed — demoraliza- 
tion of  the  army,  on  the  one  hand,  the  levying  of  new  troops  and  their 
training  and  the  summoning  of  a  legion  from  far  distant  Germany,  on  the 
other.  To  complete  the  discipline  the  troops  were  kept  under  tents  in  one 
of  the  most  severe  winters.  The  limbs  of  many  were  frost-bitten  and  it 
was  observed  of  one  soldier  that  as  he  carried  a  bundle  of  wood  his  hands 
were  so  frozen  that  they  fell  off,  still  clinging  to  their  burden — a  palpable 
exaggeration,  but  exaggeration  is  an  element  commonly  found  in  encomias- 
tic treatments.  The  story  is  simply  told  to  magnify  the  severity  of  the 
winter  and  the  strictness  of  the  general  in  his  discipline.  And  now  we  are 
given  a  picture  of  the  general,  the  very  type  of  a  great  leader  who  shares 
the  hardships  of  his  soldiers  but  who  has  in  him  that  stern  and  unyielding 
nature  of  the  old  Roman  of  early  days.  The  description  of  him  is  given 
added  force  by  the  rhetorical  device  of  asyndeton;  ipse  cultu  levi,  capite 
intecto,  in  agmine,  in  laboribus  frequens  adesse,  laudem  strenuis,  solarium 
invalidis,  exemplum  omnibus  ostendere.  The  severity  of  the  winter  and 
service  caused  many  to  desert,  but  not  as  in  the  case  of  other  armies,  where 
a  first  or  second  offense  was  pardoned,  did  Corbulo  let  his  soldiers  go  free. 
Death  was  the  penalty  for  desertion  and  this  strict  discipline  was  justified 
from  the  results  which  followed,  namely,  that  there  were  fewer  desertions 
than  in  those  camps  where  pardon  was  granted. 

In  this  chap.  36  we  have  an  implied  o-vyKptats  between  Corbulo  and 
Paccius  Orfitus.  Corbulo  kept  his  troops  in  camp  until  spring  should 
open.  But  Paccius  Orfitus  who  seems  to  have  been  in  a  camp  at  some 
distance  was  eager  to  attack  the  barbarians  while  off  their  guard,  as  he 
thought,  and  he  had  written  Corbulo  to  this  effect,  but  was  ordered  by  his 


EXPOSITION  35 

superior  to  keep  within  his  fortifications  and  await  greater  forces.  These 
commands  he  disobeyed  and  was  defeated,  which  so  displeased  Corbulo 
that  he  ordered  Paccius  and  his  troops  to  keep  outside  the  rampart.  From 
this  disgrace  they  were  released  only  by  the  prayers  of  the  entire  army. 
Herein  we  see  two  qualities  of  Corbulo — his  wisdom  in  foreseeing  danger 
and  judging  a  situation  and,  though  strict  and  severe,  his  willingness  to 
yield  to  the  prayers  of  the  whole  army.  In  this  chapter  there  is  not  a  single 
historical  event  recorded.  Paccius  Orfitus,  a  subordinate  officer  who 
disobeys  orders  and  is  punished,  is  used  simply  as  a  foil  to  Corbulo. 

Active  operations  now  begin  for  the  first  time.  Tiridates  supported 
by  his  brother  Vologeses  begins  to  make  war  openly  in  Armenia,  but  in 
what  part  of  Armenia  we  are  not  told.  He  avoided  a  conflict  with  the 
united  forces  of  the  Romans,  flitting  hither  and  thither  in  keeping  with 
Parthian  tactics.  Corbulo  tried  long  in  vain  to  get  a  battle,  but  was  com- 
pelled to  divide  his  forces  and  invade  different  places  at  the  same  time.  He 
also  won  over  the  Moschi  who  proved  a  valuable  ally  to  the  Romans.  So 
the  plans  of  Tiridates  miscarried  and  he  sent  a  committee  to  expostulate 
with  Corbulo.  In  this  the  encomiastic  element  consists  in  Corbulo's  adap- 
tability. He  tried  to  win  a  battle  on  Roman  lines  of  fighting,  but  could 
not  because  the  enemy  would  not  fight  that  way.  So  he  divided  his  troops, 
used  Parthian  tactics,  and  met  with  complete  success.  The  tone  of  Tiri- 
dates' message  as  delivered  by  his  ambassadors  was  one  of  complaint  and 
haughty  braggadocio:  sin  per  star  etur  in  bello,  non  defore  Arsacidis  virtutem 
fortunamque  saepius  iam  clade  Romana  expertam.  In  contrast  to  this  we 
have  in  Corbulo  a  commander  conscious  of  his  victory  and  his  mastery  of 
the  situation,  self-possessed,  and  free  from  any  spirit  of  boastfulness:  ad  ea 
Corbulo,  satis  comperto  Vologeses  defectione  Hyrcaniae  attineri,  suadet 
Tiridati  precibus  Caesarem  adgredi.  This  characterization  of  Corbulo  as 
moderate  in  the  use  of  his  victories,  as  seeking  substantial  results  and  not 
mere  pomp  and  display  is  one  that  is  consistent  throughout  the  narrative 
and  must  not  be  lost  sight  of. 

The  shrewdness  of  Corbulo  in  detecting  the  designs  of  his  enemy  is 
further  amplified  in  chap.  38.  A  conference  had  been  arranged  for  between 
Corbulo  and  Tiridates.  To  this  conference  Tiridates  stipulated  that  he 
would  bring  a  thousand  troops,  but  that  Corbulo  might  bring  as  many  as 
he  pleased,  provided  they  came  without  helmets  and  corselets.  Such  a 
trick  would  be  apparent  to  any  man,  to  say  nothing  of  a  vetus  et  providus 
dux,  for  any  number  of  such  troops  would  be  useless  against  a  cavalry 
using  arrows.  Nevertheless  Corbulo  does  not  pretend  to  understand 
the  trick,  but  proceeds  to  arrange  for  the  conference.     His  cleverness  is 


36  A   STUDY   OF   CN.    DOMITIUS   CORBULO 

shown  in  choosing  a  place  for  the  deploying  of  troops,  in  his  arranging  the 
allied  cohorts  and  auxiliaries  on  the  wings,  the  sixth  legion  in  the  center, 
with  three  thousand  added  from  the  third  legion — all  under  one  eagle, 
so  that  the  appearance  was  that  of  one  legion.  However,  the  conference 
came  to  naught,  either  because  Tiridates  suspected  some  trick,  or  else  he 
hoped  to  intercept  the  provisions  which  he  had  heard  were  coming  to  the 
Romans  by  way  of  Trapezus.  But  in  this  again  he  was  unsuccessful  by 
reason  of  the  precautions  taken  by  Corbulo,  who  had  the  supplies  brought 
in  under  escort.  The  name  of  Trapezus  is  mentioned  only  incidentally 
and  it  is  from  this  that  we  get  the  first  clue  as  to  Corbulo's  location.  The 
name  is  brought  in  only  incidentally  and  gives  an  encomiastic  touch  to  the 
narrative  in  showing  the  foresight  taken  by  Corbulo  for  his  commissary 
department. 

The  negotiations  having  failed,  Corbulo  determined  that  the  war  should 
not  needlessly  be  dragged  on  longer  and  that  he  would  compel  the  Armen- 
ians to  defend  their  own  possessions.  The  characterizing  element  comes 
out  in  Corbulo's  choosing  the  most  formidable  stronghold  in  all  that 
praefecture  which  he  himself  will  storm.  Volandum  being  the  strongest 
fort  he  takes  upon  himself  the  heaviest  task  in  its  reduction,  but  in  destroy- 
ing it  he  wins  the  greatest  glory.  Observe  that  two  other  nameless  forts 
of  lesser  significance  are  assigned  to  a  lieutenant  and  a  praefect  of  the 
camp  respectively  and  although  they  were  captured  they  are  dismissed 
with  the  bare  statement:  pari  fortuna  legatus  ac  praefectus  usi  sunt.  But 
we  have  an  elaborate  description  of  the  taking  of  Volandum.  First  an 
inspection  of  the  fort  and  its  suitable  points  of  attack  is  made.  The  soldiers 
are  urged  to  punish  perfidy  and  cowardice  and  win  glory  and  booty.  The 
army  of  attack  is  divided  into  four  divisions.  Some  form  a  testudo  to 
undermine  the  walls;  others  bring  scaling  ladders;  many  throw  firebrands, 
and  spears  are  hurled  from  engines  of  war;  leaden  slugs  were  hurled  from 
close  range;  and  such  was  the  zeal  of  the  soldiers  that  within  the  third  part 
of  a  day  the  walls  were  stripped  of  defenders  and  the  towers  of  the  gates 
came  tumbling  down.  The  place  was  taken  by  storm  and  with  what 
result  ?  Simply,  omnes  puberes  trucidati  sunt,  nullo  milite  omisso,  paucis 
admodum  vulneratis.  Surely  this  is  a  very  elaborate  description  of  a 
fight  in  which  the  Romans  lost  not  a  soldier.  The  account  is  a  charac- 
terizing description  pure  and  simple.  Everything  that  does  not  lend  itself 
to  this  purpose  is  left  out.  We  are  not  told  where  Volandum  was  nor  how 
many  troops  there  were  in  it.  I  believe  that  it  was  some  place  of  very 
minor  importance,  and  was  used  simply  as  a  means  to  bring  out  the  praise 
of  Corbulo.     The  encomiast  has  exalted  its  capture  into  a  great  victory  for 


EXPOSITION  37 

him  who  took  it,  but  the  facts  will  scarcely  bear  out  the  idea  of  its  being  a 
great  stronghold.  While  the  taking  of  the  other  two  forts  is  so  briefly 
narrated,  yet  what  is  said  serves  to  amplify  the  praise  of  Corbulo  by  showing 
that  his  general  plan  met  with  entire  success.  The  omission  of  their  names 
and  the  description  of  their  capture  make  more  prominent  the  part  played 
by  Corbulo. 

After  the  capture  of  the  three  forts  and  the  surrender  of  various  unnamed 
places  we  are  told  that  confidence  arose  that  Artaxata  could  be  captured. 
At  this  point  we  have  one  of  the  clearest  indications  of  the  author's  disregard 
for  chronology.  In  the  context  there  is  not  a  hint  as  to  the  location  of 
Volandum,  nor  the  time  when  it  was  taken.  I  have  given  my  reasons  for 
believing  that  it  was  not  the  'OXavrj  of  Strabo  and  that  it  was  captured  in 
the  year  58.  But  no  mention  whatever  is  made  of  the  winter  quarters 
58-59,  nor  of  the  march  to  Artaxata.  I  cannot  believe  that  a  careful 
annalist  in  seeking  to  give  a  careful  record  of  events  would  have  omitted 
such  important  facts  in  the  march  of  Corbulo  from  the  western  border  of 
Armenia  up  to  Artaxata,  had  he  been  writing  history  at  first  hand.  Taci- 
tus has  evidently  followed  the  account  of  some  writer  who  was  not  concerned 
with  historical  facts  per  se,  but  picked  out  and  made  use  of  such  points  only 
as  lent  themselves  most  readily  to  an  encomiastic  treatment. 

We  are  at  once  told  of  the  precautions  taken  by  Corbulo  to  prevent  a 
surprise  by  the  enemy  while  he  is  marching  to  Artaxata.  As  further  proof 
of  the  encomiastic  trend  of  the  narrative  we  are  not  given  a  hint  as  to  where 
Tiridates  has  been  or  what  he  has  been  doing.  He  is  brought  on  the 
scene  as  a  foil  to  the  Roman  leader  to  show  the  effectiveness  of  the  latter's 
plans  on  the  march.  Corbulo  does  not  lead  his  troops  by  the  direct  route 
to  Artaxata,  for  in  that  case  they  would  have  been  exposed  to  greater  danger 
and  herein  is  shown  again,  as  we  have  already  seen,  that  foresight 
of  a  cautious  general.  A  brief  picture  of  Tiridates  follows,  but  it  adds  no 
historical  fact  of  importance.  Out  of  shame  and  fear,  pudore  el  metu,  he 
is  forced  to  take  some  active  measures  against  the  Romans,  but  they  are 
of  no  effect  against  the  well-laid  plans  of  Corbulo.  He  resolved  to  offer 
battle  or  rather  to  lure  the  Romans  into  an  ambush  by  pretending  flight. 
This  statement  then  leads  to  the  encomiastic  phrase,  non  ignaro  duce  nostro, 
qui  viae  pariter  et  pugnae  composuerat  exercitum,  and  we  have  a  careful 
description  of  the  plans  for  the  march  made  by  Corbulo.  We  are  told 
what  legion  was  placed  on  the  right  wing  and  what  on  the  left ;  what  forces 
were  stationed  in  the  center;  and  how  many  soldiers  guarded  the  rear  and 
the  commands  given  them.  We  are  told  where  the  bowmen  and  other 
cavalry  forces  were  stationed.     In  the  whole  description  we  have  an  elabor- 


38  A    STUDY   OF   CN.    DOMITIUS    CORBULO 

rate  o-vyKptats.  Tiridates  out  of  shame  and  fear  is  driven  to  do  something, 
but  our  general,  non  ignaro  duce  nostro,  goes  forward  with  the  consciousness 
of  plans  so  well  laid  that  victory  is  sure  to  follow.  To  add  emphasis  to 
the  validity  of  Corbulo's  plans  it  is  said  that  one  decurio  militum  advanced 
too  boldly  and  was  slain  by  the  archers  of  the  enemy,  which  incident  served 
as  a  wholesome  example  to  the  rest  of  the  troops  of  the  necessity  of  obedience. 
This  way  of  lauding  the  wisdom  of  Corbulo's  plans  by  picking  out  one  or 
two  characters  who  act  contrary  to  them  and  are  punished  is  a  favorite 
method.  For  example,  we  recall  the  story  of  the  two  men  punished  in  the 
camp,  the  one  for  having  no  side  arms,  and  the  other  for  being  girt  with  a 
dagger  only,  and  the  disobedience  of  Paccius  Orfitus.  The  loss  of  one 
nameless  decurio  militum  was  certainly  an  insignificant  thing  in  itself  but 
served  admirably  well  to  show  the  wisdom  of  the  leader's  plans. 

Tiridates,  failing  in  his  attempts  to  draw  Corbulo  from  his  fixed  purpose, 
and  night  coming  on,  withdrew,  while  Corbulo  measured  off  a  camp. 
The  latter,  not  sure  as  to  what  Tiridates  intended,  was  in  doubt  whether 
to  go  on  to  Artaxata  that  same  night.  But  scouts  sent  out  brought  back 
word  that  the  enemy  was  withdrawing  either  to  the  Medians  or  Albanians, 
so  he  waited  till  the  following  day,  on  which,  when  preparations  for  storm- 
ing the  city  had  been  made,  Artaxata  surrendered.  The  inhabitants  secured 
safety  by  surrendering,  but  we  must  understand  by  this  their  lives  only, 
for  the  city  was  at  once  burned  to  the  ground.  The  reasons  for  doing  so 
are  given.  The  city,  on  account  of  the  size  of  the  walls,  could  not  be  held 
without  a  strong  garrison,  and  that  was  not  available.  Then,  if  the  city 
should  be  left  intact  and  ungarrisoned,  there  would  be  nulla  utilitas  aut 
gloria  in  its  capture.  It  is  not  likely  that  Corbulo  in  his  Memoirs  would 
have  given  as  a  reason  for  destroying  the  city,  nulla  gloria.  The  whole 
course  of  his  life,  as  we  have  it,  shows  clearly  that  he  was  not  seeking  glory 
for  glory's  sake.  "Gloria"  followed  as  a  consequence  from  his  successful 
career,  but  his  encomiast  represented  him  as  seeking  after  it.  The  whole 
incident  as  a  historical  fact  is  treated  very  cursorily,  and  this  is  due  to  the 
fact  that  the  writer  is  concerned  with  the  praise  of  his  hero  and  not  with 
facts  as  facts  of  history.  He  uses  them  only  so  far  as  they  lend  themselves 
to  characterization. 

We  have  here  the  much-disputed  question  of  the  "miraculum."  Was 
it  an  eclipse  or  not  ?  All  commentators  save  Egli  assume  that  it  was  not. 
Henderson  says:  "The  identification  is  impossible.  Not  only  could  Cor- 
bulo scarcely  have  reached  the  city  so  soon,  but  the  description  of  the  mira- 
culum in  Tac.  Ann.  xiii.  41.4  is  inconsistent  with  any  possible  effect  of  an 
eclipse,  however  partial.     And  to  go  on  to  accuse  Corbulo  of  not  knowing 


EXPOSITION  39 

an  eclipse  when  he  saw  it,  and  thus  describing  it  wrongly,  is  a  perversely- 
topsy-turvy  argument."12  But  Henderson  himself  turns  around  and 
indulges  in  a  "perversely  topsy-turvy  argument"  in  assuming  that  a  body 
of  legionary  soldiers  would  not  understand,  but  could  be  so  moved  by  an 
"atmospheric  effect  of  cloud  and  sunshine."  Such  effects  of  cloud  and 
sunshine  do  not  occur,  and  how  he  can  say  that  Corbulo  described  a  "novel 
effect  of  cloud,  sunshine,  and  storm,  ....  clearly  and  well,"  if  he  saw  it, 
is  hard  to  comprehend.  But  as  will  be  seen  from  the  quotations  regarding 
eclipses  which  I  have  given  in  the  chapter  on  "Chronology,"  there  is  a 
similarity  of  description  between  them  and  this  passage.  There  is  an  ele- 
ment in  this  description  which  is  true  of  an  eclipse  but  could  never  be  true 
of  "cloud  and  sunshine,"  and  that  is  the  strange  effect  which  eclipses  of  the 
sun  always  produce  on  men's  minds.  This  is  a  fact  so  well  known  that  it 
scarcely  needs  comment.  In  Ann.  i.  2.  8,  during  a  meeting  in  camp  an 
eclipse  of  the  moon  occurred,  and  to  avoid  the  evil  predicted  thereby  the 
legionaries  clashed  bronze  instruments.  Here,  be  it  observed,  the  clouds 
played  a  part,  but  it  was  the  eclipse  itself  which  affected  their  minds.  The 
effect  of  an  eclipse  on  the  minds  of  the  Athenian  troops  before  Syracuse, 
Thuc.  vii.  50.  4,  is  familiar.  St.  Maximus  of  Turin  rebuked  the  people 
in  the  following  words  for  making  a  clamor  to  avert  the  evils  of  an 
eclipse: 

Cum  ante  dies  plerosque  de  veslrae  avaritiae  cupiditate  pulsaverim,  ipsa  die 
circa  vesperum  tanta  vociferatio  populi  extilit,  ut  religiositas  eius  penetraret  ad 
caelum.  Quod  cum  requirerem,  quid  sibi  clamor  hie  velit,  dixerunt  mihi,  quod 
laboranti  lunae  vesira  vociferatio  subveniret  et  defectum  eius  suis  clamoribus  adiu- 
varet.13 

The  references  might  be  multiplied  ad  libitum  but  never  do  we  hear  of 
any  such  effect  produced  by  clouds  and  sunshine. 

With  reference  to  the  description,  we  may  ask  what  is  the  significance 
of  it  as  given  in  Tacitus?  Did  Corbulo  describe  the  eclipse  as  we  have 
it  recorded  ?  That  he  did  so  may  very  well  be  questioned.  But  that  the 
phenomena  observed  were  very  unusual  is  a  reasonable  inference.  The 
eclipse  afforded  an  excellent  excuse  for  the  destruction  of  the  city  when 
we  recall  the  way  in  which  the  ancient  peoples  looked  upon  such  phenomena. 
The  explanation  is  that  we  have  here  an  account  as  given  by  some  pane- 
gyrist whose  aim  was  not  one  of  historical  accuracy,  but  a  characterization 
of  the  Roman  leader.  It  is  an  exaggeration  with  the  aim  of  showing  that 
even  the  forces  of  nature  were  working  to  aid  in  the  fulfilment  of  Corbulo's 
12  The  Life  and  Principate  oj  the  Emperor  Nero,  p.  473. 

'3  Quoted  by  Ginzel  Spezieller  Canon  der  Finsternisse,  p.  219. 


40  A   STUDY   OF   CN.    DOMITIUS   CORBULO 

plan.  It  was  used  to  justify  his  destruction  of  the  city.  As  I  have  stated 
before,  it  was  a  commonplace  with  ancient  encomiasts  to  exaggerate  any 
fact  which  thereby  would  amplify  the  praise  of  the  person  concerned.  Even 
Cicero  in  lauding  the  good  qualities  of  Pompey  says:  vend  tempestatesque 
obsecundarint.14  In  the  account  of  this  miraculum  in  Tacitus,  I  think  we 
can  see  indicated  the  handling  of  it  by  three  different  persons.  The  first  was 
Corbulo,  who  saw  the  eclipse  and  described  in  his  Memoirs  the  strange 
phenomena  which  he  observed;  the  second  was  some  panegyrist,  who  took 
the  incident  and  gave  to  it  an  exaggerated  interpretation  as  a  miraculum  velut 
numine  oblatum  for  the  praise  of  Corbulo;  the  third  was  Tacitus,  who  felt 
that  the  account  he  was  following  was  too  exaggerated  to  be  true,  and 
that  he  did  not  care  to  give  it  as  a  statement  of  fact  and  so  introduced  it 
with  the  qualifying  word  adicitur.  And  more  especially  do  the  words  ut 
....  crederetur  show  that  Tacitus  stands  apart  from  the  account  that 
was  given. 

Beginning  with  ob  haec  consulates,  in  chap.  41, 1  believe  we  have  Tacitus' 
own  words,  while  that  which  goes  immediately  before  was  taken  almost 
bodily  from  his  source.  The  narrative  continues  in  xiv.  23  without  the 
least  break  in  thought  with  what  precedes.  Artaxata  once  destroyed, 
Corbulo  is  represented  as  that  providus  dux.  He  knew  how  to  make  use  of 
a  victory  and  at  once  set  out  for  Tigranocerta.  News  of  the  destruction  of 
Artaxata  would  either  inspire  fear  in  the  enemy,  or  else,  if  he  should  spare 
Tigranocerta,  would  win  for  him  a  reputation  for  clemency.  The  narra- 
tion at  once  passes  into  a  characterization  of  the  general.  This  is  apparent 
from  the  absence  of  all  data  in  chaps.  23,  24,  relating  to  the  march,  except 
the  two  very  general  and  indefinite  statements  that  the  Romans  passed 
along  the  borders  of  the  Mardi  and  that  they  came  into  Tauronitium.  The 
whole  account  is  given  up  to  a  personal  record  of  Corbulo.  The  march 
is  described:  turn  infenso  exercitu,  ne  spem  auferret,  neque  tamen  remissa 
cura,  which  recalls  the  way  in  which  he  went  against  the  Chauci,  magna 
cum  cura.  We  have  his  dealings  with  the  submissive:  misericordia  adver- 
sus  supplices;  with  the  fugitives:  celeritate  adversus  prqfugus,  and  with 
the  stubborn:  inmitis  Us.  Even  the  mention  of  the  Mardi  serves  only  to 
show  Corbulo's  economy  of  Roman  lives:  quos  Corbulo  inmissis  Hiberis 
vastavit  hostilemque  audaciam  externo  sanguine  ultus  est.  We  have  stand- 
ing out  conspicuously  his  heroic  example  in  endurance  of  drought,  heat, 
and  long  marches  as  we  had  it  before  in  the  piercing  cold  of  the  camp :  ad 
hoc  penuria  aquae,  fervida  aestas,  longinqua  itinera  sola  ducis  patientia 
mittigabantur ,  eadem  pluraque  gregio  milite  tolerantis.     We  have  his  peril 

'4  Pro  Man.  48. 


EXPOSITION  41 

from  threatened  assassination.  His  dementia  is  shown  in  his  treatment 
of  the  surrendered  city  Tigranocerta,  in  not  allowing  any  plundering  to 
take  place  in  it.  In  regard  to  the  fort  Legerda  we  have  the  mere  statement 
that  it  was  taken  by  storm  because  the  hot-headed  young  men  had  shut  it 
up,  without  being  given  a  hint  as  to  its  location  or  its  strength.  Then  the 
return  of  the  Hyrcanian  embassy  and  the  escort  assigned  it  so  far  as  the 
Red  Sea  and  the  repulse  of  Tiridates,  who  had  entered  per  Medos  extrema 
Armeniae,  are  recounted.  But  these  statements  with  the  following  one, 
caedibus  et  incendiis  perpopulatus  possessionem  Armeniae  usurpabat,  simply 
conform  to  the  general  indefiniteness  of  the  historical  narrative  which  we 
have  observed  throughout  the  whole.  They  are  not  used  as  facts  of  history 
per  se. 

Chap.  26  closes  with  an  account  of  the  arrival  of  Tigranes,  his  estab- 
lishment on  the  throne,  preparations  made  for  his  defense  and  the  with- 
drawal of  Corbulo  to  Syria.  The  narrative  continues  at  the  beginning  of 
book  xv.  and  without  any  apparent  break.  In  chaps.  1  and  2  there  is  an 
account  of  the  attitude  of  the  Parthians.  Tiridates  was  naturally  hesitat- 
ing. He  wished  to  exact  vengeance  for  the  slights  inflicted  upon  the  race 
of  the  Arsacidae,  yet  he  was  held  back  by  a  consciousness  of  Roman  great- 
ness and  by  reverence  for  a  continued  and  unbroken  treaty.  He  was 
incensed  by  Tigranes'  plundering  expedition  among  the  Adiabenians. 
Other  nations  were  looking  to  him  for  assistance,  and  were  placed  in  such 
a  situatipn  that  unless  they  received  it  they  would  be  compelled  to  make 
terms  with  the  Romans.  He  was  an  exile  from  his  kingdom,  and  by  his 
very  silence  greatly  moved  the  people.  In  this  situation  Vologeses  called 
an  assembly,  and  his  address  is  given  in  chap.  2,  together  with  a  brief  sum- 
mary of  the  preparations  made  to  drive  out  the  Romans.  It  might  seem 
that  here  we  have  a  narration  of  events  pure  and  simple,  such  as  would  be 
in  keeping  with  an  annalistic  arrangement  and  this  is  true,  but  the  narrating 
of  historical  events  is  not  inconsistent  with  encomiastic  treatment.  I  have 
already  shown  that  these  events  did  not  happen  in  the  year  under  which 
they  are  recorded.  All  geographical  data  which  might  enable  us  to  locate 
the  Parthians  are  lacking,  and  we  get  no  clue  as  to  where  they  were  until 
the  description  of  Tigranocerta  given  in  chap.  4.  It  is  simply  a  crxxixa 
avyicpiTiKov.  The  account  given  aims  to  depict  the  feelings  and  desperate 
situation  of  the  Parthians,  which  would  lead  them  to  put  forth  every  possible 
effort  to  recover  their  lost  territory,  which  loss  had  come  about  by  Corbulo's 
overrunning  Armenia.  But  the  attempt  to  recover  met  with  dismal  failure, 
for  Corbulo  had  heard  of  their  intentions  and  even  before  had  taken  such 
precautions  for  the  defense  of  Tigranocerta  that  their  assaults  were  of  no 


42  A    STUDY   OF   CN.    DOMITIUS   CORBULO 

avail.  They  were  the  plans  of  a  providus  dux,  and  in  encountering  them 
the  enemy  semet  frustratur .  The  siege  was  a  dismal  failure.  Those  who 
had  engaged  in  it  had  been  routed.  Tigranes  and  his  forces  were  safe 
within  their  walls,  while  legions  had  been  sent  into  Armenia  and  others 
were  prepared  to  break  in  from  the  borders  of  Syria  and  in  lieu  of  this 
situation  an  embassy  was  sent  to  the  Roman  leader  and  Monaeses  was 
ordered  to  quit  Tigranocerta. 

Chap.  6  contains  a  series  of  questions  which  evidently  give  the  criticism 
of  Corbulo's  opponents.  Some  commentators  claim  to  see  herein  a  criti- 
cism of  him  by  Tacitus,  but  I  think  that  Tacitus  is  not  voicing  a  personal 
opinion,  but  is  simply  following  his  source.  The  situation  is  similar  to 
that  as  given  in  Ann.  xi.  19,  in  which  case  it  has  been  said  that  Corbulo 
was  criticized  by  Tacitus.  We  saw,  at  that  point,  that  most  people,  plerosque, 
commended  him,  while  certain  ones,  quosdam,  criticized.  So  here,  the 
majority,  plures,  approved  Corbulo's  course,  and  only  some,  alii,  inter- 
preted his  actions  as  due  to  some  secret  compact.  There  was,  no  doubt, 
criticism  of  Corbulo,  but  in  each  case  the  author  makes  it  clear  that  it  came 
from  the  minority  while  the  majority  approved.  And  in  view  of  Corbulo's 
career,  before  and  after  this,  entirely  successful  and  honorable,  there  was 
absolutely  nothing  to  justify  the  criticism  of  the  minority.  Not  one  of  his 
plans  had  miscarried,  except  in  a  case  or  two  where  a  subordinate  officer 
was  disobedient  to  commands,  but  in  no  instance  was  any  reflection  cast 
upon  Corbulo.     Rather,  it  only  went  to  prove  his  wisdom. 

Paetus,  who  had  been  appointed  by  the  Roman  government  to  take 
charge  of  Armenia,  now  appears,  and  a  division  of  the  forces  is  made. 
Corbulo  was  to  remain  in  Syria.  From  this  point  to  the  end  of  the  account 
we  have  a  strong  contrast  between  the  two  generals.  On  the  one  hand, 
is  the  reserved,  effective  commander;  on  the  other,  the  boastful,  timid, 
inefficient.  To  say,  as  some  have  said,  that  Corbulo  in  his  Memoirs  has 
blackened  Paetus'  record  for  his  own  glorification,  is  gratuitous.  Doubt- 
less he  did  depict  that  man  as  a  sorry  general,  but  his  encomiast  to  bring 
out  the  contrast  more  strongly  has  selected  the  weak  points  in  his  charac- 
ter and  painted  them  in  a  bad  light.  There  was  some  justification  for  the 
criticism,  but  I  doubt  whether  the  writer  was  concerned  about  that  phase 
of  the  question.  The  phrase,  neque  aemidi  patiens,  has  been  interpreted 
by  Furneaux  as  implying  criticism  of  Corbulo,  but  we  must  interpret  this 
in  the  light  of  the  whole  context  and  of  the  intent  of  the  author  in  using  the 
phrase.  He  felt  it  no  criticism  to  say  that  Corbulo  could  brook  no  rival 
when  that  rival  was  such  a  person  as  he  has  depicted  him  to  be,  a  boastful, 
inefficient  leader,  just  arrived  to  take  charge  of  a  work  of  which  he  knew 


EXPOSITION  43 

nothing.  He  meant  it  in  commendation  of  him  as  is  shown  by  the  very 
next  sentence:  Paetus,  cut  satis  ad  gloriam  erat,  si  proximus  haberctur, 
despiciebat  gesta. 

The  character  of  Paetus  at  once  appears  in  contrast  with  that  of  Corbulo 
by  his  boastfulness.  He  said  that  Corbulo  had  made  a  practice  of  storming 
cities  only  in  name:  usurpatas  nomine  tenus  iirbium  expugationes  dictitans, 
while  he  would  thoroughly  subdue  and  reduce  to  a  province:  se  tributa  ac 
leges  et  pro  umbra  regis  Romanum  ius  victis  impositurum.  The  embassy 
sent  to  Rome  by  Vologeses  having  returned  without  being  successful  in  its 
mission,  the  war  was  again  taken  up  by  the  Parthians,  and  we  are  told  that 
Paetus  did  not  decline  it.  However,  at  the  very  outset  his  conduct  is  shown 
in  an  unfavorable  light  by  his  utter  disregard  for  the  omens.  The  horse 
bearing  the  consular  insignia  refused  to  cross  a  bridge;  a  sacrificial  victim 
escaped  out  of  the  rampart  and  javelins  of  the  soldiers  took  fire,  but  all  these 
Paetus  scorned.  This  action  is  in  contrast  to  that  of  Corbulo  when,  on 
entering  Armenia  to  recover  what  Paetus  had  lost,  he  first  performed  in 
due  order  the  lustrum.  Paetus  is  further  contrasted  by  his  lack  of  pre- 
paration and  foresight  and  his  hastiness  in  action :  necdum  satis  firmatis 
hibernaculis,  nullo  rei  frumentariae  provisu,  rapit  exercitum  trans  montem 
Taurum  reciperandis,  ut  ferebat,  Tigranocertis  vastandisque  regionibus, 
quas  Corbulo  integras  omisisset.  But  in  spite  of  this,  he  did  gain  some 
success,  yet  did  not  know  how  to  preserve  it,  and  the  author  seems  to 
have  disparaged  even  this:  gloriaeque  et  praedae  nonnihil  partum,  si  aut 
gloriam  cum  modo  aut  praedam  cum  cura  habuisset.  Corbulo  knew  how 
to  turn  a  victory  to  account,  as  we  saw  in  the  case  of  the  destruction  of 
Artaxata.  We  saw  that  he  came  to  the  Chauci  magna  cum  cura,  and  his 
carefulness  all  the  way  through  in  the  laying  of  his  plans.  Though 
Paetus  captured  a  few  forts,  the  impression  the  writer  aims  to  give  us  is 
that  his  campaign  was  entirely  without  results,  except  to  show  his  incapacity 
and  boastfulness,  for  he  wrote  to  Nero  in  a  manner  as  if  the  war  were 
already  ended,  in  grandiloquent  style,  but  void  of  results:  verbis  magnificis 
rerum  vacuas. 

The  author  has  shown  the  inefficiency  of  Paetus  in  conducting  a  cam- 
paign, and  his  inability  to  maintain  whatever  advantage  he  might  have 
gained.  In  contrast  to  this,  he  now  turns  to  Corbulo  and  shows  his  activity 
and  energy  in  fortifying  the  Euphrates. 

While  the  enemy  were  present  in  the  plains  on  the  Armenian  side,  they 
were  prevented  from  interfering  with  the  bridge-building  by  the  diligent 
use  of  catapulta  and  ballista.  Then  when  the  bridge  was  completed  and 
the  troops  had  seized  the  opposite  hills,  by  the  mere  display  of  such  activity 


44  A    STUDY    OF   CN.    DOMITIUS    CORBULO 

and  strength,  tanta  celeritate  et  ostentatione  virium,  the  enemy  ceased  their 
demonstrations  against  Corbulo  and  turned  their  attention  to  Paetus. 
We  are  now  reminded  of  the  incompetency  of  Paetus,  imminentium  nescins, 
who  had  the  fifth  legion  far  off  in  Pontus  and  had  weakened  the  rest  of  his 
forces  by  indiscriminate  furloughs.  Still  in  spite  of  his  weakened  condition 
he  could  have  held  his  camp  and  warded  off  the  Parthians  but  he  lacked 
steadfastness  in  his  own  plans  and  those  of  others:  si  Paeto  aid  in  suis  aut 
in  aliis  consiliis  constantia  juisset.  He  left  the  winter  quarters  with  a  boast 
that  not  a  foss  and  rampart  but  their  bodies  and  arms  would  be  opposed  to 
the  enemy.  After  the  loss  of  a  few  men  he  returned  in  consternation  to  his 
fortifications,  and  when  the  Parthians  did  not  press  on  immediately,  with  idle 
confidence,  vana  fiducia,  he  placed  three  thousand  of  his  legionaries  on 
Mt.  Taurus,  thinking  the  enemy  thereby  could  be  checked.  He  placed  his 
wife  and  son  in  Arsamosata  for  protection  and  reluctantly  informed  Cor- 
bulo of  his  situation.  Vologeses  pressed  on.  The  auxiliaries  were  frightened 
away.  The  legionaries  were  cut  down  and  the  one  fort,  a  turris,  which 
held  out  for  a  time,  was  taken  by  storm.  As  the  sound  and  the  wounded 
came  straggling  into  camp  the  confusion  increased.  Paetus  made  no 
effort  to  control  the  situation,  but  sent  a  second  urgent  request  for  assist- 
ance to  Corbulo:  ne  dux  quidem  obniti  adversis,  sed  cuncta  militiae  munia 
deseruerat,  missis  iterant  ad  Corbulonem  precibus,  veniret  propere,  signa  et 
aquilas  et  nomen  reliquum  infelicis  exercitus  tuerelur.  With  Paetus  every- 
thing was  confusion  and  demoralization,  while  with  Corbulo  there  was 
energetic  action  with  calm  deliberation.  He  is  undismayed,  leaves  a  part 
of  his  troops  to  guard  the  Euphrates  and  with  thorough  preparation  hastens 
by  forced  marches  to  Paetus'  relief.  He  ordered  the  first  of  the  defeated 
troops  who  met  him  to  return  and  seek  the  clemency  of  Paetus.  Then 
by  a  speech  to  his  own  men  he  fired  them  to  a  zeal  of  marching  day  and 
night  to  rescue  the  Roman  camp  and  R.oman  legions. 

In  chaps.  13,  14  we  have  a  further  description  of  the  demoralized  con- 
dition among  Paetus'  troops  and  his  own  lack  of  control  over  them.  He 
was  reduced  to  the  point  of  being  compelled  to  write  a  letter  to  Vologeses, 
not,  we  are  told,  as  a  suppliant,  but  as  complaining  of  Vologeses'  action 
in  resisting  the  king  of  Roman  choice.  Paetus  is  put  in  the  attitude  in 
which  we  saw  Tiridates  put  in  xiii.  37,  that  of  a  leader  already  defeated 
and  making  an  outcry  against  the  injustice  done  him.  He  reminded  Volo- 
geses that  all  the  rest  of  the  Roman  world  was  at  peace,  while  he  was  making 
his  attack  upon  but  two  legions.  He  reminded  him  of  the  careers  of  Lucul- 
lus,  Pompey,  and  Caesar  in  Armenia.  But  what  a  contrast  between  them 
and  him,  while  Corbulo  is  compared  favorably  with  them.     To  these  com- 


EXPOSITION  45 

plaints  Vologeses  replied  that  the  name  of  holding  and  bestowing  might 
rest  with  the  Romans,  but  the  power  was  with  the  Parthians.  It  was 
finally  agreed  between  Paetus  and  Vologeses  that  all  Roman  forces  were 
to  withdraw  from  Armenia.  The  forts  and  provisions  were  to  be  turned 
over  to  the  Parthians,  and  to  heap  insult  on  injury,  the  Romans  were 
forced  to  build  a  bridge  over  the  Arsanias  as  a  monument  of  the  Parthian 
victory.  Rumor  had  it  that  the  legions  were  sent  under  the  yoke.  At  any 
rate  the  withdrawal  was  a  most  disgraceful  one,  for  the  Parthians  lined 
the  roads  and  took  away  the  slaves,  clothing  and  arms,  while  the  Roman 
troops  fled  in  fear,  avoiding  anything  which  might  occasion  a  conflict.  It 
is  evident  that  Paetus  had  abundant  supplies,  while  on  Corbulo's  authority 
the  statement  was  made  that  the  Parthians  were  in  need  of  supplies,  and 
that  they  would  have  given  up  the  siege  and  that  he  himself  was  but  three 
days'  march  away.  Paetus  in  the  presence  of  envoys  from  Vologeses  is 
represented  as  having  taken  an  oath  that  no  Roman  should  enter  Armenia 
until  word  was  brought  back  from  Nero.  At  this  point  Tacitus  again 
expresses  his  dissent  from  his  source.  He  felt  that  the  rhetorical  elabora- 
tion was  too  great  to  be  consistent  with  the  facts,  and  that  the  author  had 
gone  too  far  in  blackening  Paetus'  character,  so  he  says  that  granting  that 
some  of  these  things  were  given  to  increase  the  disgrace  of  Paetus,  quae  ut 
augendae  infamiae  composita,  eis  reliqua  non  in  obscuro  habentur,  yet  there 
is  no  doubt  that  Paetus  marched  forty  miles  in  one  day  after  his  defeat  and 
that  the  wounded  were  abandoned  everywhere  so  that  the  retreat  was 
more  like  a  rout. 

Corbulo  met  the  retreating  army  on  the  Euphrates  River,  and  out  of 
compassion  for  the  defeated  and  bedraggled  troops,  he  did  not  present  a 
display  of  standards  and  arms.  It  shows  his  compassion  for  the  common 
soldier,  as  we  have  seen  before  in  his  enduring  with  them  the  hardships 
of  camp  and  march,  and  it  contrasts  him  strongly  with  Paetus,  who  had  fled 
leaving  the  wounded  all  along  the  road.  Between  the  generals,  the  con- 
ference was  brief.  Paetus  was  for  invading  Armenia  at  once  with  their 
united  forces,  and  claimed  that  everything  was  as  it  had  been  before  his 
capitulation.  But  that  would  have  been  in  violation  of  the  oath  he  had 
taken  that  no  Roman  should  enter  Armenia  until  word  had  been  received 
from  Rome.  Further,  his  troops  were  either  destroyed  or  utterly  demoral- 
ized. The  two  men  could  not  have  worked  together,  for  the  author  has 
told  us  that  Corbulo  could  "brook  no  rival,"  and  he  shows  that  he  had  no 
orders  from  Rome  to  enter  Armenia,  and  we  have  seen  that  he  was  a  man 
who  strictly  obeyed  orders.  Whether  the  arguments  given  by  Paetus  in 
regard  to  the  immediate  invasion  of  Armenia,  or  those  given  by  Corbulo 


46  A   STUDY   OF   CN.    DOMITIUS   CORBULO 

for  not  doing  so,  be  right,  does  not  concern  the  present  discussion.  I  think 
it  clear  that  the  writer  wanted  his  readers  to  feel  that  the  course  of  Corbulo 
was  the  correct  one. 

We  find  in  the  account  from  the  time  Paetus  appears  down  to  his  defeat 
not  much  more  than  an  amplified  description  of  his  inefficiency.  In  one 
year  he  has  lost  practically  all  that  Corbulo  had  won  in  several  years  of 
arduous  preparation  and  campaign.  It  is  only  a  description  which  paints 
in  darkest  colors  the  defeated  general.  Paetus  was  a  poor  general,  and  we 
may  assume  that  Corbulo  described  him  so,  but  whoever  wrote  the  account 
from  which  Tacitus  drew  chose  to  magnify  the  worse  side  of  Paetus  and 
pass  over  any  good  qualities  he  may  have  possessed.  The  whole  is  an 
elaborate  rhetorical  avyKpicns  which  serves  to  bring  out  most  distinctly 
the  meritorious  qualities  of  the  general  Corbulo.  This  becomes  more 
apparent  when  we  bear  in  mind  the  disregard  for  all  chronology  and  topo- 
graphy. The  withdrawal  into  winter  quarters  is  mentioned,  but  we  have 
to  take  the  whole  episode  into  consideration  and  by  laborious  inference 
determine  what  winter  quarters  are  meant,  but  we  have  no  clue  as  to  their 
locations.  Arsamosata,  a  fort,  is  mentioned  in  the  most  incidental  way, 
while  we  learn  that  Paetus  was  somewhere  on  the  Arsanias  River  north  of 
Mt.  Taurus,  but  nothing  more  definitely.  Armenia  was  lost  and  we  have 
now  again  to  follow  the  successful  course  of  Corbulo. 

During  the  winter  the  commission  from  Vologeses  went  to  Rome  and 
returned  without  any  success.  The  war  was  now  put  entirely  into  Corbu- 
lo's  hands.  All  the  military  forces  of  the  East  were  turned  over  to  him 
while  the  native  rulers  of  dependent  states  were  ordered  to  obey  him.  The 
encomiastic  nature  of  this  comes  out  when  we  are  told  that  Corbulo's  power 
was  almost  equal  to  that  of  Pompey  in  the  war  with  the  pirates:  in  tan  turn 
ferine  modum  aucta  potestate  quern  populns  Rom  anus  Cn.  Pompeio  bell urn 
piraticum  gesturo  dederat.  An  account  of  the  careful  preparations  made 
to  invade  Armenia  follows.  The  least  efficient  troops  were  transferred 
to  Syria  for  garrison  duty,  while  the  best  were  assembled  for  the  expedition. 
Then  in  contrast  to  Paetus  who  had  disregarded  important  omens,  he 
performs  the  lustrum  in  due  form  and  addresses  his  troops. 

Corbulo  is  represented  as  following  the  line  of  march,  by  which  Lucul- 
lus  had  at  one  time  penetrated  into  the  country,  but  the  reasons  for  this  are 
hard  to  see,  for  the  army  never  seems  to  have  gone  farther  than  the  scene 
of  Paetus'  defeat,  which  was  not  more  than  two  ordinary  days'  march  from 
the  Euphrates.  It  is  evidently  a  straining  after  a  comparison  with  that 
famous  general  for  the  purpose  of  lauding  Corbulo.  When  ambassadors 
came  from  Tiridates  and  Vologeses,  who  were  soon  forced  to  send  them, 


EXPOSITION  47 

Corbulo  did  not  scorn  them :  venientes  Tiridatis  Vologesisque  de  pace  legalos 
hand  aspernatus.  This  is  a  quality  of  Corbulo  which  is  followed  consist- 
ently throughout.  He  is  free  from  all  spirit  of  boastfulness,  and  while 
always  successful  he  tempers  his  success  with  sound  judgment.  When, 
as  we  saw  in  xiii.  37  he  had  forced  Tiridates  to  send  an  embassy  to  Nero 
to  seek  a  settlement,  although  he  knew  he  was  master  of  the  situation,  yet 
he  followed  a  moderate  course  of  action:  satis  comperto  Vologesen  defec- 
tione  Hyrcaniae  attineri,  suadet  Tiridati  Caesarem  adgredi.  In  the  cam- 
paign against  Vologeses,  again  entirely  successful,  he  thought  he  should 
moderate  his  victory:  quamvis  secundis  rebus  suis,  moderandum  fortunae 
ratus  misit  ad  Vologesen.*5  With  this  calm  deliberation  on  the  part  of 
Corbulo  we  have  contrasted  the  impulsiveness  of  the  centurion  Casperius 
who  was  sent  in  the  embassy  to  Vologeses  and  who  delivered  his  commands 
ferociter.  Just  why  he  should  have  done  so  there  is  no  apparent  reason, 
but  his  action  contrasts  remarkably  with  that  of  Corbulo.  In  the  final 
settlement  with  the  Parthians  when  Corbulo  is  represented  as  having 
everything  in  his  own  hands  he  moderates  his  victory,  allowing  Vologeses 
to  have  his  own  way  in  non-essentials.  Yet,  while  seeming  to  make  some 
concessions,  he  is  really  successful  at  every  point :  scilicet  externae  superbiae 
sueto  non  inerat  notitia  nostri,  apud  quos  vis  imperii  valet,  inania  tramittun- 
tur.16 

In  his  negotiations17  with  Tiridates  Corbulo  did  not  relax  active  opera- 
tions against  the  enemy,  for  the  wholesome  effect  it  would  have  of  inspiring 
fear  in  them.  He  drove  them  from  their  homes,  destroyed  their  forts, 
devastated  their  land  and  filled  the  strong  and  weak  alike  with  fear.  Yet 
in  spite  of  this  the  barbarians  were  said  to  have  had  a  natural  liking  and 
admiration  for  him:  non  infensum  nee  cum  hostili  odio  Corbulonis  no  men 
etiam  barbaris  habebatur,  eoque  consilium  eius  fidum  credebant.  We  saw 
such  inclination  of  the  enemy  shown  for  him  at  the  time  he  came  to  the  East 
when  the  hostages  preferred  him  to  Quadratus.18  In  the  above  we  see  Cor- 
bulo's  cleverness  in  dealing  with  men,  and  this  quality  will  be  brought  out 
more  strongly  in  what  follows.  When  Tiridates  chose  as  a  place  of  meeting 
the  scene  of  Paetus'  defeat,  Corbulo  offered  no  objection  because,  it  is  said, 
the  dissimilarity  of  fortune  would  add  to  his  glory:  Corbulo  non  vitavit, 
ut  dissimilitudo  fortunae  gloriam  augeret.19  We  may  question  in  our  own 
minds  whether  it  did  add  to  his  glory,  but  certainly  there  was  no  such 
question  in  the  mind  of  his  encomiast.  This  tendency  to  give  the  glory 
of  Corbulo  has  led  the  writer  into  some  peculiar  statements.  At  the  very 
outset  it  was  said  that  Corbulo  came  among  the  Chauci,  magna  cum  cura 

•5  xv.  5.  l6  xv.  31.  i7  xv.  27.  lS  xiii.  9.  J?>  xv.  28. 


48  A   STUDY  OF   CN.    DOMITIUS   CORBULO 

et  mox  gloria,  which  prepared  the  reader's  mind  for  an  encomiastic  account 
of  the  hero.  One  reason  why  the  hostages  preferred  Corbulo  to  Quad- 
ratic was:  per  recentem  gloriam.  When  Artaxata  was  destroyed  a  reason 
assigned  for  its  destruction  was  that  there  would  be  no  glory  in  having  taken 
it  if  it  should  be  left  intact :  nulla  in  eo  utilitas  aut  gloria,  quod  capta  essent. 
It  was  said  of  Paetus  that  his  glory  would  have  been  sufficient  had  he  been 
subordinate  to  Corbulo:  Paetus,  cui  satis  ad  gloriam  erat,  si  proximus 
haberetur.  But  what  astonishes  us  at  first  reading  is  to  be  told  that  when 
Paetus  sent  word  informing  Corbulo  of  his  situation,  Corbulo  made  no 
haste,  in  order  to  let  the  danger  increase,  so  that  by  bringing  help  he  might 
win  the  greater  glory :  nee  a  Corbulone  properatum,  quo  gliscentibus  peri- 
culis  etiam  subsidii  laus  augeretur  2°  This,  too,  has  been  used  as  grounds 
for  the  criticism  of  Corbulo,  but  nothing  can  be  more  unlikely  in  view  of 
the  whole  account  and  especially  that  which  follows,  because  Corbulo  did 
at  once  set  about  making  preparation  to  go  to  the  relief  of  Paetus,  and  when 
the  second  summons  came  he  hastened  by  forced  marches  and  so  inspired 
his  troops  that  they  marched  day  and  night:  diu  noctuque  iter  pro  perabant.21 
The  aim  of  the  encomiast  was  to  represent  in  a  laudatory  way  the  glory 
which  would  come  to  Corbulo  by  rescuing  Paetus  from  the  greater  danger, 
and  so  from  our  point  of  view  he  has  fallen  into  an  unhappy  characteriza- 
tion in  his  endeavor  to  represent  Corbulo  as  winning  a  greater  glory,  but 
he  has  evidently  intended  it  as  an  encomiastic  statement.  Corbulo  in  his 
Memoirs  would  never  have  used  such  a  flimsy  pretext  for  not  going  to  the 
assistance  of  Paetus.  One  of  the  last  characterizations  of  Corbulo  is  that 
to  his  "glory  he  added  the  charm  of  affability:  he  invited  the  king  to  a 
banquet."  He  was  conspicuous  in  the  social  world  as  well  as  a  general  and 
statesman:  addidit  gloriae  comitatem  epulasque.22  And  it  is  in  view  of  this 
whole  course  of  striving  after  glory  which  the  writer  insists  upon  that  we 
must  interpret  those  few  passages  which  seem  to  imply  a  base  motive. 

The  statesmanship  of  Corbulo  is  further  shown  when  he  sends  his  son- 
in-law,  Vinicianus  Annius,  to  the  camp  of  Tiridates  to  do  him  honor.  When 
the  two  opposing  generals  met,  Corbulo  followed  the  eastern  custom  in 
the  matter  of  salutation.  In  this  is  seen  his  adaptation  to  a  given  circum- 
stance. He  praised  Tiridates  for  his  wisdom  in  choosing  a  pacific  course 
of  action,  although  as  a  matter  of  fact  Corbulo  had  forced  him  to  do  so : 
exim  Romanus  laudat  iuvenem  omissis  praecipitibus  tuta  et  salutaria  capes- 
sentem.23  And  now  from  this  diplomacy  of  Corbulo  Tiridates  is  led  to  seek 
the  kingdom  from  Nero.  Although  Corbulo  had  been  entirely  successful 
in  the  field  and  had  forced  the  Parthians  to  terms  by  means  of  arms,  yet 

20  XV.    IO.  2I  XV.    12.  "  XV.  30.  33  XV.     29. 


EXPOSITION  49 

it  is  his  cleverness  in  diplomacy  which  leads  Tiridates  apparently  to  forget 
that  and  seek  terms  on  which  the  Roman  and  Parthian  could  agree.  Cor- 
bulo  wins  for  the  Romans  what  they  desire,  but  lets  the  enemy  believe  that 
he  is  having  his  own  way.  For  on  the  appointed  day  Tiridates  in  the  pres- 
ence of  all  the  Parthians  and  Romans  came  to  a  tribunal  on  which  was 
a  statue  of  Nero,  removed  the  crown  from  his  own  head  and  placed  it  on  the 
head  of  the  statue  with  the  resolve  not  to  take  it  back  until  he  received  it 
from  the  hand  of  Nero.  This  description  leads  Tacitus  to  add  one  of  those 
tags  which  are  so  common  in  his  writings:  at  nunc  versos  casus;  iturum 
Tiridaten  ostentui  gentibus  quanto  minus  quam  captivum  ?3*  As  already 
stated,  Corbulo  was  affable  toward  the  Parthians  and  gave  a  banquet. 
When  his  wondering  guest  wished  to  know  the  meaning  of  everything  he 
saw  or  heard,  Corbulo,  exaggerating,  moved  him  to  an  admiration  of  the 
old  customs:  prisci  moris.  We  saw  the  encomiastic  character  of  such  a 
feeling  at  the  very  start  when  Corbulo  brought  the  troops  back  veterem  ad 
moretn.  And  now,  before  going  to  Rome,  Vologeses  requests  of  Corbulo 
that  Tiridates  may  not  have  to  endure  any  appearance  of  slavery,  nor  give 
up  his  sword,  nor  be  kept  from  embracing  the  governors  of  the  provinces, 
nor  be  obliged  to  stand  at  their  doors.  This  no  doubt  was  granted  and 
Tacitus  is  led  again  to  say:  scilicet  externae  superbiae  sueto  non  inerat 
notitia  nostri,  apud  quos  vis  imperii  valet,  inania  tramittuntur.25 

What  a  contrast  this  campaign  of  Corbulo  affords  with  that  of  Paetus 
in  the  preceding  year:  thorough  preparation,  complete  success  in  offensive 
warfare,  absence  of  boastfulness  on  the  part  of  the  leader,  the  accomplish- 
ment of  his  purpose  by  diplomacy,  and  the  establishment  of  friendly  relations 
between  Rome  and  the  king  whom  he  has  conquered.  The  characteriz- 
ing element  is  everywhere  present.  There  is  no  mention  of  a  single  place 
after  Corbulo  leaves  Melitene,  and  this  is  remarkable  when  we  remember 
that  the  meeting  took  place  on  the  site  of  Paetus'  defeat.  We  cannot 
believe  that  Corbulo  in  his  Memoirs  was  so  careless  of  topography  and 
chronology.  It  is  unthinkable  that  any  man  in  writing  an  account  of  his 
own  campaigns  would  be  so.  But  his  encomiast  found  no  occasion  for 
using  the  places  mentioned,  and  consequently  l,eft  them  out.  What 
became  of  Tigranes  who  had  been  made  king  of  Armenia  we  are  not 
told,  but  a  careful  historian  would  not  have  passed  by  such  a  person  in 
silence,  so  we  are  forced  to  conclude  that  Tigranes  could  serve  no  further 
purpose  in  the  characterization  of  Corbulo,  and  was  no  longer  men- 
tioned. The  policy  of  the  Roman  government,  if  it  had  any,  is  passed  >" 
over  in  silence. 

34  XV.    29.  25  XV.     31. 


50  A   STUDY   OF   CN.    DOMITIUS   CORBULO 

I  have  shown  that  the  writer  had  no  chronology  other  than  a  natural 
sequence  of  events  and  that  he  disregarded  all  topography  save  such  places 
as  served  to  lend  an  encomiastic  touch  to  Corbulo.  The  different  persons 
also  are  used  for  this  purpose.  Tiridates  appears  conducting  negotiations 
in  the  year  58,  and  serves  for  a  time  as  a  foil  to  Corbulo,  but  soon  disappears 
and  we  hear  nothing  of  him  until  the  day  before  Corbulo  reaches  Artaxata. 
where  he  serves  to  show  the  splendid  arrangement  of  Corbulo's  plan  of 
marching  and  fighting.  He  then  disappears  again,  and  we  do  not  hear  of 
him  until  the  following  year,  60,  when  he  comes  in  per  Medos  extrema  Armen- 
iae,  and  affords  Corbulo  an  opportunity  of  overrunning  Armenia.  Again 
he  disappears,  and  we  know  nothing  of  his  movements  until  he  threatens 
Corbulo  and  finally  defeats  Paetus  in  62.  From  this  on  he  is  used  as  a 
foil  to  Corbulo  in  setting  off  the  latter's  good  qualities. 

All  lack  of  chronology  in  the  original  led  Tacitus  into  the  inconsistency 
of  narrating  under  one  year  events  which  spread  over  several  years,  though 
perhaps  we  should  not  call  it  an  inconsistency,  for  he,  like  modern  scholars, 
found  the  narrative  so  constructed  that  it  was  impossible  to  separate  and 
make  definite  assignments  of  events. 

In  the  account  itself,  there  are  no  data  to  determine  what  the  source 
of  Tacitus  was.  As  I  stated  in  the  introduction,  the  Memoirs  of  Corbulo 
will  be  the  ultimate  source  of  all  accounts  dealing  with  his  campaigns. 
This  source  is  indicated  in  Tacitus  where,  in  giving  an  account  of  the  dis- 
pute between  Corbulo  and  Quadratus,  he  uses  the  expression:  testante 
contra  Corbulone.26  Again,  in  showing  that  the  situation  of  Paetus  at  the 
time  of  his  surrender  to  the  Parthians,  was  by  no  means  desperate,  he 
employs  the  phrase :  prodiderit  Corbulo. 27  Some  may  see  in  these  statements 
a  direct  reference  to  the  Memoirs  of  Corbulo,  but  that  does  not  necessarily 
follow.  They  simply  show  that  Corbulo  was  authority  for  the  statements 
given.  There  is  nothing  in  the  character  of  the  expressions  nor  in  the  way 
in  which  they  are  used,  to  preclude  their  having  been  employed  in  any 
writing  from  which  Tacitus  may  have  drawn. 

There  are  other  statements  not  so  definite  as  these,  and  which,  at  least, 
show  that  the  Memoirs  were  not  the  only  source.  Tacitus  might  have  used 
these  expressions  as  his  own  if  he  had  been  using  other  records  of  the  cam- 
paigns of  Corbulo.  They  are  expressions  such  as  are  found  in  any  writing 
of  a  historical  character  and  simply  point  to  what  is  generally  accepted, 
or  believed  about  a  thing  without  indicating  any  particular  author.  They 
are:   feruntque  mililem;28  aegre  compulsum  ferunt;29  addidit  rumor, 3°  and 

26  xiii.  9.  a8  xi.   18.  30  xv.  15. 

3?  xv.  16.  39  xv.   10. 


EXPOSITION  5 1 

satis  constitit  fuisse  in  eo  exercitu.31  Furthermore,  there  are  expres- 
sions which  Corbulo  would  never  have  used  in  his  Memoirs.  It  is  not  likely, 
for  example,  that  he  would  have  used  the  expressions  last  quoted  above 
for  his  knowledge  would  have  been  definite,  and  he  could  have  spoken 
with  positiveness.  When  Paetus  sent  to  him  for  aid  he  would  never  have 
given  as  an  excuse  for  not  hastening:  quo,  gliscentibus  periculis,  etiam  sub- 
sidii  laus  auger  etur.32  Nor  when  Tiridates  proposed  the  place  of  Paetus' 
defeat  as  a  place  of  meeting,  would  he  have  said:  Corbulo  non  vitavit,  ut 
dissimilitudo  fortunae  gloriam  augeret.33  I  have  already  referred  to  the 
excuse  given  for  the  destruction  of  Artaxata,  that  if  it  had  not  been  destroyed 
there  would  have  been  no  "glory"  in  having  taken  it.  It  is  unthinkable  to 
suppose  that  Corbulo  would  have  represented  himself  as  striving  after  glory 
simply  in  such  cases.  He  may  have  been  vain-glorious,  but  the  accounts 
of  him  in  Tacitus  and  Cassius  Dio  do  not  reveal  it  even  though  that  in 
Tacitus  represents  him  as  striving  after  glory.  I  think,  too,  that  Corbulo 
would  have  avoided  such  expressions  as  the  following:  verbis  magnificis 
et  super  experientiam  sapientiamque  etiam  specie  inanium  validus.34  I 
have  also  referred  to  places  where  Tacitus  expresses  dissent  from  his 
source,  or  where  he  uses  some  such  phrase  as  "adicitur,"  not  caring  to 
give  full  assent  to  the  statement  made.  The  cases  in  which  he  expresses 
disagreement  are  those  in  which  exaggeration  was  used:  for  example, 
that  of  the  punishment  of  the  two  soldiers  for  not  being  properly  armed 
when  working  in  the  trenches,  where  the  writer  wanted  to  show  the 
severity  of  the  leader  as  a  disciplinarian,  and  again  where  he  says  that 
certain  statements  were  made  to  exaggerate  the  infamy  of  Paetus  on  the 
occasion  of  his  defeat. 

Now  the  Memoirs  of  Corbulo  might  have  been  the  authority  for  Tacitus' 
statement:  contraque  prodiderit  Corbulo  Parthos  inopes  copiarum  et  pabulo 
attrito  relicturos  oppugnationem,  neque  se  plus  tridui  itinere  afuisse.35  But 
I  take  the  words  quae  ....  composita,  to  refer  to  all  that  precedes  in  chaps. 
15  and  16,  and  another  source  than  the  Memoirs  of  Corbulo  is  indicated 
in  the  words  addidit  rumor  of  chap.  15,  and  constitit  of  chap.  16.  The 
word  contra  also  indicates  this  as  it  shows  that  what  follows  is  given  distinctly 
on  the  authority  of  Corbulo. 

It  cannot  be  stated  whether  Tacitus  had  at  hand  the  Memoirs  of  Cor- 
bulo or  not.  If  he  had,  he  certainly  would  have  given  more  information 
in  regard  to  the  topography  and  chronology  which  Corbulo  must  have 
given  in  his  Memoirs.    Bruns  has  shown  that  Tacitus  characterizes  by 

31  xiii.  35.  33  xv.  28.  35  xv.    16. 

3*  xv.    10.  34  xiii.  8. 


52  A    STUDY   OF   CN.    DOMITIUS    CORBULO 

means  of  the  indirect  method,  but  we  have  seen  in  the  account  of  Corbulo 
that  elaborate,  direct  characterization  was  employed,  and  that  the  technique 
of  history  was  departed  from.  The  whole  account  has  a  distinct  encom- 
iastic treatment,  which  is  unique  in  the  historical  works  of  Tacitus,  and 
it  is  for  these  reasons  that  I  am  led  to  the  belief  that  he^employed  some 
encomiastic  biographical  account  as  his  source. 


THE  ACCOUNT  OF  CORBULO'S  CAMPAIGNS  IN 
CASSIUS  DIO 

Cassius  Dio1  gives  an  account  of  Corbulo's  campaign  against  the  Chauci 
in  which  he  says  that  Corbulo  united  the  armies  and  conquered  the  Chauci, 
but  that  when  Claudius  heard  of  his  success,  he  recalled  him  out  of  envy 
and  fear,  lest  a  private  citizen  by  his  successes,  should  become  too  promi- 
nent a  person.  Corbulo  obeyed,  saying  only:  2>  jua/capioi  oJ  7raAai  ttotI 
o-TpaT-qyrjcravTes.  However,  he  was  accorded  the  insignia  of  a  triumph, 
and  intrusted  with  an  army  which  he  set  to  digging  a  canal  between  the 
Rhine  and  the  Meuse.  Dio  makes  no  mention  of  the  personal  qualities 
of  Corbulo  and  his  power  as  a  disciplinarian.  He  omits  the  story  of  Gan- 
nascus  and  the  punishment  of  two  soldiers  for  not  being  properly  armed 
when  working  in  the  trenches.  The  account  in  Tacitus  eulogizes  Corbulo 
for  bringing  back  the  army  veterem  ad  morem.  Dio  says  of  him:  oTpaTrj- 
ywv  Ta  re  OTpaTevp-aTa  ovv€Kp0TrjO€,  Kal  twv  fiap/3dpo}v  dAAous  tc  kul  ov? 
CKaAow  Kav^ors  iK&Kwoe. 

An  elaborate  description  is  given  in  Tacitus  of  the  way  in  which  Corbulo 
was  received  when  he  went  to  take  charge  of  affairs  in  the  East;  of  the  pre- 
ference shown  him  by  the  natives;  of  the  demoralized  condition  of  the  army; 
of  the  strictness  of  discipline  in  the  severe  winter  quarters,  57-58  (?); 
and  of  the  heroic  figure  of  the  commander  conspicuous  in  the  midst  of  it 
all.  Dio  simply  states  that  Corbulo  brought  together  and  disciplined  the 
scattered,  demoralized  army;  that  he  filled  Vologeses  and  Tiridates  with 
fear;  and  that  he  did  these  things:  ofy  on  tw  yeVei  \ap,Trp6<;  r)  tw  aw/ua™ 

lo^ypos,  dAAa.  Kal  Trj  ^XV  o.pTicf>po)v  rjv,  Kal  wo\v  p.\v  to  avopeiov  7roA.i>  Se  Kal 
to  oiKaiov  to  tc  ttlo-tov  h  7ravTas  Kal  tovs  otKei'ous  Kai  tous  7roAeju,i'ovs  £tXcv- 
This  is  the  most  elaborate  personal  description,  if  we  may  call  it  elaborate, 
that  Dio  gives  of  Corbulo.  He  makes  no  mention  of  winter  quarters,  of 
negotiation  with  Vologeses,  or  the  capture  of  any  forts.  He  does  not  even 
mention  Volandum,  the  capture  of  which  is  so  elaborately  described  in 
Tacitus,  which  fact  strengthens  my  belief  that  it  was  a  place  of  no  great 
importance.  He  makes  no  mention  of  the  march  to  Artaxata,  but  simply 
states  that  Corbulo  took  the  city  without  a  struggle  and  destroyed  it.  He 
omits  all  reference  to  the  miraculum. 

The  account  of  the  march  from  Artaxata  to  Tigranocerta  is  substantially 
the  same  in  Dio  as  in  Tacitus,  but  is  made  briefer  by  omitting  all  personal 
1  Cassius  Dio  lx.  30;    lxii.  19-23. 

53 


54  A   STUDY   OF   CN.    DOMITIUS    CORBULO 

characterization  of  the  general.  If  anything  worth  mentioning  took  place 
between  the  surrender  of  Tigranocerta  and  the  establishment  of  Tigranes 
on  the  throne  in  that  place,  Dio  does  not  record  it.  He  gives  an  account 
of  the  efforts  of  Vologeses  to  overthrow  Tigranes,  which  agrees  with  the 
account  in  Tacitus,  so  far  as  facts  go,  but  omits  all  personal  characteriza- 
tion of  Corbulo. 

Vologeses,  at  a  later  time,  attacked  Tigranocerta.  Paetus  came  to  its 
relief,  but  was  driven  back  over  Mount  Taurus,  and  shut  up  in  a  place 
called  Rhandeia,  on  the  Arsanias  river.  Tacitus  does  not  give  the  name 
of  this  place.  According  to  Dio,  Paetus  could  have  held  out  against  the 
Parthians  had  he  not  been  a  coward,  for  the  enemy  was  without  heavy- 
armed  troops  and  provisions,  and  could  not  have  carried  on  a  siege.  But 
Paetus  sent  to  Vologeses  a  commission,  and  made  an  agreement  whereby 
the  Romans  were  to  give  up  Armenia.  The  Parthians  imposed  on  the 
Romans  the  task  of  bridging  the  Arsanias  as  a  token  of  their  defeat.  In 
the  meantime  Corbulo,  with  his  army,  had  reached  the  Euphrates  River 
where  he  awaited  Paetus.  Vologeses  sent  a  commission  to  Corbulo  to 
demand  the  withdrawal  of  the  Romans  from  beyond  the  Euphrates  to  which 
demand  Corbulo  agreed,  on  condition  that  the  Parthians  withdraw  from 
Armenia. 

Dio  omits  all  reference  to  the  strained  relations  between  Corbulo  and 
Paetus.  Tacitus  had  found  in  his  source  that  the  army  of  Paetus  was  sent 
under  the  yoke,  a  statement  which  he  doubted,  and  thought  was  added  to 
increase  the  disgrace  of  Paetus.  Dio  makes  no  allusion  to  such  a  thing, 
which,  I  think,  shows  that  Tacitus  was  following  an  author  who  blackened 
Paetus'  character  in  order  to  make  that  of  Corbulo  stand  out  more  con- 
spicuously. 

After  the  agreement  between  Corbulo  and  Vologeses  at  the  Euphrates 
River,  the  latter  sent  an  embassy  to  Nero,  but  it  returned  without  having 
accomplished  much.  Corbulo  was  again  placed  in  command  of  affairs  in 
Armenia,  and  openly  prepared  to  make  war  on  the  Parthians,  but  secretly 
advised  Vologeses  to  send  his  brother,  Tiridates,  to  Nero  to  seek  the  king- 
dom, which  he  did.  The  Romans  and  Parthians  met  to  adjudicate  matters 
at  Rhandeia,  as  that  place  was  acceptable  to  both:    tovto  yap  to  x<i>piov 

d/u.<pOT€/30is  r/peo-e,  tw  p.ev  on  airo\aft6vT€<i  es  avro  tovs  'Pw/Wovs  viroo-novtovs 
affrrjuav,  77-jOos  tv8ei$iv  o)v  cvrjpyerrjvTO  tw  8e  otl  tyjv  <5vo-/<A.€iav  T-qv  ev  avr<S 
■nporepov  crvp.f3a.o-av  <r<f>i(nv  airoTpiif/€(r6ai  tp.eXX.ov.  The  account  in  Tacitus 
makes  Corbulo  choose  this  place:  ut  dissimilitudo  fortunae  gloriam 
augeret.  But  this  is  in  keeping  with  the  author's  effort  to  show  that 
Corbulo  acquired  "glory."     I  think  we  have  the  correct  explanation  in  Dio. 


THE   ACCOUNT   OF   CORBULO  S   CAMPAIGNS   IN   CASSIUS   DIO         55 

The  account  of  the  erection  of  a  platform,  the  setting-up  of  an  image  of 
Nero,  and  the  removal  by  Vologeses  of  the  crown  from  his  own  head,  and 
placing  it  on  the  image,  is  substantially  the  same  in  both  authors,  but  in 
Tacitus  we  have  an  amplified  description  of  the  military  preparations 
made  by  Corbulo,  of  his  complete  success,  and  of  the  "glory"  he  acquired 
in  giving  a  banquet  to  his  wondering  guest. 

A  comparison  of  the  two  authors  will  show  that  so  far  as  facts  of  history 
go,  the  two  accounts  are  essentially  the  same.  It  is  true  that  what  we  have 
from  Dio  is  an  epitomized  account.  But  the  author  has  adhered  strictly 
to  the  technique  of  history,  while  in  Tacitus  we  have  the  same  historical 
facts  somewhat  amplified  with  the  addition  of  elaborate,  direct,  personal 
characterization. 


LOAN  DEPT. 


-imvr-mrrt^rn*^ 


IiD2lA-40w-8,,72 
(QU738l0)476-A-32 


General  Library    . 
University  of  California 
Berkeley 


ov-tr 


185' 


